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Abstract 
Finite state transition models such as State Machines (SMs) have become a 
prevalent paradigm for the description of dynamic systems. Such models are well-suited 
to modelling the behaviour of complex systems, including in conditions of failure, and 
where the order in which failures and fault events occur can affect the overall outcome 
(e.g. total failure of the system). For the safety assessment though, the SM failure 
behavioural models need to be converted to analysis models like Generalised Stochastic 
Petri Nets (GSPNs), Markov Chains (MCs) or Fault Trees (FTs). This is particularly 
important if the transformed models are supported by safety analysis tools. 
This thesis, firstly, identifies a number of problems encountered in current safety 
analysis techniques based on SMs. One of the existing approaches consists of 
transforming the SMs to analysis-supported state-transition formalisms like GSPNs or 
MCs, which are very powerful in capturing the dynamic aspects and in the evaluation of 
safety measures. But in this approach, qualitative analysis is not encouraged; here the 
focus is primarily on probabilistic analysis. Qualitative analysis is particularly important 
when probabilistic data are not available (e.g., at early stages of design). In an alternative 
approach though, the generation of combinatorial, Boolean FTs has been applied to SM-
based models. FTs are well-suited to qualitative analysis, but cannot capture the 
significance of the temporal order of events expressed by SMs. This makes the approach 
potentially error prone for the analysis of dynamic systems. In response, we propose a 
new SM-based safety analysis technique which converts SMs to Temporal Fault Trees 
(TFTs) using Pandora — a recent technique for introducing temporal logic to FTs. 
Pandora provides a set of temporal laws, which allow the significance of the SM temporal 
semantics to be preserved along the logical analysis, and thereby enabling a true 
qualitative analysis of a dynamic system. The thesis develops algorithms for conversion 
of SMs to TFTs. It also deals with the issue of scalability of the approach by proposing a 
form of compositional synthesis in which system large TFTs can be generated from 
individual component SMs using a process of composition. This has the dual benefits of 
allowing more accurate analysis of different sequences of faults, and also helping to 
reduce the cost of performing temporal analysis by producing smaller, more manageable 
TFTs via the compositionality.  
The thesis concludes that this approach can potentially address limitations of 
earlier work and thus help to improve the safety analysis of increasingly complex 
dynamic safety-critical systems. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Setting the scene: 
Sophisticated computerised distributed engineering systems become increasingly more 
prevalent. Yet our dependence on, for example, systems for transport, production plants 
or medical devices comes with a potential of harm should any of these systems fail. Such 
systems are commonly called safety-critical systems, and they also include power plants, 
air traffic control systems, spaceships and many other complex systems. 
Several definitions of the term safety appear in the literature. It is outlined by one 
of these as an extension of reliability (Avižienis et al., 2001), but from a standpoint of 
possible catastrophic failures
1
; and where reliability is defined as a measure of the 
continuous delivery of correct service. Thus, a system is in a safe state when it is in any 
state of correct service, or when it is in a state of incorrect service but due to non-
catastrophic failures. For example, an aircraft is in a safe state while it is correctly taxiing 
or flying; and the same applies as long as it is flying safely with one engine only due to a 
failure. In (Avižienis et al., 2001), reliability and safety are both defined as attributes of a 
wider scope concept called dependability. The dependability of a computing system can 
be defined as “the ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted”.  Avižienis 
(Avižienis et al., 2001) defines dependability as “the ability of a system to avoid failures 
that are more frequent or more severe, and outage durations that are longer, than is 
acceptable to the user(s)” where a user can be another interacting system. In general 
dependability is seen as an umbrella term that includes safety, reliability, availability, 
security and maintainability. 
A key objective in the design of safety-critical systems is the identification of 
potential hazards posed by such systems and the minimisation of the likelihood of these 
hazards. To achieve this, analysts need to understand how systems may fail by 
investigating potential causes and to estimate the probability of hazardous system 
failures, so that a system’s corresponding design can be adjusted with overall failure 
preventive measures which render the system safer — this process is known as safety 
analysis. The analysis can be qualitative by attempting to determine the necessary and 
                                                     
1
 For studies on basic dependability concepts, taxonomy of faults and fault tolerance, the reader is 
referred to (Laprie, 1985) and (Laprie, 1998) and (Avižienis et al., 2004). 
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sufficient causes, or combinations of such causes, that lead the system to a hazardous 
state. On the other hand, safety analysis can be quantitative and the objective is to 
estimate the probabilities of hazardous system failures from the estimated probabilities of 
component failures. Both types of analyses are often done using a Boolean combinatorial 
model called the fault tree (FT)
2
  — logical model which shows how low level failures 
logically combine and propagate to cause system failures. Although fault tree analysis has 
been proved to be a robust technique, the application of this technique is challenged by 
the dynamic nature of modern systems. Safety-critical systems indeed become 
increasingly dynamic, i.e. exhibit dynamic behaviour undergoing a plethora of mode and 
state transitions in the context of operation.  
A simple example of dynamic behaviour that has implications for safety analysis 
is given in Figure 1—1 (Mahmud, Papadopoulos, & Walker, 2010). The system 
illustrated in the figure represents a Primary-Standby (PS) redundant system. It is generic 
in the sense that components A (i.e. the primary) and B (i.e. the backup) can be any 
sensing, control or actuating device. S is a monitoring sensor whose role is to activate B 
upon detection of an output deviation from A (e.g. omission of output). I represents the 
input to the system – input to each of the two redundant components, and Out is the 
output of the system. Out must receive input from either A or B for the PS system to 
function.  
 
Figure 1—1. Simple example of a primary standby system 
 
This example system exhibits dynamic behaviour; for instance it can switch from primary 
component A to backup B during its operation — i.e., the state of the system moves from 
                                                     
2
 Direct acyclic graphs which represent how several logical combinations of component failures 
(events) lead a composed system to a total failure. Graphically, failure events are interconnected 
through Boolean gates, mainly conjunction (AND gates) and disjunction (OR gates), and as 
illustrated with an example later in this chapter. 
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state1 = [A active, B OFF] to state2 = [A failed, B ON]. This behaviour renders the 
system as fault tolerant since a failure of A can be tolerated without loss of system 
function. Looking at scenarios of system failure in more detail, we can observe that the 
supposedly fault tolerant system is not always fault tolerant. For instance, if the system is 
operating with its primary component but with a failed monitoring sensor, so it is in a 
state such as state3 = [A active, S failed, B OFF], then a failure of A will immediately 
cause a total failure of the PS example system (B will not be activated since S has already 
failed).  It is clear that the order of failure of A and S is important for the system, since 
the outcomes are so different when A fails before or after S. This creates implications for 
fault tree analysis, a technique unable to capture the ordering of events but also creates 
difficulties in the analysis of dynamics systems in general. We shall return to this 
example later on when we lay out in more detail the motivation of this work. 
For better capturing behaviour in dynamic systems, states-transition formalisms 
are increasingly being used within system design languages. Descriptions can be from a 
functional viewpoint – e.g. to show how an aircraft system moves from taxiing to flying 
mode, or from the viewpoint of representing possible dysfunctional aspects which 
degrade systems or cause total failure. This latter kind of dynamics’ aspects, from this 
point onwards, will be designated by the name of failure behaviour — behaviour of 
systems under failure conditions — and is a central issue in this thesis. Recently proposed 
system description languages which incorporate states-transitions formalisms for 
describing dynamic behaviour include but are not limited to: 
 
(1) AltaRica3 — a formal verification technique, which has demonstrated its value in 
formally specifying the behaviour of complex systems when faults occur 
(Griffault A. , 2003). The language underlying formalism is a state-transition 
based system (Rauzy, 2002). 
(2) FSAP/NuSMV-SA4 — a Formal Safety Analysis Platform equipped with a model 
checker, i.e. NuSMV, for Safety Analysis. Like AltaRica, and formal verification 
                                                     
3
 The language AltaRica was issued in 1996 from an industrial collaboration with an academic and 
research institution – LABRI (Laboratoire Bordelais de Recherche en Informatique). For 
methodological studies on AltaRica, the reader is referred to (Arnold et al., 2005). 
4
 FSAP/NuSMV has also been developed in collaboration between research institutions with 
industry. This was under the auspices of the Enhanced Safety Assessment for Complex Systems 
(ESACS) European project. For methodological studies on the NuSMV model checker, the reader 
is referred to (Cavada et al., 1998). 
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techniques in general, this language has the potential of dealing with complex 
behavioural aspects of dynamic systems. FASP/NuSMV descriptions have a 
state-transition based representation (Bozzano & Villafiorita, 2003). 
(3) AADL5 — an Architecture Analysis and Design Language intended to be the 
aerospace standard. This description system has also a state-transition formalism 
for modelling the behaviour of systems
6
, including in conditions of failure (Feiler 
& Rugina, 2007). 
Furthermore, representations such as Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPNs) and 
Markov Chains (MCs) are also state-transition formalisms. It is emphasised, however, in 
[(Codetta-Raiteri, 2005), (Rugina, 2007) and (Walker, 2009)] that GSPNs and MCs have 
demonstrated their importance in quantitative analysis (i.e. to compute probabilistic 
measures of failures);  in addition, these models present rather low-level formalisms 
(Rauzy, 2002) – higher level descriptions are often converted into GSPNs and MCs for 
quantitative analysis, and thus these models are not well suited to capture complex 
systems’ dynamics, and whose representations often need to be abstracted. 
In (Papadopoulos Y. , 2000) for instance, it is emphasised that complex system  
behaviour can rather be expressed as a hierarchy of State Machines (SMs) or mode 
charts
7
, in order to break the corresponding description down into smaller streamlined 
constituents – an abstract state represents a set of states at a lower level of the hierarchy. 
Furthermore, we find the SM abstraction concept in AADL as well; a SM representation 
of the failure behaviour of a component can also represent its subcomponents in the 
                                                     
5
 AADL has been developed under the auspices of the International Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE) – Avionics Systems Division (ASD). For studies on architectural (and 
behavioural) descriptions, the reader is referred to (Feiler et al, 2006). For studies on dependability 
modeling and error annex, the reader is referred to (Feiler & Rugina, 2007) and (AADL-
Committee-As2cAnnexE, 2006), respectively.  
6
 See the behaviour annex in (AADL-Subcommittee, 2007) and (Gaufillet et al, 2006). 
7
 A mode being defined in (Papadopoulos, 2000) as an abstract functional state in which the 
system maintains a stable functional profile – e.g. a flying mode for an aircraft is the set of states in 
which the system maintains a stable flying profile. Thus, a system’s dynamic behaviour is 
expressed as a set of different functional states (i.e. a set of modes) plus a set of modes’ transitions. 
Degraded modes are those where there is partial loss of functionality, but in which the system is 
still operational. Failed modes are those in which there is total loss of the intended functionality, 
and thus rendering the situation hazardous. 
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presence of failures as an abstraction (Feiler & Rugina, 2007). Therefore, SMs are an 
expressive, high-level form of representation well-suited for modelling the nominal as 
well as the failure behaviour of safety-critical systems; the nominal behaviour of a system 
is collectively known as the behaviour of the system without failure conditions.  
This thesis aims to improve dynamic safety analysis, and the emphasis is 
therefore placed on descriptions of failure behaviour. Such descriptions have in the past 
provided input for safety analysis in techniques for example where state automata 
describing failure behaviour have been converted into analysis models — e.g., GSPNs, 
MCs or FTs.   
The SM of Figure 1—2 for instance (originally used in Mahmud, Papadopoulos, 
& Walker, 2010) represents the failure behaviour of the primary-standby example system 
introduced earlier. This SM depicts the significance of the temporal sequencing of 
failures.  
 
 
Figure 1—2. Failure behaviour SM of the PS example system 
 
For instance, the sequences [A fails before B] or [B fails before A] both lead the system 
to a total failure; hence the temporal order is insignificant in this case. On the other hand 
the sequence [S fails before A] leads to total failure, while [S fails after A] does not cause 
a failure and therefore is not represented in the SM. If the SM was to be converted in a 
model suitable for safety analysis (for example a fault tree), then for the accuracy of 
results it would be important to preserve the significance of the temporal ordering so that 
only one sequence [S fails before A] is accounted as cause of system failure. 
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1.2 Research Motivation 
One attempt to perform safety analysis on systems modelled with SMs went through 
transforming their descriptions into GSPNs or MCs. However, this was limited to 
quantitative analysis as identified earlier in [(Codetta-Raiteri, 2005) and (Rugina, 2007)], 
and noted in (Walker, 2009) as well. For instance in (Rugina, 2007), this has been applied 
to AADL models (effectively SMs) by transforming these to GSPNs. This was automated 
using a transformation tool called ADAPT
8
 (from AADL Architectural models to 
stochastic Petri nets through model Transformation). The tool interfaces from the AADL 
side with OSATE
9
 (an Open Source AADL Tool Environment) and, from the GSPN side, 
with a dependability evaluation tool Surf-2 (Béounes et al., 1993). 
However, performing a qualitative analysis before quantification appears to be 
beneficial. A central issue is that qualitative analysis can be applied to early models of 
system design, and where no probabilistic data are available; and then analysis models 
(e.g., FTs) can be interpreted stochastically to perform probabilistic analysis when failure 
data becomes available, e.g. in the refined models. Another central issue which favours a 
prior qualitative analysis is that removing redundancies, or insignificant component 
failures — those which are irrelevant to a system failure behaviour — can make 
quantitative analysis more tractable. Something else again which recommends a prior 
qualitative analysis is that Boolean model assessment tools are much more efficient than 
those of state-transition models (Rauzy, 2002). 
One of the premier and rigorous analysis techniques with an underlying Boolean 
formalism is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
10
. FTA has demonstrated its value in a variety of 
contexts over the years
11
, and it is still widely practised in reliability engineering (and in 
many safety-critical industries such as automotive, aerospace and nuclear). Besides, FTA 
is employed in conjunction with influential formal languages – e.g. qualification of 
AltaRica modelling and analysis platform [with a computer performed generation of fault 
                                                     
8
 For details on the tool, the reader is referred to (Rugina et al., 2008). 
9
 http://www.aadl.info/aadl/currentsite/tool/toolsets.html#OSATE 
10
 For studies on the technique, the reader is referred to the fault tree handbook in (Vesely, 1981). 
11
 In the aerospace industry for instance, FTA has been recognised as a significant system safety 
analysis technique since 1963 (Ericson, 1999). 
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tree exhaustive Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs)
12
] as a validation tool
13
, as well as its use (FTA 
capability within AltaRica) as part of several aerospace projects on, for instance, Airbus 
civil aircraft programs (Pouzolz, 2010). As for FTA employment with recent Architecture 
Description Languages (ADLs), several research efforts have been directed towards using 
the technique to analyse complex systems by automatically generating fault trees from 
models like in AADL (Joshi et al., 2007). 
FTA postulates a catastrophic situation (i.e. a hazard or top event in the fault tree 
vocabulary) which must be avoided. It then reasons backward to identify all scenarios
14
 
which could conduct the system to that hazard. It thus deduces a hazard cause, or 
contributory causes (i.e. their logical combinations), and a cause can be for instance an 
initiating failure of a component of the system under analysis. FTA can be qualitative by 
attempting to minimise the deduced cause combinations, i.e. reducing them to logical 
expressions that consist of the necessary failures, and which are sufficient to cause the 
hazard. The technique can also be quantitative by combining figures for component 
failure rates to calculate overall probabilities of system hazards.  
For instance, performing FTA on the PS example system of Figure 1—1 will 
yield the below results, where each is a necessary and sufficient cause, or combination of 
causes, for the system to fail as a whole.  
(1) Omission of Input at I (O-I) 
(2) Both A and B fail 
(3) Both A and S fail (as B will not be activated) 
Thus, these results are called Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) of the fault tree – i.e. 
disjunction of branches individually leading the system to the top event, and which are 
graphically represented in Figure 1—3 – i.e. fault tree of the fault tolerant example 
                                                     
12
 A MCS is a conjunct of the necessary and sufficient individual component failures which cause 
a system hazard, and as illustrated later in this section. 
13
 AltaRica has been used in a certification process, and in a first industrial application of Model 
Based Safety Analysis (MBSA), with Dassault aviation in 2007. For further details about AltaRica 
employment in recent industrial projects, the reader is referred to (Pouzolz, 2010) and (Bernard & 
Pouzolz, 2010). 
14
 Causal relationships branches of the fault tree. 
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system. Failures A, B, S and O-I are circled
15
 which means they are basic or initiating 
events (i.e. they cannot be further developed). The gate in the centre, which is used twice, 
is the logical AND gate and the one above is the logical OR gate. The fault tree top event 
is the total failure of the PS example system. 
 
 
Figure 1—3. Fault tree16 of the PS example 
 
O-I is a single point of failure (a one-event MCS), and the two other analysis results are 
also minimal logical combinations of initiating failures of individual components. 
MCS (3) [rightmost branch: both A and S fail], however, does not appear to be an 
accurate analysis result: the appearing conjunct will lead the system to a total failure only 
if S fails before A, and which means that S will be unable to activate backup B upon 
omission of output from A (since it has already failed). But, if S fails after A then it has 
already served its purpose and activated B; thus the failure conjunct will not be a 
sufficient combination of causes to fail the system as a whole, rendering hence MCS (3) 
unduly pessimistic. This example shows, therefore, that a fault tree model is not able to 
cope accurately with systems exhibiting dynamic behaviour; and thus performing analysis 
on such models will put the obtained results in doubt. These can be dangerously 
erroneous such as the case of an optimistic analysis result (e.g. where a system fails when 
                                                     
15
 A, B and S are abbreviations for ‘A failure’, ‘B failure’ and ‘S failure’, respectively. 
16
 Although shading is meaningless in a fault tree model; the purpose is to distinguish MCS (3) i.e. 
[A and S fail] from MCS (2) in the centre of the tree, and in term of the significance of the 
temporal order of failures. 
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in fact this wasn’t predicted), rather than an unduly pessimistic result (a system predicted 
to fail but it hasn’t e.g. the PS example system). The sequence [S fails before A] is a 
significant temporal order of failures for the example system; hence it needs to be 
expressed accurately in the analysis model as a sufficient failure cause. Therefore, there is 
a need to extend fault trees with, at least for the case presented in this example, a 
modelling capability to express that two failures should occur, but one before another in 
order to cause a total failure. 
This modelling shortage (and any consequent analysis results with the 
corresponding repercussions on the design) is due to, at the origin, the nature of ‘pure’ 
Boolean logic based combinatorial models e.g. conventional fault trees which from this 
point onwards we will call static
17
 fault trees. This poses a significant problem when it 
comes to analyse dynamic systems, and where it is imperative to preserve the significance 
of such dynamic aspects throughout the analysis. 
To compensate this shortage, there have been many important attempts to 
increment the modelling capacity of fault trees, and thence to bridge the gap between 
FTA modelling tools and the systems being modelled. One of these is the State-Event 
Fault Tree (SEFT). It is designed to extend the static fault tree with representation 
capacities for states and events (Kaiser et al., 2007). It, therefore, allows a better 
capturing of systems state-based descriptions by the analysis model, and hence easily 
preserving the significance of the sequence-dependant behaviour (which is typically 
associated with fault tolerant systems). A limitation in using SEFTs as analysis models, 
however, is that these are not designed for qualitative analysis; they are more suitable for 
quantitative analysis instead. This is by converting them to other state-transition 
formalisms such as GSPNs or MCs, and to be then passed to assessment tools e.g. Surf-2 
(Béounes et al., 1993) from the GSPN side, or a Markov chain generation algorithm 
(Vesely et al., 2002) depending on the formalism chosen. 
Another attempt in extending fault trees is the Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT). This 
one adds dynamic gates to the static fault tree (Vesely et al., 2002). The added ingredients 
allow a more accurate representation of systems where the order in which events occur 
affects the outcome. The priority AND gate, for instance, and whose output evaluates to 
true if all of its input events occur on a one-at-a-time basis (one failure occurs before 
another), solves the problem found in the fault tree of Figure 1—3. This added gate 
                                                     
17
 Its use is more expressive in this thesis, since fault trees capture only the ‘static’ aspects of 
dynamic systems. 
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represents well a much better alternative to the rightmost branch of the fault tree – i.e. 
MCS (3), such that the ordered sequence [S fails before A] leads the system to a total 
failure (but not necessarily the inverse). However, and like SEFTs, DFTs are also 
designed for quantitative analysis. The DFT methodology
18
 was introduced to provide a 
Markov analysis of fault trees (Vesely et al., 2002), fault trees being extended with 
dynamic gates (hence becoming DFTs) to capture the significance of the temporal 
sequencing of events, and thereby making it possible to automatically generate the 
equivalent Markov models, and without a loss of the event-order semantics. As regards 
the Markov models, however, despite their straightforward representation of the 
sequence-dependant behaviour in systems, they have their own known flaws (Vesely et 
al., 2002). They grow easily large and cumbersome, and thus impractical for large 
systems
19
. 
An attempt to overcome this weakness in a solution of a Markov model
20
 is to 
provide modular DFT analysis for a system. This means if a system-level fault tree can be 
divided into independent modules (effectively individual branches leading the system, on 
their own, to the top event), and if these can be solved separately (through analysis of 
their corresponding Markov models), then the corresponding results can be combined to 
achieve a full analysis (Vesely et al., 2002). However, even for a simple example DFT — 
for a Vehicle Management System (VMS)
21
 with just three components mainly (depicted 
by Figure 1—4), the Markov model is complex and presents several redundant paths. In 
the VMS example, each one of the three vehicle management components A, B and C is 
sharing the same spare S with the other components, and through its corresponding Warm 
SPare gate (WSP)
22
. If a component fails, then S (if it has not already failed and is 
available) is supposed to take over that failed component’s job. 
                                                     
18
 The analysis technique performed on a DFT model. 
19
 The number of states and transitions in a Markov model grows exponentially with the number of 
components in the modelled system (Vesely et al., 2002). 
20
 Some quantitative assessments may pass through higher level formalisms (e.g. GSPN) for a 
following Markov analysis (Rugina, 2007). But, these will also end up being confronted with the 
disadvantage of a Markov model (state explosion). 
21
 The original version of the DFT (and the corresponding Markov model) can be found in (Vesely 
et al., 2002). 
22
 A warm spare has a reduced failure rate before being switched into active use. The other types 
of spares are cold (do not fail dormant) and hot (maintain their same failure rates) (Vesely et al., 
2002). 
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Figure 1—4. An example DFT for VMS revised from (Vesely et al., 2002) 
 
For the example system to fail as whole, it is sufficient that one of the two DFT 
disjunction branches results in the top event, e.g. (i) the single WSP branch (rightmost 
one) evaluates to true, which means that C fails and cannot be replaced by S (e.g. S has 
failed, or is already replacing either A or B whichever has failed), or C has been replaced 
by S which has failed in its turn afterwards.  Alternatively, and for a total failure situation, 
it is also sufficient that (ii) the WSP conjunct branch (leftmost one) evaluates to true, and 
which means that A and B fail together, but none of these can be replaced by S (S has 
already failed, or is replacing C in response to a corresponding failure); or simply S is 
already replacing either A or B (whichever failed first), but S has failed in its turn 
afterwards. 
The conversion of a DFT to an equivalent Markov model starts from a state 
where all the system components are operational, then repeatedly generates a set of target 
states (and associated transitions) by considering the effect of failure of every component. 
The same applies to every new state by considering the effects of the remaining failures 
(not already treated in a same path from the initial state). Any new state can be either an 
operational or a failed state. The former means that the system is still functioning, despite 
some component failures. The latter is a state of a total failure of the system. The type of 
a state (operational or failed) is determined by being checked against the fault tree. 
For the fault tree of the given VMS example, its equivalent Markov model is 
depicted by Figure 1—5 (for clarity, state transitions are shown labelled with individual 
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component failures, rather than failure rates). States are labelled with three consecutive 
symbols linked to the components A, B and C (in this order). Each symbol represents the 
status of its corresponding component, for instance, the first symbol can be A (component 
A is functioning), S (component A is failed but S has taken over), or X (component A is 
severely failed, meaning that S is also failed or is not available to take over). Therefore if 
a state is labelled with e.g. SBX, this means that the VMS system is in a state where A 
has failed and then switched to spare S, B is functioning and C, however, is severely 
failed (S is no longer available to take over since it is already replacing A). This state i.e. 
SBX (when checked against the DFT) is a state of a total failure of the system; in Figure 
1—4, a severe failure of C – without a possibility to switch to S – is sufficient to cause 
the top event. To be in this specific state, A has to fail first (S takes over) and C fails 
afterwards. A reversed order of these failures has a clearly different effect on the system, 
such that C fails first (then a switch to S) and A fails afterwards (severe failure of A since 
S is no longer available), but the system can still operate in the state XBS – the DFT 
shows that also B has to severely fail, so that the AND gate delivers an output which 
evaluates to true, hence the top event of the fault tree. 
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Figure 1—5. Markov model for the DFT of VMS example 
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Markov models are solved using ordinary differential equations (Vesely et al., 
2002), with one time-dependant probability associated with each state (which represents 
the probability that the system is in that state) and states are mutually exclusive. 
However, like the Markov model in Figure 1—5 which corresponds to a relatively small 
example system, these models are in general complex with a considerable size. Though, 
in this thesis, we also discuss a possibility for optimising them such that the quantitative 
results that correspond to the total failures are preserved.  
An alternative representation of the VMS failure behaviour can be an abstraction 
like the SM model of Figure 1—6, and rather than analysing it using standard fault trees 
(like in Joshi et al., 2007 and Rauzy, 2002) we will show later in this thesis that we can 
also automatically detect the sequence-dependent failure behaviour, and thereby 
producing the combinations/sequences of events leading to a complete failure of the 
system (like those in the right-hand side of the figure). Thereafter, these can be analysed 
quantitatively, e.g., based on the work in (Merle, 2010) or the quantitative developments
23
 
of the work in (Walker M., 2009).  
 
  
Figure 1—6. Reduced representation for the VMS failure behaviour 
 
This figure
24
 shows that the order of failures of any of the two components A or B is only 
relevant to the system failure behaviour with respect to an occurrence of a failure of the 
component C. If C fails before any possible failures of the two (A or B) – i.e. transition to 
state ABS, then all it takes (for a total failure) is either an S failure on its own (and 
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 At the time of writing this thesis, an extension of the work in (Walker M., 2009) with 
quantitative analysis capabilities is undertaken at the University of Hull. 
24
 The transition labels in the figure are abbreviations of component failures, e.g., ‘A’ means ‘A 
fails’…etc. 
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irrespective of its order with failure of C), or both A and B failing afterwards (S is not 
available), and in any order between them
25
. Otherwise, if anyone of A or B fails before C 
(the system is in the states SBC or ASC, respectively, when C fails), then this is sufficient 
to cause a total failure, on its own, since S will not be available to take over C. But if C 
does not fail at all, then failures of all the other components (including S, and irrespective 
of their orders) become necessary to completely fail this example of VMS. 
To summarise, we have outlined through the previous examples two important 
problems in current safety analysis approaches to systems exhibiting dynamic behaviour. 
The first problem appears in approaches which convert SMs into static fault trees for the 
purposes of analysis
26
 and which are not always suitable for dynamic systems.  
Qualitative analysis is based on logic manipulations of Boolean equations and, therefore, 
the temporal semantics are lost during the assessment, and this can have undesired 
repercussions which affect the quantitative results afterwards. 
The second highlighted problem appears in approaches which though applicable 
to dynamic systems (e.g. using analysis models such as SEFTs, DFTs or GSPNs) enable 
mainly quantitative (probabilistic) assessments and not useful qualitative analyses in the 
absence of probabilistic data about failures. 
 
1.3 Research Hypothesis and Potential Solution 
In this thesis, it is speculated that we can analyse non-repairable systems represented as 
state-automata qualitatively as well as quantitatively, and without any loss of the event-
order significance throughout the analysis and that this analysis can in principle be done 
in a way that can be applied in large systems. Note that this has not been achieved before 
and therefore represents an original contribution to literature in safety analysis of 
dynamic systems. 
The approach, we propose, allows both qualitative temporal analysis and 
probabilistic assessments. The analysis is performed on dynamic system models 
                                                     
25
 In this case (after a failure of C), the representation of a B transition before A is redundant and 
thus irrelevant to the system failure behaviour (i.e. if B fails before a failure of A then, when A 
fails, there will be two instantaneous transitions to the final state ‘SystemFailure’).  
Similarly, the failure-order between S and C is as irrelevant as the failure-order between S, A and 
B (it is only important to consider the failure-order of C vis-à-vis anyone of A or B). 
26
 It rather encourages a prior qualitative analysis and enables following formal assessments 
throughout the calculation of probabilistic measures (quantitative analysis). 
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represented as acyclic SMs which are converted to Temporal Fault Trees (TFTs) in a 
Pandora
27
 style (Walker & Papadopoulos, 2006). Pandora is a recent technique of the 
University of Hull which augments fault trees with temporal information and enables 
qualitative analysis of that information. 
The proposed approach intends to bridge the gap between (1) Boolean-based 
qualitative analysis (e.g. FTA) and (2) quantitative-only analysis approaches (e.g. Markov 
solutions for GSPNs, SEFTs or DFTs), by presenting a solution which is primarily 
twofold.  
First, in this thesis we demonstrate the feasibility, and technical applicability, of 
an automatic generation of Pandora TFTs from SM descriptions of systems which allows 
the preservation of the significance of the temporal semantics expressed by SMs in the 
analysis models. For this, we develop an algorithm characterised by its quadratic growth 
with the number of full paths (from the initial state to the final states) in the SM model. 
The generated TFTs are processed through a set of Pandora temporal logic rules, to result 
in the relevant minimal sequences of events which cause a system total failure —  i.e., the 
results of qualitative temporal analysis.  
The second element of the approach is a compositional algorithm for constructing 
large system TFTs from the smaller TFTs of its constituents. Large systems are typically 
described using smaller models of dynamic behaviour for components. The safety 
analysis of such systems also demands a compositional approach that can grow and still 
deliver results as systems grow large in scale and complexity.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This first aim of the thesis is to develop an approach that satisfies the hypothesis and it is 
generic in nature and therefore potentially applicable to any description language that 
uses a state-transition representation for describing behaviour. Thus, it should be possible 
to apply this approach to systems described for instance in AltaRica, AADL and EAST-
ADL
28
 (Freund et al., 2003). A second aim is to develop an approach that can in principle 
                                                     
27
 Pandora means the time, i.e. ORA ([ώρα] in Greek), of the Priority-AND (PAND) gate. 
28
 The acronym EAST-ADL means Electronic Architecture through Software Technology, 
Architecture Description Language (we particularly mean EAST-ADL2, i.e. the second version of 
the language specifications). The language is directed to the automotive industry, and is intended 
to incorporate state semantics in its domain model. 
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be automated and in the future incorporated within an automated safety analysis 
technique like HiP-HOPS
29
 (Papadopoulos, 2000). This would mean enabling TFTs, i.e. 
the automatically generated Pandora failure logic from systems SMs, to be synthesised 
and analysed within HiP-HOPS. In turn, this would enable taking advantage of further 
capabilities of this tool. HiP-HOPS is also a dependability versus cost architecture 
optimisation technique (Parker, 2010). The tool is characterised by its flexibility and its 
wider scope of application. It has demonstrated its values in analysing (and optimising 
architectures of) systems described using several languages, e.g. SimulationX models for 
marine systems (Papadopoulos et al., 2003), Matlab-Simulink models (Papadopoulos et 
al., 2001) and, most recently, EAST-ADL2 models for automotive systems (Biehl et al., 
2010). 
The verification of the hypothesis and achievement of the aims above relies on 
meeting two principal objectives. The first one is an automatic generation of Pandora 
TFTs from SM models of systems. A key requirement is that the generation algorithm 
detects the sets of events of which the order is relevant to the system failure behaviour as 
opposed to those sets in which order is unimportant. A second key requirement is an 
algorithm which is practically possible in term of complexity and computational expense.  
In summary, the first objective is an applicable approach to perform a 
temporal safety analysis which is suitable for complex dynamic systems, 
and whose behavioural aspects are represented using SMs (or generally, 
state-transition descriptions). 
The second objective is to improve the scalability of the approach by enabling the 
compositional synthesis of large system TFTs from the individual component SMs. The 
idea here is to apply the proposed algorithm on component SMs, and then having 
generated local TFTs minimised wherever possible, to proceed and synthesise system 
TFTs via a process of composition.  
In summary, the second objective is an approach to compositional 
synthesis of system TFTs from the SMs of the components of the system. 
                                                     
29
 The acronym HiP-HOPS means Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
Studies and, in (Papadopoulos, 2000), a state-transition formalism (modes and modes’ transitions) 
is suggested to be used for the description of systems with dynamic behaviour. 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
The structure of the thesis is illustrated in Figure 1—7.  
 
Figure 1—7. Organization of the thesis
Analysis System models 
Qualitative temporal 
analysis 
Analysis-related 
descriptions 
Analysis models 
Pandora FTs  SMs 
Chapter 3: 
Pandora 
Chapter 4: 
Compilation of SMs into Pandora equations 
Chapter 5: 
Compositional synthesis of Pandora FTs from SMs 
Chapter 6:  
Case study 
Chapter 2: 
Approaches to safety analysis 
(static vs. dynamic) 
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Chapter 2 consists of a literature review on contemporary safety analysis approaches with 
an emphasis on automated safety analysis techniques, like AltaRica and HiP-HOPS, as 
well as some dynamic analysis approaches like those based on SEFTs, DFTs and AADL 
models. In chapter 3, we continue the literature review with a presentation of the Pandora 
qualitative temporal analysis technique and in chapter 4, we present our approach for an 
automatic generation of Pandora TFTs from SM models of systems. Chapter 5 presents 
our method to improve the scalability of our approach through a compositional synthesis 
of system TFTs that is applicable to hierarchical state automata. In chapter 6, we apply 
the technique on the brake-by-wire case study and, finally, we present our conclusion in 
chapter 7 by discussing the contributions, improvements and future works.   
 
1.6 Publications 
The automatic generation of TFTs from SM models of systems, presented in chapter 4, 
was outlined in (Mahmud, Papadopoulos & Walker, 2010) and published in the 
proceedings of the 40
th
 annual IEEE/IFIP international conference on Dependable 
Systems and Networks
30
 (DSN 2010).  
The algorithm which generates the TFTs has been formalised and presented 
together with an approach for the compositional synthesis of TFTs from SMs in 
(Mahmud, Walker, & Papadopoulos, 2011). The latter has been published in the 
proceedings of the sixth international conference on Availability, Reliability and Security 
(ARES 2011), and presented at the second workshop and tool session on DYnamic 
Aspects in DEpendability Models for Fault-Tolerant Systems (DYADEM-FTS).  
A journal extension of the latter paper has been published into a special issue of 
the ACM Performance Evaluation Review (PER) on Modelling Dynamic Behaviours of 
Complex Distributed Systems (Mahmud, Walker, & Papadopoulos, 2012). 
On another note, some safety analysis techniques which are detailed in the 
literature review are discussed in deliverables of the European project ATESST2 
(Advancing Traffic Efficiency and Safety through Software Technology second phase). 
For example, a review of relevant safety analysis techniques can be found in (Walker, 
Mahmud, Papadopoulos et al., 2010), and (Törngren, Walker, Papadopoulos, Mahmud et 
al., 2008). 
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 This was in the framework of the Proactive Failure Avoidance, Recovery and Maintenance 
(PFARM) workshop. 
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2 Approaches to safety analysis  
According to Laprie (1992) safety is seen as an attribute of dependability, and this is 
compatible with the concepts’ definitions presented in the introduction. Laprie (1992) 
defines dependability to be: “Trustworthiness of a system such that reliance can 
justifiably be placed on the service it delivers”. The service being the behaviour of the 
system as it is perceived by its interacting human(s) or other system(s), and a system 
failure occurs when the delivered service deviates from fulfilling what the system is 
intended for (i.e. the system function). Safety is, therefore, concerned with the non-
occurrence of catastrophic failure consequences on the environment. Examination of 
systems to understand how they can fail with the determination of frequencies of possible 
failures lead to safety analysis. Such assessments typically provide, in return, a useful 
resource in the design of failure mitigation mechanisms.  
The range of existing safety analysis techniques in research literature and in use 
in industrial practice is enormous. In this chapter, we explore safety analysis through a 
comprehensive review of the relevant literature. We study different approaches to safety 
analysis and identify the corresponding pros and cons. The results from this study 
provide: (a) a more refined view of the problem to address (and its derivatives) and (b) a 
classification of the relevant safety analysis techniques including the work presented in 
this thesis. 
This chapter begins with a presentation of relevant classical safety analysis 
techniques, and by using the term ‘classical’ we mean a number of the foremost analysis 
techniques, though, still well-established in the safety domain. These include Functional 
Hazard Analysis (FHA) (ARP4761, 1996), Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
(PSSA) which is also described in (ARP4761, 1996), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Vesely 
W. E., 1981) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [(ANSI/IEEE-Std.352, 
1987) and (Rausand & Høyland, 2004)].  
The remaining part of the chapter presents a classification (of some relevant 
analysis techniques) into two main categories: static and dynamic approaches to safety 
analysis. The former includes, e.g., Failure Propagation & Transformation Notation 
(FPTN) (Fenelon & McDermid, 1993), Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and 
Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) (Papadopoulos Y. , 2000) and Component Fault Trees 
(CFTs) (Kaiser et al., 2003). The section of dynamic approaches includes fault injection 
and simulation techniques such as Altarica [(Griffault et al., 1999) and (Bieber et al., 
2002)], the Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis technique (DCCA) [(Güdemann et 
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al., 2007) and (Ortmeier et al., 2005)], Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) (Dugan et al., 2000), 
Markov analysis (Trivedi, 2001), State Event Fault Trees (SEFTs) (Grunske et al., 2005) 
and stochastic analysis of models described using the Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language (AADL) (Rugina A. , 2007). 
 
2.1 Classical safety analysis techniques 
Safety analysis typically starts early in the development cycle of a system. This usually 
means, given a set of desired functions, safety analysis starts taking place when a decision 
has been made to develop a system that is able to fulfil these functions. To illustrate the 
integration of safety with the design, Figure 2—1 (adapted from the ARP 476131 related 
to the aerospace industry) represents typical design activities associated with the 
corresponding safety tasks.  
We observe in the Figure 2—1 that a safety technique called Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA) takes place first. Starting from the aircraft level, FHA attempts to 
identify failure conditions that are associated with the aircraft functions. The technique 
proceeds during the activities ‘Concept Development’ and the ‘Allocation of Aircraft 
Functions to Systems’ of an aircraft design lifecycle. These are preliminary activities 
preceding more refined design descriptions and that take place when there is primarily a 
functional focus
32
 — i.e., no physical realization has yet been decided. 
Before we discuss the relevant safety techniques in more detail, we wish to note 
that design and safety analysis practitioners in different industries (like aerospace, 
automotive and railway) may use closely related (and sometimes different terminologies 
for the same) safety techniques. For example, sometimes in the literature FHA can be 
substituted with an improved version known as Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) 
[(Papadopoulos et al., 1999), (Papadopoulos Y. , 2000) and (Johannessen et al., 2001)]. 
Similarly, FFA is used to identify safety hazards in a conceptual design of a system. It 
extends FHA to include, e.g., failure classes such as (but not limited to) 
omission/commission of service provision or early/late delivery of output.  
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 The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standard for the Aerospace Recommendation 
Practice (ARP 4761). 
32
 Emphasis is rather put on the functions of a system including the identification of safety 
requirements that need to be addressed. 
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Figure 2—1. (a) Fragment of a Safety Assessment Process alongside (b) a Typical 
System Development Cycle (Fragments adapted from ARP 4761) 
 
Moreover, Pumfrey (1999) has noted that in the automotive industry FFA can be referred 
to as FMEA (i.e., establishment of direct relationships from causes to effects of failure). 
However, it is often omitted in the corresponding literature to mention that a specific kind 
of FMEA (a predictive
33
 FMEA) that is being used to indicate the same technique as 
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 It starts from hypothetical failure modes to assess the corresponding effects. It takes place in the 
early stages of the design lifecycle. 
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FFA. The other kind of FMEA starts from known
34
 rather hypothetical failure modes, and 
thus the latter is different from the FFA technique. 
Let’s now present the big picture of an integration of some relevant safety tasks 
within a system design lifecycle. Figure 2—1, for instance, depicts the process for an 
aircraft typical development cycle. But apart from the aircraft specificities, the figure 
represents a typical association (and irrespective of the type of industry
35
) of a lifecycle 
activities with the relevant safety tasks. The shown top level displays the design activities 
and the safety tasks undertaken when the concerns are predominantly functional — 
during concept development in the figure. The design engineer builds a formal model of 
the aircraft functions and operations architecture. The safety engineer, on the other hand, 
extends the architecture with descriptions of failure e.g. a failure propagation model 
(FPM
36
), i.e., functional failure modes. Nonetheless, the common underlying basis is the 
functional and safety requirements identified in the aircraft level FHA/PASA. The latter 
(i.e., PASA), which is used in the aerospace industry, is a preliminary aircraft safety 
assessment technique. It is used to evaluate a proposed architecture based on the FHA 
(and severity classification
37
 of failure conditions) and derive safety requirements.  
Table 2—1 illustrates an example of an aircraft FHA. The function to, e.g., 
decelerate an aircraft on the ground can fail while the aircraft is either in taxing or in 
landing mode. The corresponding FHA table shows that a loss of the deceleration 
capability (even though alerted) has an effect that is classified as more severe
38
 if the loss 
occurs while the aircraft is landing rather than taxiing (even though the failure is non 
alerted in the latter phase).  
 
                                                     
34
 i.e., an FMEA that takes place in the latter stages of the design lifecycle. 
35
 This is shown in the V lifecycle model in (Pumfrey, 1999) that represents similar activities and 
safety tasks without any industry-specific connotations. 
36
 The use of FPM appears in the insertion of the model-based approach (of which models are 
primary artefacts) in the industries and in safety standards of the More Integrated Systems Safety 
Assessment (MISSA) European project (://www.missa-fp7.eu/). FPMs can be used as basis for the 
assessment of the functions (e.g. in MISSA aircraft functions) architectures against the safety 
requirements. 
37
 E.g. catastrophic, critical, marginal and insignificant failures (IEC-61508, 1997). 
38
 We wish to note, though, that in the (ARP4761, 1996) hazardous is synonymous to severe-
major. 
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Table 2—1. Example of an aircraft FHA — fragment adapted from ARP4761 
 
 
After the allocation of functions to systems (during design), another FHA 
assessment, at system-level though, takes place in order to re-examine the system 
functions. A system-level FHA is particularly useful to assess the architecture of systems 
that integrate multiple functions — the FHA re-takes place to take into account condition 
of failure, not only of a single function, but also of combinations of functions. The 
outcome helps to start preliminary system safety assessments (i.e., PSSAs) whose 
objective is to establish system safety requirements and architecture evaluations. PSSA is 
a technique that determines how failures can cause the functional hazards (identified by 
the FHA) and thus, when applied to proposed system architectures, it can help to 
determine whether or not these (i.e., the architectures) can reasonably be considered as 
acceptably safe.  The capacity of PSSA in determining scenarios that lead to the 
functional hazards makes the technique similar to FTA — i.e., the hazard causes are 
structured in a fault tree for assessment. Moreover, the basic events of the PSSA fault tree 
can be used by FMEA analysts for the purpose of, e.g., assuring that (at least those more 
influential) cause effects have been addressed in the analysis. Although PSSA also 
Function Phase Failure 
Condition 
Failure Effect 
Condition on Aircraft / Crew 
Classification 
Decelerate 
Aircraft 
on the 
ground 
Taxi 
Non Alerted Loss 
of Deceleration 
Capability 
Crew is unable to stop the 
aircraft resulting in low speed 
contact with nearby vehicles, 
terminal or aircrafts. Crew 
reaction time can result in 
potential overrun. 
Major 
Landing 
Alerted Loss of 
Deceleration 
Capability  
Crew notifies emergency ground 
support of a more suitable airport 
for an immediate preparation for 
emergency landing. Crew 
prepares passengers for landing 
overrun. 
Hazardous 
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defines safety requirements (as in FHA), it is not intended to verify that the more refined 
(or implemented) architectures meet those safety requirements. Indeed, verification of the 
safety of a system as a whole is comprehensively complemented by a system safety 
assessment (SSA) technique.  
A safety integrated development cycle like the one represented in Figure 2—1 — 
or like the ‘system and safety lifecycle’ described in (Pumfrey, 1999) — consists of two 
major processes that are typically performed in an iterative manner: a system design 
process and a safety analysis process. Yet, the functions that must be accomplished by the 
system (and their sequential relationships) need to be determined and described at the 
early stages of the lifecycle. Functional models such as Functional Block Diagrams
39
 
(FBDs) are often used to represent the functional interrelationships in a system. These 
diagrams consist of blocks of functions connected by directed lines to represent the 
function flow and flow direction.  
To illustrate the concept we use an example of a vehicle Cruise Control (CC). 
Figure 2—2 — constituted from (Abele et al., 2010) — represents the corresponding 
FBD, some subsystems (or components) desired functions being textually described. The 
input to the CC can be signals for the on, off, set/resume or cancel CC switch modes 
which require interpretation. Thereafter, the vehicle speed controller has the basic 
functionality to evaluate
40
 the vehicle speed, and thus determines the CC state diagram — 
a component which decides transitions between states (e.g. on / off) and calculates the 
speed to be maintained by the CC (set point).  
                                                     
39
 These are also referred to in some literature as Functional Flow Block Diagrams, e.g. in (NASA, 
2007).  
40
 This is typically performed based on additional inputs from, e.g., the vehicle speed sensor and 
the wheel speed sensors which are not represented in the figure since they are not within the CC 
boundary. 
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Figure 2—2. Functional block diagram of a Cruise Control 
 
The set point is used to calculate a torque request by the controller, and which gets 
handled afterwards by the Engine Management System (EMS
41
). We wish to note that in 
situations where more information is available at the early stages, functions can be 
decomposed hierarchically into a network of sub-functions. We wish to note, though, that 
standards like the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC-60812, 2006) and the 
military (MIL-STD-1629A, 1980) recommend the use of FBDs as a basis for both FMEA 
and FMECA
42
 (a FMEA extension for criticality analysis).  
FMEA (and FMECA) inductively derive the corresponding effects from 
hypothetical (or known) causes, whereas FTA
43
 works backwards to deduce the causes of 
some undesired outcome. In Figure 2—1 for example, the SSA uses the PSSA FTA to 
verify that all significant and previously identified effects can be dealt with as events in 
the fault tree. At this stage though, these are typically undeveloped events (e.g. because 
there is no sufficiently available information), but do not need to be further elaborated on 
for verification of compliance with applicable safety requirements. We wish to 
emphasize, though, that effects/causes relationships in both techniques, i.e., FTA and 
FMEA (as well as FMECA) link effects logically to their corresponding networks of 
causes, and typically with neither concept of time nor information about the temporal 
sequencing in which the causes occur. Despite this, FTA and FMEA are (until now) 
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 The EMS typically consists of a speed transmission and controls for the torque and idle speed. It 
is beyond the CC boundary, and thus not represented in Figure 2—2. 
42
 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis. 
43
 It is conducted in the early stages of the lifecycle for, e.g., the PSSA and usually used as a basis 
(among other techniques) for the SSA (e.g., Figure 2—1). 
44 
 
among the prevalent techniques used in research and in several safety-critical industries 
— e.g., aerospace, automotive and nuclear. 
 
2.1.1 Fault tree analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive top down technique that allows analysts to 
perform both quantitative (probabilistic) analysis as well as qualitative (logical) analysis. 
This is particularly useful when there is no sufficient probabilistic failure information 
about the constituent parts — e.g. subsystems or components — of the system under 
analysis (e.g., at the early stages of the conception). FTA starts from a bad (or an 
undesired) situation called the top event or the root of the fault tree, and then it attempts 
to deduce the different causes (or possibly combinations of causes) that lead the system to 
the top event.  The root causes can be, e.g., component failures called basic events or 
combinations of these. Figure 2—3 illustrates the different graphical representations of 
the events that can appear in a fault tree.  
 
 
Figure 2—3. Fault tree symbols describing events 
 
A basic event (a) is typically an initiating fault. It is represented as a leaf in the fault tree, 
which means that it cannot be further expanded, i.e., no other events can lead to it. 
However, (b) represents an event that for one reason or another has not been further 
developed, because either this does not impact the analysis or there is no sufficient 
information. But in the case where an event arises from the combination of other events 
that are (or ultimately expand to) basic events, then it is labelled as an intermediate event 
(c). A normal event (d) is not expected to cause any problem on its own and is part of the 
normal operation of the system. It is typically an external event that may lead to an 
undesired situation only in combination with other events. The remaining event (e) does 
not necessarily have to be a fault, but is intended to constrain certain types of logic gates. 
For example, an INHIBIT gate is true only if its input event is true and its attached 
45 
 
conditioning event is also true, the latter can be applied to Priority-AND gates as well. 
Figure 2—4 illustrates a list of symbols that correspond to the fault tree gates, even 
though the list is not exhaustive
44
. 
 
 
Figure 2—4. Fault tree symbols describing gates 
 
An OR gate (a) is true if any of its inputs is true, whereas an AND gate (b) is true only if 
all of its inputs are also true. In contrast, an exclusive OR (XOR gate as described in c) is 
true if exactly one of its inputs is true, while a Priority-AND (PAND gate as in d) is true 
if all of its inputs occur (i.e., evaluate to true), but according to the sequence specified in 
the conditioning event that is attached to the gate. Finally, the INHIBIT gate (as in e) 
described previously acts like an AND gate with two input events: the single input event 
of the INHIBIT gate and its attached enabling conditioning event. We wish to note, 
though, that a fault tree is fundamentally Boolean logic, i.e., gates with temporal or event-
sequencing information are part of subsequent versions of the fault tree, e.g., the DFT 
approach in (Vesely et al., 2002). 
Fault trees can be used in conjunction with many design activities of the lifecycle 
of a system; they may also take place in the early stages like in the PSSA activity, though 
for a predictive role at such stage. For example, qualitative analysis can be performed 
very early in the lifecycle to speculate as to how a bad situation can happen, i.e., for 
instance through the minimisation of possible combinations of the deduced failure events 
that cause the supposed top event of the fault tree. However, quantitative analysis can be 
used when sufficient
45
 probabilistic data becomes available, e.g., by combining figures 
for actual component failure rates to calculate overall probabilities of system-level faults 
(i.e., failure rates for top-events of fault trees). We wish to note, though, that quantitative 
FTA can also be performed in a predictive role (Pumfrey, 1999), e.g., starting with an 
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 For a more detailed list of gate symbols, we refer the reader to (Villemeur, 1992). 
45
 i.e., with respect to a certain acceptable level of detail or accuracy. 
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acceptable failure rate assigned to the top event, and then deciding how to allocate a 
failure rate solution between the events down the tree. 
We use an example that represents an anti-lock braking system
46
 (ABS) with 
some connected components (as in Figure 2—5) to show a system-level fault tree — of 
an omission of ABS brake reference data (i.e., an output deviation that negatively impacts 
the brake actuator connected upstream). An ABS is intended to prevent the wheels from 
locking while braking, which is very useful when a vehicle needs to be urgently stopped 
on slippery surfaces in particular. Thus, it is not exaggerated to say that a driver, average 
or professional irrespectively, can be relieved from nerve-wracking situations (with 
possible catastrophic consequences) if the vehicle is equipped with an ABS. Figure 2—5 
shows a simplified ABS version with three inputs — a brake reference, a vehicle speed 
and a wheel speed data — for an intended delivery of a processed brake reference data to 
the connected brake actuator. The system is represented only once in the figure, but 
overall it is actually duplicated on the vehicle wheels.  
                                                     
46
 The example has been made on the basis of some outcome from the projects ATESST2 
(http://www.atesst.org) and MAENAD “Model-based Analysis & Engineering of Novel 
Architectures for Dependable Electric Vehicles” (http://www.maenad.eu). We wish to note, 
though, that it has been simplified for the purposes of illustrating a fault tree and an FMEA (Table 
2—2, page 53).  
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Figure 2—5. Some components influencing the anti-lock braking subsystem 
 
The brake reference, as shown in the figure, is some data that is originally 
produced by the brake pedal (i.e., a pedal position initially), then propagated and 
processed by some components in series that are: the brake pedal sensor to capture the 
pedal position (upon detection of a pedal displacement). It then propagates the pedal 
position to the next component in the series, i.e., the brake calculator which computes the 
driver requested torque using the transmitted pedal position. The brake calculator sends 
thereafter the produced value to the brake controller which decides the required torque on 
each wheel. The latter is one of the required parameters needed by the ABS function to 
appropriately decide the braking force (then delegated to the brake actuator) on the 
corresponding wheel. The other parameters required by the ABS function to fulfil its duty 
are given by: the sensed vehicle velocity input (captured by the vehicle speed sensor) and 
the sensed wheel angular velocity input which is detected by the wheel speed sensor. 
These values originate from a component which is represented as an abstraction of the 
dynamics of the vehicle — i.e., the effects that the velocities of the wheels can have on 
the vehicle. The component outcome represents a torque on each wheel, which allows the 
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corresponding speed (of the wheel) to be sensed, and a detectable overall speed for the 
vehicle. 
 
Figure 2—6. Fault Tree of the “No ABS brake reference data supplied to the brake 
actuator” 
 
The hierarchal structure of the system to analyse is captured neatly in the fault 
tree. For example, the fault tree in Figure 2—6, which represents the network of causes 
leading to the top event “No ABS brake reference data supplied to the brake actuator”, 
reflects the structure of the ABS and the connected components in Figure 2—5. It shows 
how basic and intermediate events (as well as one undeveloped event) connect to the top 
event; the intermediate events appear as inner nodes linked to more developed events 
downwards in the fault tree. For instance, a defective brake pedal because of, e.g., a break 
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in its wiring, or an initiating fault in the pedal will cause the brake pedal sensor to fail in 
its attempt to detect a pedal displacement (omission of input to the brake pedal sensor) — 
i.e., the fault tree intermediate event “No brake pedal position to brake pedal sensor”. 
The latter is sufficient on its own (OR gate) to cause the higher intermediate event “No 
requested brake torque data to the brake controller”, and which propagates through the 
brake controller to the ABS (i.e., the intermediate event “No brake reference data 
supplied to the ABS from the controller”) then to the actuator (the top event of the fault 
tree).  
FTA aims at multiple usages (some of which have been mentioned previously). 
But we put now more emphasis on qualitative FTA, which does not rely on the presence 
of failure measures (necessary for quantitative FTA). Qualitative analysis works by 
minimising, i.e., reducing the fault tree such that it displays only the failure events that 
could, individually or collectively, cause the top event to occur. The outcome is a 
minimal cut-set form of the fault tree, i.e., a representation limited to the significant 
failure events — e.g., the fault tree example of Figure 2—7.  
In the example, the Boolean logic expression which corresponds to the fault tree 
before analysis — i.e., left hand side of the Figure 2—7 — is the disjunction of the 
expressions of the separate branches underneath the top event, i.e., the cut-sets which 
correspond to the intermediate events E1 and E2. The symbols ‘.’ and ‘+’ represent the 
gates ‘AND’ and ‘OR’, respectively. 
E0 = E1 + E2  
Since E1 and E2 are equal to A + E3 and to B.E4 respectively, then we have: 
E0 = (A + E3) + (B.E4) 
Moreover, E3 (resp. E4) is equal to B.C (resp. E5+C). Therefore, we get: 
E0 = (A + (B.C)) + (B . (E5+C)) 
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Figure 2—7. An example of minimal cut-sets 
 
Boolean associative and distributive laws
47
 in addition to the precedence order of the 
logic operators (i.e., the fault tree gates) make it possible to remove and re-arrange 
parentheses in an expression. Therefore, E0 can be re-written as:  
E0 = A + B.C + B.E5 + B.C 
Since E5 is the conjunction of the basic events A and D, then E0 becomes: 
E0 = A + B.C + B.A.D + B.C  
We eliminate the redundant B.C using the OR idempotent
48
 law, and hence: 
E0 = A + B.C + B.A.D 
                                                     
47
 E.g., (X+Y)+Z  X+(Y+Z)  X+Y+Z (OR associative law),  (X.Y).Z  X.(Y.Z)  X.Y.Z 
(AND associative law), X.(Y+Z)  X.Y+X.Z (AND distributive law over OR) and X+(Y.Z)  
X+Y.Z (priorities for Boolean evaluation). 
48
 X + X  X (OR idempotent law) and X.X  X (AND idempotent law). 
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The conjunction of A, B and D is removed by using an absorption
49
 law, and thus the 
minimal cut-set form of the fault tree (right hand side of Figure 2—7). 
E0 = A + B.C 
We must point out that qualitative FTA can alleviate some problems that are 
encountered in the quantitative
50
 aspects during the assessments of complex systems. For 
example, the fault tree minimal cut-set forms help in allocating probabilistic measures to 
the relevant failure events, facilitating thereby the consequent quantitative analysis. 
Thereafter, the quantitative results from FTA (and FMEA as well) feed back into earlier 
assessments
51
 such as system level FTAs and (for the case of an aircraft development) 
aircraft level FTAs, like in Figure 2—1. 
 
2.1.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is commonly known (and often used) as a 
bottom-up analysis technique. In that sense, it proceeds by analysing the system 
components individually, or sometimes collectively, to determine failure effects thereof 
on the system
52
. The history of FMEA (and its criticality version known as FMECA
53
) 
goes back to the 1950s (Rausand et al., 2004). At the time, the technique was introduced 
in response to the growing concerns about the reliabilty of military systems.  The standard 
guidelines in (MIL-STD-1629A, 1980) were thereafter developed and revised during the 
1970s.  
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 X + X.Y  X 
50
 In both directions, i.e., probability of occurrence of the top event as well as allocation of 
probability budgets to lower-level events (i.e., the predictive role of quantitative FTA mentioned 
earlier). 
51
 For the purposes of, e.g., helping in the demonstration of compliance with the quantitative 
requirements derived from FHAs. This can facilitate the assessments and reviews of the 
certification authorities (ARP4761, 1996). 
52
 The technique aims at addressing the consequences that result from, typically, single failures. 
53
 It adds to the FMEA a formal classification of failure effects according to severity and 
probability of each contributing factor to system level hazards. This helps in implementing 
corrective measures to mitigate the high risk effects. For more information about FMECA, we 
refer the reader to (MIL-STD-1629A, 1980). 
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The technique commonly uses a tabular description to link failure modes
54
 (of the 
system constituent parts) to their induced effects and magnitude identified accordingly. 
We wish to note, though, that an FMEA table may contain a number of optional columns 
that correspond to, e.g., means of failure detection, severity of the failure effects (with 
mitigation strategies if possible) as well as comments and recommendations (Pumfrey, 
1999). FMEA can be useful in many ways such as (but not limited to) serving as a basis 
for probabilistic reliability and availability analysis, providing future references for 
consideration of design changes (to avoid or minimise the effects of the most critical 
failures identified), and helping to show how some design alternatives can (or cannot) 
represent optimal trade-offs
55
 — i.e., designs that meet dependability criteria (such as 
safety, reliability and availability) at a minimum cost. 
There are different ways to conduct an FMEA (depending on the application), but 
the following are generally considered as major steps. 
 Definition of the system and its components. 
 Identification of the operating states of the components. 
 Identification of the component failure modes and the possible effects of each 
component failure. 
 Investigation of other factors e.g. detection and protection. 
 Making conclusions and recommendations. 
As an example, Table 2—2 represents a part of an FMEA which corresponds to the ABS 
(depicted in Figure 2—5). For the component “vehicle speed sensor”, two failure modes 
are considered: no signal and false signal. For example, an omission of output from the 
vehicle speed sensor (i.e., “No signal”) makes the ABS ineffective, since it becomes 
impossible to detect the lock up tendencies of the wheels — the ABS interprets that a 
wheel is being likely to lock up by determining its brake slip according to the signal 
received from the vehicle speed sensor. As a consequence on the vehicle, the braking 
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 i.e., forms of deviation from correct service (Avizienis et al., 2004).  
55
 In (Papadopoulos et al., 2011), the safety analysis tool framework (HiP-HOPS) integrates an 
automated optimisation of design models using genetic algorithms to evolve designs into new and 
optimal ones. 
53 
 
system switches to regular (i.e., no ABS function). As for the last column of the table, it 
shows some comments related to such a situation, like directing the driver to prevent 
wheel lock up by manually pumping the brake pedal. The comments can also include 
some warnings to prepare the driver, e.g., a possible yawing of the vehicle depending on 
the condition of the road, or during a panic stop. 
 
Table 2—2. Fragment of FMEA for the ABS 
Component 
Failure 
Mode 
Subsystem 
Effects 
Vehicle 
Effects 
Comments 
Vehicle 
speed 
sensor 
No signal 
Impossible to 
determine the brake 
slip for each wheel, 
and thus the 
corresponding lock 
up tendencies cannot 
be determined. 
Vehicle braking in 
the regular manner 
(i.e. ABS inactive). 
1) The driver has to 
manually pump the 
brakes to prevent 
wheel lock up. 
 
2) The vehicle may 
spin on wet and 
slippery roads (or 
during a panic stop) 
False signal 
Incorrect 
determination of the 
vehicle speed leading 
to incorrect 
calculations of the 
different wheel brake 
slips. 
1) Possible lock up 
of wheels during 
braking (the 
corresponding lock 
up tendencies were 
not detected by the 
ABS). 
 
2) Possible 
unnecessary changes 
to the fluid pressure 
at each wheel 
(performed 
automatically by the 
ABS). 
Effect 1) same as 
above. 
 
Effect 2) possibility 
of non optimised 
vehicle braking 
(depending on the 
vehicle speed 
estimation and the 
brake pedal 
position). 
 
 
Despite the purely combinatorial aspect of FTA and FMEA (which makes them 
classified as static approaches too), there is a contemporary and important research focus 
— both industrial and academic — on using these techniques in conjunction with 
influential, state-of-the-art modelling languages like AADL and Altarica. In the circle of 
the aerospace industry for instance, there is a recent work about generating FMEA and 
FTs from AADL models. This work is described in (Hecht et al., 2011) and (Hecht et al., 
2010) concerning an automated generation of FMEA and in (Joshi et al., 2007) 
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concerning a generation of fault trees. AADL is clearly gaining growing acceptance in the 
aerospace community and Altarica’s modelling and analysis platform — a tool which 
uses computer-performed generation of fault trees — was qualified as a validation tool in 
several aerospace projects, including Airbus civil aircraft programs (Bernard R. , 2009). 
Besides, the company Dassault Aviation
56
 has demonstrated the consistency of its Falcon 
7X flight controls according to the requirements of the certification authorities with the 
aid of Altarica models. Dassault Aviation has developed an Altarica tool for the 
Conception and Analysis of Systems (so-called OCAS) with a generator of fault trees 
from Altarica
57
 models proposed in (Rauzy, 2002). The generated FTs can then be 
analysed by the Aralia tool (Dutuit & Rauzy, 1997); the performed analysis is both 
qualitative — in order to extract all the minimal cut-sets — and quantitative to calculate 
probabilities of the top events. 
 
2.2 Static approaches 
We present in this part some relevant static approaches in addition to FTA and FMEA 
discussed earlier. Static analysis is sufficient for many systems, e.g. where the full failure 
behaviour of the system is accurately represented through static causal relationships 
between the individual components — the corresponding failures have their effects on the 
system individually or in logical combinations with other failures. We wish to note, 
though, that some static safety techniques have been extended to model and analyse 
dynamic systems. For example, Papadopoulos (2000) suggests an extension of HiP-
HOPS with a modes/ modes’ transitions formalism to be used for the description of 
systems with dynamic behaviour. Besides, there has been a considerable body of work 
focused on how to enable the tool to handle temporal fault trees [(Walker & 
Papadopoulos, 2008) and (Walker, 2009)]. 
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 For more details about the different participants in Altarica — industry and academic/ research 
bodies — with their corresponding tools and variations of the language, we refer the reader to 
(Bernard R. , 2009). 
57
 The described compilation into fault trees is based on a variation of Altarica (so-called Altarica 
data flow). The reason is to drop out features like bidirectional flows which make the compilation 
difficult. 
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The techniques discussed in this section are Failure Propagation & 
Transformation Notation (FPTN), Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and 
Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) and Component Fault Trees (CFTs). 
 
2.2.1 FPTN 
Failure Propagation & Transformation Notation (FPTN) is a simple graphical technique 
designed to allow a compositional approach to safety analysis and to aid FTA and 
FMECA in representing the failure behaviour of systems (Fenelon & McDermid, 1993). 
The technique consists of a hierarchical notation for the description of faults propagation 
through a compositional, modular architecture of a system. Besides, failures in FPTN are 
typed according to particular failure domains — e.g., failures of types timing, value or 
commission / omission (Fenelon & McDermid, 1992).  Failures that are lying in the 
timing domain are those which occur at an incorrect time, whereas value failures can 
occur, e.g., when an incorrect value is returned by some computation. As for the type 
commission (resp. omission), it groups failures that are due to a function which is 
provided when not required (resp. a function which is not provided when required). In 
FPTN, these types constitute the basis of a simple classification of failures; however, new 
failure mode types can be added by users of the notation according to their application 
domains. Besides, transformation of failures from one domain into another (which is not 
uncommon in many systems) is supported and well-expressed in FPTN — typically, this 
can happen as failures propagate through a system. For example, a watchdog timer in a 
real-time system can force a computation exceeding its budgeted execution time to return 
an approximate value; thus, transforming a failure domain from time to value. 
In FPTN, a component or subsystem is typically drawn as a box with a set of 
inputs and outputs, by means of which architectures with interconnected modules can be 
graphically described. Besides, a module can also contain other modules, thereby 
allowing the FPTN descriptions to be hierarchical (Grunske & Neumann, 2002). 
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Figure 2—8. An example FPTN graphical description —  
(used in Walker, Mahmud, Papadopoulos et al., 2010) 
 
Figure 2—8, for example, shows a component named Subsystem1 with an error handler 
(EH) to the top-left and a criticality class (II*) to the top-right. The component I/O 
interface consists of a set of inputs (arrows on the left) and a set of outputs (arrows on the 
right). Each arrow is labelled by its name typed with its domain — e.g., input ‘A’ typed 
with ‘t’ (timing) and output ‘Y’ typed with ‘o’ (omission). ‘v’ is an abbreviation for 
value. The failure behaviour of a module is described inside the box in the form of logical 
equations. The canonical form of these equations is a “sum-of-products” form equivalent 
to the minimal cut-sets of the fault trees which correspond to the output failure modes. 
For instance, the fault X (which is lying in the domain ‘t’) is caused by a conjunction of 
failures A and B lying in the domains ‘t’ and ‘v’ respectively. Besides, the figure shows 
that the module’s EH handles the failure C:t, and thus this one has no effect on the rest of 
the system (i.e., the downstream modules). These capabilities enable the technique to be 
used both deductively and inductively: The former to deduce from an output failure its 
corresponding root causes (i.e., a fault tree) and the latter by tracing a component failure 
through the system to determine its effects (an FMECA). We wish to note, though, that 
the logical equations like those represented in Figure 2—8 are typical; FPTN also enables 
the description of recovery mechanisms and internal failure modes.  
Despite a system architecture being reflected by its corresponding FPTN 
description (supposedly facilitating the identification of the causes of faults which 
propagate through the system components), the technique suffers from a lack of means 
for the analysis of fault propagation (Wallace, 2005). Another issue consists of the 
difficulty that may arise as a result of, e.g., changes taking place in components. For 
example, changes which may alter the types of propagated faults (or propagation 
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directions) may, as a result, necessitate reconstruction of modules. This limits the 
reusability which was hoped through the compositionality of an FPTN failure model. 
 
2.2.2 HiP-HOPS 
HiP-HOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies) is an 
automated safety analysis technique originating from a number of classical techniques 
such as FFA, FTA and FMEA. The technique starts taking place early in the design 
lifecycle with exploratory FFA (Papadopoulos, 2000); though, its primary use can be 
described only after a hierarchical model of the system has been developed — i.e., 
following the FFA. The failure behaviour of components is analysed using a modification 
of classical FMEA, called the Interface Focused FMEA (IF-FMEA). The application of 
this technique generates a model of the local failure behaviour of the component which is 
represented as a table. The table provides a list of component failure modes observed at 
the component outputs. For each component output failure, the causes are determined as a 
logical combination of internal malfunctions or deviations of the component inputs. An 
IF-FMEA table records component reactions to failures that are generated by other 
components. Moreover, the table determines the failure modes that the component itself 
generates and may propagate to other components. Upon determination of local failure 
behaviour of all components, HiP-HOPS can show how the functional failures (identified 
in the exploratory FFA) arise from combinations of the low-level component failure 
modes (identified in the IF-FMEAs). This is done by automatically synthesising fault 
trees; a fault tree is generated incrementally by parsing the expressions, which are derived 
from the IF-FMEA, and encountered during a hierarchical traversal of the system model.  
Additionally, the HiP-HOPS tool automatically performs minimal cut-set analysis 
(i.e., the smallest combinations of component failures that are sufficiently needed to cause 
a system failure) and probabilistic calculations on the minimised fault trees to predict the 
reliability and availability of the system. Last but not least, the tool performs 
dependability vs. cost optimisations of system architectures, and has the potential to be 
extended and configured to any model that provides the topology of the system. In other 
words, a model specifying the components and the connections between components with 
failure annotations is suitable for the HiP-HOPS analysis. This has already been 
demonstrated with, e.g., Simulink system models (Papadopoulos et al., 2004) and marine 
system designs developed in SimulationX (Papadopoulos et al., 2003). 
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Figure 2—9 illustrates the HiP-HOPS analysis of a system model. The system 
components — described using, e.g., Matlab Simulink, SimulationX or EAST-ADL 
(leftmost hand side of the figure) — are first annotated through a graphical user interface 
(the GUI underneath the system model). Those annotations consist of failure modes and 
failure expressions which are required for the fault tree synthesis. After being read and 
interpreted by the model parser, the annotation formats get converted into another format 
readable by the fault tree synthesizer for the generation of fault trees. The resultant fault 
trees (to the top right) — these can also be displayed using the Fault Tree Plus tool58 — 
are then analysed (centre of the figure) to be reduced into minimal cut-sets. Finally, the 
cut-sets are passed to an FMEA synthesizer to generate the FMEA tables (bottom right).  
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 A widely used FTA tool of Isograph. 
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Figure 2—9. HiP-HOPS architecture (the safety analysis tool perspective) 
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An example which explains how HiP-HOPS mechanises the construction of fault trees, 
determines the cut-sets and constructs the FMEAs from design models follows. 
 
Example of a HiP-HOPS use 
Figure 2—10 shows a Simulink system model which consists of two 
interconnected subsystems (subsystem1 and subsystem2). Subsystem1.y is the output port 
of Subsystem1. Similarly, Subsystem2.y is the output port of Subsystem2. 
 
Figure 2—10. Abstracted system model for a HiP-HOPS analysis 
Assuming that Subsystem1 has been annotated with the following failure data: 
O-connection1 = Failed1 
Where ‘O-connection1’ represents an omission of connection1 (output deviation) and 
‘Failed1’ represents an internal failure (i.e., a basic event) of Subsystem1. Information 
about cost and weight of a component can also be added as well as probabilities of 
failures (e.g., a constant failure rate like, for instance, 6.18754E-06 for ‘Failed1’).  
Subsystem2, however, is annotated as follows: 
O-y (of Subsystem2) = O-connection1 OR Failed2 
where O-y represents an omission of output y, which is caused either by O-connection1 
or an internal failure of Subsystem 2 ‘Failed2’. Now, we refine Subsystem2 as in Figure 
2—11, which shows two subcomponents P and F arranged in parallel, fed by the input x 
of Subsystem2 and supplying output through subcomponent S then y (of subsystem2). 
 
61 
 
 
Figure 2—11. Refinement of Subsystem2 
 
An output deviation of subcomponent P (omission in the example) is either 
caused by an omission on its input (i.e., connection2) or an internal failure of P (i.e., 
FailedP). 
O-Po = O-connection2 OR FailedP 
Similarly, an output omission from F is either caused by an input omission on 
connection2 or an internal failure of F (i.e., FailedF). 
O-Fo = O-connection2 OR FailedF 
In the example, supply to subcomponent S must be received from at either P or F for its 
proper functioning. Therefore, an output omission from S is caused by an internal failure 
(i.e., FailedS) or omission on both inputs (i.e., Si1 and Si2 together). 
O-So = (O-Si1 AND O-Si2) OR FailedS 
Thereafter, HiP-HOPS parses the system’ model and synthesises the component 
fault trees into system fault trees — one per system failure, i.e. as in Figure 2—12. 
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Figure 2—12. System fault tree synthesised by HiP-HOPS 
 
HiP-HOPS displays the synthesised fault trees using web browsers like Internet Explorer, 
Mozilla Firefox or Netscape Navigator — plus the editor of Isograph FaultTree+ 
appendix A —1). 
The synthesised fault tree shows a total of four cut-sets
59
. Three of those are of 
order
60
 one (each contains one basic event) and the other cut-set is of order two. The 
failures Failed1, Failed2 and FailedS, which correspond to Subsystem1, Subsystem2 and 
its component S respectively, are each a single point of failure. The cut-set of order two, 
however, consists of both failures FailedP and FailedF — of components P and F
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respectively — causing together (i.e., the conjunction of both) the top event to occur62. 
The different cut-sets are generated automatically by HiP-HOPS using the tool cut-set 
calculator; the calculation outcome is shown in appendix A — 2. 
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 A cut set is a branch of the fault tree leading to the top event — the occurrence of the events of 
the branch causes the top event to occur. 
60
 The order of a cut-set is the number of basic events it contains — i.e., a cut set of order n (nϵℕ+) 
contains n basic events. 
61
 Both components P and F belong to Subsystem2. 
62
 Omission on both inputs of component S (i.e., Si1 and Si2) will ultimately lead to an omission 
on the output of Subsystem2, thereby causing an occurrence of the top event. 
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A further detail to note here (about Figure 2—12) is that the numbers appearing 
to the right of each branch (or sub-branch) are results calculated by HiP-HOPS. These 
results are based on extra failure data information which we omitted to show within the 
failure annotations of the components for the sake of clarity — e.g., failure rates as well 
as cost and weight of subsystems/components implementations. 
The HiP-HOPS FMEA synthesiser produces FMEA tables which describe direct 
and further effects of the failure modes. For example, Figure 2—13 shows that an internal 
failure of subsystem1 (i.e., Failed1) has a direct effect which is omission on output y of 
subsystem2. An FMEA table showing the further effects of the failure modes is in 
appendix A — 3. 
 
 
Figure 2—13. Fragment of a HiP-HOPS FMEA table showing the direct effects of 
failure modes 
Overview on optimization of designs with HiP-HOPS 
The purpose of optimisation of design models with HiP-HOPS is to have cost-
effective and reliable solutions to the problems that have been identified (Papadopoulos, 
Y. et al., 2005). These problems can be related to safety, availability, reliability, or even 
too high costs of designs — even though the required dependability criteria like those 
cited before are met. In this sense, optimisation can be of multiple concerns and may 
target different objectives, and thereby achieving optimality is a hard problem. The 
process undertaken can be highlighted through Figure 2—14 which shows (in the left 
hand side) a system model annotated with failure and cost information, as well as sets of 
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design variants as the functional requirements can be met by many of these (but each 
variant has different dependability characteristics and cost). 
The annotated design model (with function/component elements implementable 
by variants) is then passed to HiP-HOPS for (dependability vs. cost) evaluation. 
Thereafter, HiP-HOPS performs automatic optimisation on the design model by selecting 
the variants to apply in the architecture (right hand side of Figure 2—14); this has been 
made possible with advances in e.g. genetic algorithms. The returned result is a set of 
“Pareto” optimal trade-off designs and the process can be iterative to, e.g., review some 
requirements / design concepts. 
 
 
Figure 2—14. HiP-HOPS (the optimisation tool perspective) 
 
2.2.3 Component fault trees 
Component Fault Trees (CFTs) enable a compositional method of modelling the failure 
behaviour of a system through the failure behaviour local to the components. It is a useful 
way of modelling in a sense that it helps to cope with design changes. Also, it impacts 
positively the efforts needed for the analysis following these changes (Kaiser, B. et al. 
2003). Each component of the system can be represented by its own fault tree (i.e., the 
CFT), which links output failures to input causes through the use of (input / output) ports, 
logical gates and basic events. Therefore, CFTs are logical structures like standard fault 
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trees and, in that sense, they can still be analysed (qualitatively and quantitatively) using 
standard fault trees algorithms.  
 
 
Figure 2—15. Component Fault Tree 
 
For example Figure 2—15 shows two CFTs, each corresponds to a component 
(e.g. a primary and a secondary) with an internal failure represented by the corresponding 
basic event. The power unit (bottom) may propagate a power failure to both components 
via their input ports. The power failure is a common cause failure by which both 
components fail then propagate their failures through the output ports, and thereby 
causing a total failure of the system. Though, a system total failure can also happen if 
both components fail internally. 
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CFTs, due to their nature, can be developed separately for different parts of the 
system and the approach is, therefore, favourable for reuse (e.g., making libraries of 
component types). As for the topology, it appears more as directed acyclic graphs —
called Cause Effect Graphs (CEGs) — rather than a real tree structure. 
 
2.3 Dynamic approaches 
We discuss in this section some dynamic safety analysis techniques like Altarica and 
DCCA. As for DFTs, SEFTs and AADL (presented afterwards), these are models which 
are well-suited to describing the dynamic aspects of complex systems; but the 
corresponding dynamic analysis requires their conversion to analysis models like GSPNs 
and Markov chains — though, limited to probabilistic evaluations. 
 
2.3.1 Altarica 
The Altarica language provides formal specification capabilities for modelling both 
functional and dysfunctional
63
 behaviours of systems. The technique has the ability to 
describe complex critical systems using a state-transition representation — called 
Transition System (TS) in some related literature (like in Bernard R. , 2009) or mode 
automata (e.g. in Rauzy, 2002). Indeed, the behavioural underlying state/transition 
formalism was one of the initial choices made for Altarica during its development.  
A “TS” representation of a component, called a node, is characterised by 
variables (whether state variables or data flow variables
64
), events which label the 
transitions between the states and an assert clause to constraint the data flows according 
to the states. These concepts are illustrated by the following Altarica modelling of the 
primary-standby example (i.e., the PS of chapter 1). The node description of the example 
system shown next has the following state variables (see  
Table 2—3): operational, primary, B and S (all declared as Boolean). This is 
because the PS system can work either in primary mode (i.e., “operational = true” and 
“primary = true”) or in standby mode (i.e., “operational = true” and “primary = false”); 
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 By dysfunctional behaviour we mean the behaviour under fault conditions. 
64
 Flows render Altarica a data flow language as well. 
67 
 
otherwise, it is completely failed (i.e., “operational = false”). But this is not sufficient, 
more failure information is needed and particularly while the PS is working in primary 
mode.  For example, the system can operate in primary mode:  
(1) with a failed backup component (i.e., “operational = true” and “primary = true” 
and “B = false”);  
(2) or with a failed monitoring sensor (i.e., “operational = true” and “primary = true” 
and “S = false”);  
(3) or simply under no failure condition anywhere in the system (i.e., all state 
variables are true).  
Such failure information is relevant and impacts the failure behaviour of the PS; for 
example, a failure of A while the system is in primary mode case (1) would cause a total 
failure of the PS. However, the effect would be a system degradation instead (but still 
operational) in the case of primary mode (3) — the graphical TS model in Figure 2—16 
clearly shows the relevant failure information, and where the middle of the figure 
represents a degraded PS system. 
 
Figure 2—16. Graphical and labelled transition system associated to the PS Altarica node 
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Such relevant failure information constitutes an Altarica domain, which is 
necessary towards the description of a node. For our example, we define the domain as 
follows (using an abbreviated notation which corresponds to each relevant situation 
mentioned earlier) 
Domain whoisactive = { A0S, AB0, ABS, 0BS }; 
Where all cases concern the operational status of the PS, but as follows: 
A0S means primary mode and B is failed — i.e., case (1) 
AB0 means primary mode and S failed — i.e., case (2) 
ABS means primary mode and none is failed — i.e., case (3) 
0BS means standby mode 
 
Table 2—3. State variables of the PS system.  
State Type Initial value 
operational bool true 
primary bool true 
B bool true 
S bool true 
 
In other words, the system is operating with the first of the two components from the left 
of the succession “ABS” that is not marked with 0 (i.e., false to indicate that the marked 
component is failed). 
The following represent the textual description of the PS node which conforms to 
the syntax of Altarica. 
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node  ps 
 flow 
  input: bool: in; 
  output: bool: out; 
 state 
  operational, primary, B, S : bool; 
 event 
  Afails, Bfails, Sfails; 
 init 
  operational := true; 
  primary := true; 
  B := true; 
  S := true; 
trans 
  operational & primary & B & S |- Afails —> primary := false; 
  operational & primary & B & S |- Bfails —> B := false; 
  operational & primary & B & S |- Sfails —> S := false; 
  operational & (primary = false) |- Bfails —> operational := false; 
  operational & primary & (B = false) |- Afails —> operational := false; 
  operational & primary & (S = false) |- Afails —> operational := false; 
assert 
  output = case {operational and input : true, 
else : false}; 
edon 
 
The keywords “node” and “edon” mark the start and end delimiters of the node 
respectively. The flow clause represents the input and output flows of the system (and as 
in Table 2—4) and the states are as emphasised previously. The three failure events 
correspond to the internal failures of the three components of the PS and initially (as 
under the “init” clause) all state variables are true.  
Table 2—4. Flow variables of the PS system. 
Flow Type Direction 
input bool in 
output bool out 
 
The transitions clause (i.e., “trans”) shows the values of the state variables before and 
those that have been impacted after the occurrence of a failure event — these are detailed 
in the corresponding transition table of the system (Table 2—5). The valuations which are 
shown for the variables, including flow variables like the input
65
 to the system, are called 
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 The input is a single point of failure. 
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configurations and act as guards for the failure events to cause transitions, thereby leading 
to new valuations of the variables (i.e., new configurations). 
Table 2—5. Transition table of the PS system (i.e., the SM or mode automaton). 
Event Guard 
New state 
operational primary B S 
A fails 
operational and  
primary and B and S 
and input 
true false true true 
B fails 
operational and  
primary and B and S 
and input 
true true false true 
S fails 
operational and  
primary and B and S 
and input 
true true true false 
B fails 
operational and  
primary = false  
and input 
false — — — 
A fails 
operational and  
primary and B = false 
and input 
false — — — 
A fails 
operational and  
primary and S = false 
and input 
false — — — 
 
Finally, the “assert” clause (which corresponds to Table 2—6) states that there is output 
as long as the PS is operational with input provided, and there is no output otherwise. 
 
Table 2—6. Assertion table of the PS system. 
Assertion Case Value 
output operational and input true 
output Anything else false 
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In a realistic context of modelling, the number of states and transitions can be 
tremendous. Thus, Altarica was also designed to allow a hierarchical description of a 
system by declaring instances of nested components, i.e., a tree structure of nodes with a 
root or main node, intermediate nodes and the leaves of the tree — more details can be 
found in (Griffault, 2003). We close now this section with a summary such that a failure 
can be seen as an event which can affect the state of a node, a failure mode can be seen as 
a transition characterised by a particular failure event and (last but not least) an assert 
section allows to constrain the flows in function of the states — i.e., when an event occurs 
(starting from a configuration) the state variables are first assigned with their new values, 
then the flow variables are calculated in order that the constraints defined by the 
assertions would be respected. Finally, once a system model has been specified in 
Altarica, it can then be compiled into lower level formalisms for verification purposes. 
This can be done using some available compilers which can generate fault trees, state 
automata or stochastic Petri Nets.  
 
2.3.2 DCCA 
The Deductive Cause Consequence Analysis (DCCA) [(Güdemann et al., 2007) and 
(Ortmeier et al., 2005)] is a formal safety analysis technique. The representation of the 
system models uses finite automata with temporal logic semantics known as CTL 
(Computational Tree Logic). The technique uses mathematical methods to determine if a 
component failure (or combination of component failures) causes a system hazard. 
The component failure modes are represented as logical predicates; then a 
property called ‘criticality’ specifies whether or not a combination of component failure 
modes can cause a given system failure. This property is defined in CTL and can be 
extracted automatically from the finite automata in the system model. In the case where 
the ‘criticality’ property is true, then the corresponding set of failure modes is a critical 
set (which is similar to a cut-set in standard fault trees). The DCCA technique, thus, 
attempts to discover all minimal critical sets (i.e., the irreducible sets of failure modes that 
are necessary to cause a given system failure). Therefore, the technique is also designed 
to make use of initial results from deductive approaches like FTA; otherwise the efforts 
which are required to automatically calculate and check each possible set of failure modes 
would be exponential. 
Moreover, results from formalised versions of FTA, such as formal FTA, can also 
complement DCCA. However, formal FTA annotates each gate with CTL semantics, 
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which can cause problems if the inner nodes of the fault tree cannot be easily formalised. 
But, DCCA does not require formalisation of the intermediate nodes, and thereby 
reducing the amount of time required to create the fault trees. Although these various 
techniques help to reduce the impact of the state-space explosion
66
 problem on DCCA, it 
is still prone to performance and efficiency problems in certain (albeit worst case) 
scenarios.  
A more recent extension to DCCA (Güdemann et al., 2008) enables the technique 
to take into account the limitation of fault trees in representing the order in which events 
may occur — particularly the temporal order of events which is significant to the system 
failure behaviour. This new version of DCCA is so-called Deductive Failure Order 
Analysis (DFOA). It enables an automatic synthesis of temporal fault trees
67
 from system 
models that are DCCA-annotated. This is achieved by applying DCCA first to obtain the 
unordered minimal critical sets, then DFOA second to restore a partial ordering to these 
sets using semantics based on CTL* — i.e., a version which extends CTL with additional 
operators. With these added capabilities, the DCCA technique can produce results 
specifying basic combinations of failure modes (for static systems) or sequences of 
failure modes (for dynamic systems) that must occur to cause a system failure. 
 
2.3.3 Dynamic fault trees 
Dugan originated the dynamic fault trees (DFTs) in response to a shortage in modelling 
sequence-dependent failures by static fault trees (Dugan et al., 1992). This consists 
mainly of the definition of some special purpose gates for capturing the sequence 
dependencies in a system, and thereafter solve the dynamic fault tree as a Markov chain. 
The reason is that it is difficult to develop a correct Markov model for a complex system. 
However,  it is considerably simpler to capture the system dynamics in a DFT model, and 
thereby converting automatically the fault tree to its equivalent Markov chain. The DFT 
special gates are summarised as follows: 
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 The state-space explosion, though, is a common problem in all formal model-checking 
approaches (including Altarica). 
67
 These may contain Priority-AND (PAND) and Simultaneous-AND (SAND) gates to represent 
sequences and simultaneity of events, respectively. These gates are similar to the gates of Pandora 
(see chapter 3). 
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a) The functional dependency gate (FDEP) 
This gate is typically used to model a dependency between, on the one hand, a set of 
events that are forced to occur when (on the other hand) an event — i.e., a trigger event 
— occurs. The trigger event can be for example a failure of the central switch (or 
computer which acts as a conduit to transmit messages) in a star network topology for 
instance. The dependent events can therefore be communication failures to the different 
stations that are connected to the central computer — e.g., each ei 1≤i≤n in Figure 2—17 
can represent a communication failure to a station. The FDEP gate has no logical output 
(it has no impact to any other element in the fault tree) and is, thus, represented with a 
dashed line. 
 
Figure 2—17. Functional-dependency gate 
 
b) Spare gate 
This gate is used to model situations where some components (primary units) are 
substituted by other components (spares). A spare gate has n input in general (n≥2) and 
one output: the first input (typically leftmost) relates to the primary unit and becomes true 
if this unit fails. The other inputs correspond to the different spares envisaged to replace 
the primary in case of its failure (or failure of any spare already in use since the failure of 
the primary unit). The substitution of the primary with a spare conforms to a specific 
order (typically left to right) — i.e., if the primary unit fails, then it should be replaced by 
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the next available spare in sequence. If the primary fails and all spares fail (or are not 
available
68
), then the output of the spare gate becomes true. 
 
Figure 2—18. Spare gate 
 
The spare units (such as Spare1, Spare2…Sparen in Figure 2—18) have typically 
reduced failure rates before being switched into active use (i.e., warm spares) or do not 
fail dormant at all (i.e., cold spares), exception made for hot spares which have the same 
failure rate irrespective of any state: dormant or active. Systems using cold or warm 
spares cannot be modeled accurately using combinatorial fault trees. The sequence-
dependent failures (i.e., the order in which the primary unit and spares may fail) need to 
be preserved for a more accurate analysis. 
 
c) Priority-AND gate 
This gate captures sequence-dependent failures like in the example of the primary 
standby system used in (Mahmud et al., 2010) — which is depicted in chapter one 
through Figure 1—1. In the example, it was shown that the order in which the monitoring 
sensor S and the primary unit A fail is relevant to the system failure behaviour. It is, thus, 
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  A spare is not available if, for example, it is shared with another gate, and it is still in use in lieu 
of the primary unit of that other gate. 
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modelled using a Priority-AND gate — like the one (with two inputs) in the centre of 
Figure 2—19. The figure shows that a complete failure of the system is caused by an 
omission of input, the sensor failing before the primary unit or both primary and backup 
units fail. Assuming that the output ‘Out’ has no failure modes on its own — it must only 
receive input from at either unit, primary or standby, for the system to function overall. 
 
 
Figure 2—19. DFT of the PS system 
 
We wish to note that there are other gates that can be used in a DFT, like the Sequence-
enforcing
69
 gate which forces events to occur in a specific order. 
The problem with DFTs is that these are primarily designed for quantitative 
analysis, typically solved using Markov chains. The following section shows the 
equivalent Markov model for the DFT of Figure 2—19. It highlights some path 
redundancies in the model — which can only be eliminated through a qualitative analysis. 
We wish to note, though, that Markov models are well-known with the state explosion 
problem. Therefore, any effort towards optimising Markov models will have a positive 
impact on the analysis overall. 
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 For more details, we refer the reader to (Dugan et al., 1992) and (Vesely et al., 2002). 
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2.3.4 Markov analysis 
Markov Chains (MCs) are very powerful in capturing the dynamic aspects of systems and 
in the evaluation of safety measures (Trivedi, 2001). They are often used to provide 
quantitative solutions for dynamic models like DFTs, SEFTs, GSPNs…etc. The 
underlying formalism of a MC is a state-transition system and the quantitative solution is 
reached by solving the corresponding differential equations. However, relying on Markov 
models only for the analysis also means that: 
1. Qualitative analysis is not encouraged. 
2. The failure rates (which label the transitions in the MCs) are limited to 
exponential distributions. 
3. The Markov models themselves are large and cumbersome, and thus impractical 
for systems with several components. 
A Markov model describes the behaviour of a system such that a state of the 
model represents a state of the system whether operational or not, and an arc represents a 
failure event
70
. This structure of the model allows writing the probability of being in a 
state in the form of an equation according to the source (resp. destination) states of the 
incoming (resp. outgoing) arrows. For example, let us assume a simple parallel system 
composed of two components A and B, which can fail independently
71
 with the rates A 
and B respectively (see Figure 2—20). 
 
Figure 2—20. A Markov model of a simple non-repairable parallel system 
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 This can be a repair event in the case of repairable systems. 
71
 In the example, we suppose that there is no common failure mode by which the two components 
fail simultaneously. 
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The state 1 represents a state of the system where both components A and B are OK. 
However, the state 2 (resp. state 3) represents a state of the system where A (resp. B) has 
failed, and finally the state F represents a state where both component are failed.  
The Markov solution provided by the model of Figure 2—20 is described as 
follows, and where P1, P2, P3 and PF are the probabilities of being in states 1, 2, 3 and F 
respectively. 
 
  
 P1(t) = – (A+B) P1(t) 
 
  
 P2(t) = A P1(t) – B P2(t) 
 
  
 P3(t) = B P1(t) – A P3(t) 
 
  
 PF(t) = B P2(t) + A P3(t) 
The solution of the differential equations is given by: 
P1(t) =  –        
P2(t) =  –   –   –       
P3(t) =  –   –   –       
PF(t) =  –       –  –   –  –   + 1  (1 is the constant with respect to the 
initial condition at time t0 = 0, PF(t0) = 0) 
The probability given by the Markov solution for failure of A and B is the same 
result given by combinatorial techniques for two components whose failures are 
independent, and hence:  
P(A failing AND B failing)  = P(A failing) × P(B failing)  
= (1 –  –  ) × (1 –  –  ) 
=  –       –  –   –  –   + 1 
A similar Markov model of a simple non-repairable parallel system composed of 
two components failing independently at the same rate  is represented by Figure 2—21, 
where state 2 in this model represents a state of the system such that either A or B has 
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failed (not both). This model is optimised but preserves the result which corresponds to 
the probability of being in state F (i.e., both components have failed). 
 
 
Figure 2—21. An optimised Markov model — same failure rate λ for both components 
 
The Markov solution given by the model of Figure 2—21 is as follows: 
 
  
 P1(t) = – 2 λ P1(t) 
 
  
 P2(t) = 2 λ P1(t) – λ P2(t) 
 
  
 PF(t) = λ P2(t) 
The solution of the differential equations is given by: 
P1(t) =  –          (at t0 = 0, P1(t0) = 1) 
P2(t) = 2(  –   –       )   (at t0 = 0, P2(t0) = 0) 
PF(t) =   –    -  2      + 1  (at t0 = 0, PF(t0) =0) 
PF(t) is the same as given previously with A = B = . 
Optimisation of Markov models is useful considering their growing size and can 
be applied to some patterns which are not uncommon in safety-critical systems, like the 
Markov model of Figure 2—22. The model can be used for the quantitative analysis of 
the PS example system described in chapter 1 (see Figure 1—1). There are three 
categories of states: operational, degraded and completely failed. The transitions are 
labelled with the component failure rates A, B and S for the primary A, the backup B 
and the monitoring sensor S, respectively. The states are textually described with a 
succession of symbols representing the system components in the specific order “A, B, 
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S”. This means that the system is functioning with the first one of the two leftmost 
components that is not substituted with the symbol ‘X’ (which designates a failed 
component). The symbol ‘!B’ in the figure means that component B is not failed, but 
cannot take over A’s job. This is due to a premature failure of the sensor which is, thus, 
unable to activate B upon failure of A. 
In Figure 2—23, we optimise the Markov model of Figure 2—22 whose failure 
states — ‘XXS’, ‘X!BX’ and ‘XXX’ — are all merged into one state “Total Failure” and 
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Figure 2—22. Markov model for the primary-standby system. 
the redundant transitions are removed. For example once the transition with rate A 
occurs from the initial state, then only the transition labelled with rate B matters. 
Therefore, the transitions from “XBS” to “XXX” through “XBX” of Figure 2—22 are all 
removed. Strictly speaking, the probability of the state “Total Failure” (of Figure 2—23) 
is the sum of the probabilities of the states ‘XXS’, ‘X!BX’ and ‘XXX’ (of Figure 2—22). 
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Figure 2—23. Optimized Markov model for the primary-standby system. 
 
Moreover, if the components A and B have the same failure rate, i.e., A = B = 
, then the Markov model in Figure 2—23 can be further optimised as in Figure 2—24. 
In chapter 4 (section 4.4), we present how we can use the proposed SM conversion 
algorithm to automatically optimise Markov state diagrams. Briefly in this section, one 
way of doing it is through their conversion to temporal FTs, which can then be minimised 
using the Pandora temporal laws. This way, the optimal descriptions of the Markov 
models can be automatically extracted from their original (often much bigger) diagrams. 
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Figure 2—24. A more optimized Markov model for the primary-standby system. 
 
2.3.5 State event fault trees 
State Event Fault Trees, or simply SEFTs (Grunske, L. et al. 2005), is another failure 
modelling technique which introduces representation of the temporal order of events. 
SEFTs enable to represent states and transitions in fault trees and, thus, allow preserving 
the significance of the temporal semantics expressed in state-based models of systems 
(and which one wants to analyse). This allows a more accurate modelling and analysis of 
systems exhibiting dynamic failure behaviour, rather than using standard (combinatorial) 
fault trees.  
In the SEFT approach of modelling, states are conditions which last a period of 
time and events are instantaneous and may trigger state transitions (i.e. changes of state). 
These are described by Figure 2—25 together the representation of a component. 
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Figure 2—25. Basic SEFT elements 
 
Moreover, the SEFT modelling capabilities allow to clearly differentiate between causal 
and sequential relations by means of different ports — i.e., event ports (causal) and state 
ports (sequential), see Figure 2—26. 
 
 
Figure 2—26. SEFT relations and ports 
  
Events can be combined using a conjunction (&) gate and/or a disjunction (≥1) gate to, 
e.g., trigger another event. Likewise, states may be combined to express that, e.g., two or 
more states must be true for an event to occur (SEFT gates are depicted by Figure 2—27). 
 
84 
 
 
Figure 2—27. Basic SEFT gates 
 
To better illustrate these different modelling elements, we present the following 
hydraulic distribution system (see Figure 2—28), and which consists of a water tank, two 
pumps and water distribution. A system failure can be caused by loss of the distribution, 
or by either a water leakage in the tank (empty tank) or both pumps fail. 
 
Figure 2—28. Hydraulic Distribution System — adapted from (Bernard R. , 2009). 
 
The corresponding SEFT (see Figure 2—29) shows a conjunction of the two input states 
pump1 failed and pump2 failed, the corresponding output is then combined in a 
disjunction with the state “Tank Empty”. Likewise, the output of this second gate is then 
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combined in a disjunction with the event “Loss of distribution”. This is to represent the 
system failure scenario (top-event of the SEFT). 
 
Figure 2—29. SEFT of the Hydraulic Distribution System 
 
Thereafter, the failure behaviour of each component is described by a state machine and a 
component can be in one state at a time (the active state). A state machine representation 
in SEFT is shown in Figure 2—30; it describes the failure behaviour of a pump 
component (both pumps are identical), and such that:  
 “Initialises” is triggered by an event through the event input port (causal relation) 
and as shown in the bottom of the figure. 
 “Init” is an internal initialiser event (cannot be externally triggered). It sets the 
pump “ON” (temporal relation). 
 “Fails” is an event which changes the state of the pump from “ON” to “Failed”. 
 The “Failed” state is linked to the state output port of the component (causal 
order). 
86 
 
 
Figure 2—30. Pump component 
 
For dependability assessments, though, SEFTs need to be converted to other 
models like Deterministic Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs) (Ciardo et al., 1993), then 
automated analysis can be performed by external tools like TimeNet (German et al., 
1995). However, this approach is limited to quantitative analysis and is less suitable for 
qualitative analysis. 
 
2.3.6 AADL 
The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) was developed under the 
auspices of the International Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) to describe 
hardware and software architectures of performance-critical systems in particular. The 
language has capabilities for the representation of the system as an assembly of software 
components mapped onto an execution platform. Recently, the language has been 
extended with an error model annex for dependability modelling. 
The dependability model consists of both the architecture model and the error 
model. The former consists of the description of the components with their connections 
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and interactions (also known as the nominal
72
 architecture). The latter addresses the 
behaviour of components in the presence of, on the one hand, internal faults and repair 
events and, on the other hand, external propagations from the component environment —
only components which are associated with error models (including connections) are part 
of the AADL dependability model. 
An AADL element (e.g. component or connection) can be associated with an 
error model (effectively a state machine), which consists of a model type and at least one 
error model implementation. A system error model is a composition of the error models 
of its components or subsystems and is meant to capture hazards at system level. Error 
models in AADL can be reusable through the use of an annex library, and there are two 
kinds of reusable error models: the basic model and the derived model. The basic error 
model consists of a declaration of error states for a component or a connection, as well as 
properties to specify changes of states due to error events and propagations. However, the 
derived error model is the definition of the error state of a component in terms of the error 
states of its subcomponents. 
Figure 2—31 shows a graphical representation of an error model associated with 
a component. “ON” is the initial state which can change to “OFF” due to a failure event, 
and then back to “ON” following a repair. It also shows the propagation of an output 
deviation (“Deviation”) — it acts like an event which does not change the local state but 
is visible outside the component. 
 
 
Figure 2—31. AADL SM for a component with an output deviation 
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 It describes both the structural and some aspects of the behavioural designs without any failure 
condition. 
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Table 2—7 shows the corresponding textual description of the error model example — 
the left hand side is for the declaration of states, events and propagations. There is one 
output deviation in this case with a default value of 0.8 which represents its probability of 
occurrence. The right hand side of the table represents the implementation part — i.e., the 
transitions of the state machine (including propagations) as well as failure distributions 
(poisson) assigned to the events fail and repair (for quantitative assessments). 
 
Table 2—7. Error Model Definition of a component propagating an output deviation —
textual description. 
Declaration Implementation 
error model Example1 
features 
ON: initial error state; 
OFF: error state; 
Fail, Repair: error event; 
Deviation: out error propagation 
 {Occurrence => fixed 0.8}; 
end Example1; 
error model implementation Example1.basic 
transitions 
ON- [Fail] ->OFF; 
OFF- [out Deviation] ->OFF; 
OFF- [Repair] ->ON; 
Properties 
Occurrence => poisson 1.0e-3 applies to Fail; 
Occurrence => poisson 1.0e-4 applies to Repair; 
end Example1.basic; 
 
 
A description of a similar example (graphical and textual) with input / output propagation 
is in Appendix A — 4. 
 
 
2.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of relevant safety analysis techniques. We 
discussed in more details the shortcomings of techniques for dynamic safety analysis and 
expanded on the motivation of this work which was presented in the introduction. For 
example, an objective of Altarica (as well as AADL) is to build static fault trees from 
state models. This is quite different from that of dynamic fault trees which is to represent 
89 
 
non-formally a behaviour with dynamic gates to be mainly analysed quantitatively 
afterwards. 
Although state-machine become increasingly a popular notation for description of 
dynamic behaviour, there is clearly a lack of techniques for the qualitative and 
quantitative safety analysis of such models. Synthesis and analysis of fault trees has been 
proposed but classical combinatorial fault trees cannot capture dynamic aspects. In 
chapter 3 we look in more detail to Pandora an expansion of the fault tree notation with 
temporal semantics that potentially solves this problem. 
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3 Pandora 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since FTA is primarily a combinatorial analysis technique, its application on dynamic 
systems requires that the modelling and analysis aspects of the approach are extended. 
Indeed, some extension attempts of FTA are not new; the Priority-AND gate (PAND see 
Figure 3—1) is plausibly one of the first attempts at overcoming the dominant static 
aspect of FTA. The gate dates back to the mid-seventies (Fussel et al., 1976) and is 
conceived such that its output is true if all inputs occur, and if they occur in a specific 
order (typically left to right). This allows the analyst to put a set of events into a 
sequence
73
 (i.e., temporal order) like the events e1, e2… en in Figure 3—1, and thus helps 
to express a kind of time-dependent information in the fault tree.  
 
Figure 3—1. Pandora’s PAND gate with n inputs (n≥2) 
 
Apart from the modelling perspective of the PAND, there have been efforts made 
to work around its quantitative analysis (Fussel et al., 1976). But, qualitative analysis of 
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 The explicit definition of the sequence is typically a conditioning event, even though implicitly 
it is commonly understood that the temporal order of inputs is left to right. 
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fault trees that contain such gates is neglected in general. Moreover, some issues 
seemingly remain vague in the following definition of the PAND gate which is provided 
by the fault tree handbook. 
“The PRIORITY AND-gate is a special case of the AND-gate in which 
the output event occurs only if all input events occur in a specified 
ordered sequence. The sequence is usually shown inside an ellipsis 
drawn to the right of the gate.” (Vesely et al., 1981, p IV-11)  
One issue, for instance, can be about events which can appear more than once in a 
sequence. Another unclear issue can be about events which may occur at the same time, 
or events that may contradict
74
 each other. Concerning the first issue, we can assume that, 
under condition of no repair, faults which occur will continue to exist as suggested in the 
handbook (Vesely W. E., 1981). However, there are still no precise indications regarding 
simultaneity and contradiction of events. Besides, the software tools — older ones like in 
(Worrell et al., 1978) or even recent ones e.g. in (Isograph, 2002) — seem to simply treat 
the PAND as an ordinary AND gate for the logical reductions. But, we have seen how 
this assumption can lead to erroneous results when it comes to the analysis of dynamic 
systems — like the primary-standby example system seen in chapter 1 (Figure 1—1). The 
order in which the primary component and the monitoring sensor fail influences the 
system failure behaviour overall (see the SM of Figure 1—2 in the same chapter). Thus, it 
is necessary for a correct analysis to preserve the meaning of the PAND gate, not only 
during the conversion of the SM to TFTs, but also during the logical reductions of these 
TFTs. 
Pandora (Walker M., 2009) provides two other temporal gates, the Priority-OR 
(POR) gate and the Simultaneous-AND (SAND) gate. The POR gate (see Figure 3—2) 
has at least two input events, the first input (typically the leftmost) represents an event 
which must occur before any other input event of the gate or simply occurs alone; 
otherwise the POR evaluates to false. All input events except the first one are optional, 
i.e., they may not occur but the POR output still evaluates to true. However, the SAND 
gate (see Figure 3—3) evaluates to true only if all its input events occur, but they also 
must occur at the same time. The symbols which correspond to the temporal gates are 
represented in Table 3—1. 
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 For example, (e1 PAND e2) and (e2 PAND e1) where e1 and e2 are two events. 
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Table 3—1. Temporal gate notation 
Gate Symbol 
PAND < 
POR | 
SAND & 
 
 
Figure 3—2. Pandora’s POR gate with n inputs (n≥2) 
 
In this thesis, we use a variation of Pandora which omits the SAND gate. This is 
due to the SM representation of the analysis-related information of the system to analyse; 
though, we assume that events that occur at the same time are due to a common cause 
failure (which is represented by its corresponding event in the SM). Similarly, the 
Pandora temporal laws using the SAND operator are removed from this variation. 
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Figure 3—3. Pandora’s SAND gate with n inputs (n≥2) 
 
3.2 Pandora temporal laws adapted to SM-based analysis  
Temporal fault trees, in this thesis, are generated from the SMs which describe the failure 
behaviour of dynamic systems; this will be fully detailed in chapter 4. As we have seen 
for the example of the primary standby, it is necessary to preserve the significance of the 
SM temporal semantics during the conversion to TFTs; but this is not sufficient. We also 
need to preserve the significant fault sequences all along the logical reduction of the 
generated TFTs. 
Pandora (Walker, 2009) provides a set of temporal laws, thereby enabling a true 
temporal qualitative analysis of dynamic systems. However, many of these laws contain 
the SAND operator and, therefore, these need to be identified for some alteration — the 
laws which were conceived to transform expressions containing exclusively SAND 
operator(s) will be completely removed from our selection. 
We present in this section a set of Pandora temporal laws selected to suit our 
approach for a SM-based analysis. We wish to note, though, that these laws can be 
verified using temporal truth tables (Walker, 2009) which are similar to Boolean truth 
tables, but suited for temporal logic. For example, Table 3—2 shows that A<B  
(A|B).B, by using values in the table such that zero indicates that the corresponding event 
has not occurred (i.e., false). Any other value (strictly greater than zero) indicates that the 
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corresponding event has occurred (i.e., true). Two events with non-zero values are either 
simultaneous (holding the same value) or in sequence (the event with the smaller value 
occurs before the event with the higher value).  
 
Table 3—2. A Pandora temporal truth table  
A B A<B A|B (A|B).B 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
1 2 2 1 2 
2 1 0 0 0 
 
Table 3—2 shows that A<B evaluates to zero in all rows, except when A and B are both 
assigned with different non-zero values, one for A and two for B, and A<B evaluates to 
the higher value (i.e., two). This conforms to the definition of the PAND gate whose input 
events must all occur, and in sequence so that the output of the gate evaluates to true (i.e., 
the value assigned to the last input event of the sequence). 
 
Commutative Laws 
1. A<B  B<A 
2. A|B  B|A 
 
Associative Laws 
1. A<(B<C)  (A<B)<C 
2. (A<B)<C  A<B<C 
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3. A|(B|C)  (A|B)|C 
4. (A|B)|C  A|B|C 
5. A<(B<C)  (A.B)<C  (A<C).(B<C) 
6. (A|B)|C  A|B|C  A|(B+C)  A|B.A|C 
 
Distributive Laws 
1. A < (B.C)  B.(A<C) + C.(A<B) 
2. A < (B+C)  (A|C).(A|B).(B+C) 
3. A < (B<C)  (A<C).(B<C) 
4. A < (B|C)  (A<B).(B|C) 
5. A < (B|C)  (A|B).(B|C) 
6. A | (B+C)  (A|B).(A|C) 
7. A | (B.C)  A|B + A|C 
8. A | (B<C)  (A|C) + (A|B) + A.(C<B) 
9. A | (B|C)  (A|B) + (A.C<B) 
10. (B+C) < A  (B<A) + (C<A) 
11. (B.C) < A  (B<A).(C<A) 
12. (B<C) < A  (B<C).(C<A) 
13. (B|C) < A  (B<A).(B|C) 
14. (B+C) | A  (B|A) + (C|A) 
15. (B.C) | A  (B|A).(C|A) 
16. (B<C) | A  (B|C).(C|A) 
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17. (B|C) | A  (B|C).(B|A) 
18. (A+B) < (C+D)  (A|C).(A|D).(C+D) + (B|C).(B|D).(C+D) 
19. (A.B) < (C.D)  (A<D).(B<D).(C<D) + (A<C).(B<C).(D<C)  
20. (A|B) < (C|D)  (A<C).(A|B).(C|D) 
21. (A+B) | (C+D)  (A|C).(A|D) + (B|C).(B|D) 
22. (A.B) | (C.D)  (A|C).(B|C) + (A|D).(B|D) 
23. (A<B) | (C<D)  (A<B).(B|C) + (A<B).(B|D) + (A<B).(D<C)  
 
Non-idempotent Laws 
1. A<A  A 
2. A|A  A 
 
Absorption Laws 
1. A . (A < B)  A < B 
2. A . (A | B)  A | B 
3. A < (A . B)  A < B 
4. A | (A . B)  A | B 
 
In the following and to the end of the list of laws, ‘0’ means “never occurs” and 
‘1’ means “always occurs, i.e. before anything else occurs (first always)”. 
5. A < (A + B)  0 
6. A | (A + B)  0 
7. (A . B) < A  0 
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8. (A . B) | A  0 
9. (A + B) < A  B < A 
10. (A + B) | A  B | A 
11. A + (A < B)  A 
12. A + (A | B)  A 
13. B + (A < B)  B 
14. B + (A | B)  A + B 
15. A<B . A|C  A<C<B + A<B<C + A<B . A|C 
16. A|B  A<B + A|B     
17. A|B|C  A<B<C + A<C<B + A<B . A|C + A<C . A|B + A|B|C 
18. A<B|C  A<B<C + A<B . B|C 
 
Completion Laws 
1. First Completion Law:   A.B  A<B + B<A 
2. Second Completion Law:  A+B  A|B + B|A 
3. Third Completion Law:   A  B<A + A|B 
The below are further laws of completion for the purpose of reducing temporal 
expressions, i.e., RCL (abbreviation of Reduction Completion Law): 
4. A  A.B + A|B 
5. A  (A<B + B<A) + A|B 
6. A  B<C<A + C<B<A + A|B|C + C<A|B + B<A|C 
7. A  A.B + A.C + A|B + A|C 
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8. A<B  C<A<B + A<C<B + A<B<C + A<B . B|C 
9. A  B<A + C<A + B<C<A + C<B<A + A<B . A|C + A<C .A|B + 
A|B|C + B<A<C + C<A<B + A<B<C + A<C<B 
 
Mutual Exclusion Laws  
1. A<B . B<A  0 
2. A|B . B<A  0 
3. B|A . A<B  0 
 
Simultaneity Laws  
1. A<A  0 
2. A|A  0 
 
Extension Laws  
1. A<B . B<C  A<B . B<C . A<C  A<B<C 
2. A|B . B|C  A|B . B|C . A|C 
3. A<B . B<C . C<A  A<C . B<C . C<A . A<C . B<A . C<A 
 
Extended Laws of Extension 
1. C<A . B<C  C<A . B<C . B<A 
2. C|A . B|C  C|A . B|C . B|A 
3. A<B . B|C  A<B . B|C . A|C 
4. A|B . B<C  A|B . B<C . A<C 
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5. C<A . B|C  C<A . B|C . B<A 
6. C|A . B<C  C|A . B<C . B|A 
 
POR Transformation Laws  
1. A|B . B  A<B 
2. A|B + B  A + B 
3. A<B . A  A<B 
4. A<B . B  A<B 
5. A<B + A  A 
6. A<B + B  B 
7. A|B + B  A + B 
8. A|B.C + B  A.C + B 
9. A|B|C + B  A|C + B 
 
Priority Laws  
1. A<B + A|B  A|B 
2. A<B . A|B  A<B 
3. A<B + A.B  A.B 
4. A|B + A.B  A75 
5. A<B . A|B  A<B76 
                                                     
75
 A|B + A.B  A|B + A<B + B<A (by Conjunctive Completion Law)  A + A<B  (by 
Reductive Completion Law)  A (by Absorption Law) 
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Tautology and Contradiction Laws  
1. A<0  0 
2. 0<A  0 
3. A<1  0 
4. 1<A  A 
5. A|0  A 
6. 0|A  0 
7. A|1  0 
8. 1|A  1 
 
3.3 Case study 
In this section, we show how the temporal laws that we have presented are useful by 
applying them to the vehicle management system (VMS) example of chapter 1. To 
summarise, the system operates with three vehicle management components (A, B and C) 
and its failure behaviour expressed by the DFT (Figure 3—4 a) is such that either the 
spare gate corresponding to the component C is true or the spare gates corresponding to 
the components A and B are both true to cause the VMS top-event (i.e., the system 
failure).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
76
 A<B . A|B  A<B . A<B (by POR Transformation)  A<B (by Idempotent: A.A  A) 
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Figure 3—4. The VMS DFT, SM and system failure TFTs 
 
The spare S is shared among all components, and a spare gate is true if the corresponding 
component fails and cannot be replaced by the spare. This can happen because either the 
spare itself is failed or is unavailable — i.e., it is replacing another failed component. 
Figure 3—4 (b) shows the SM which represents the system failure behaviour (as 
explained in chapter 1). Briefly, the state names use the notation based on the succession 
“ABC”. The initial state ABC” means that all components are working. Thereafter, the 
position of any failed component in the succession will take either the symbol ‘S’ or ‘X’ 
— ‘S’ means that the failed component has been replaced by the spare and ‘X’ means that 
it cannot be replaced by the spare for the reasons mentioned earlier. As for the transitions, 
these are labelled with the component symbols to indicate their corresponding failures. 
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In the next chapter, we will present an algorithm for the automatic generation of 
TFTs from SMs. That algorithm will generate the following six cut-sequences from the 
SM of the VMS. To briefly explain how we obtained these cut-sequences; there is a 
corresponding Pandora formula for each final state, a formula is the disjunction over the 
paths  (from the initial state to its corresponding final state) of the conjunction of events 
that label . Moreover, any one of the events e that label , which is incident from a state 
u with an out-degree of two or more (a state at which paths diverge), is the input event, 
which must occur first or alone, of a POR gate that associates it with the disjunction of 
other events e’ incident from u to the states u’ if, and only if, the subpath of  from u to s 
shares an event with the paths from u through u’ to any state. In this section, we put 
emphasis on the minimisation of these cut-sequences (not the full conversion algorithm) 
in order to reach their corresponding reduced forms, which are described by Figure 3—4 
(c). We will use some of the temporal laws presented in this chapter to achieve these 
results. 
 
“SystemFailure” =  
B.A.C|A|B +      (1) 
C.A|C|B +      (2) 
S.C|A|B +       (3) 
S.A.B|C|A +      (4) 
C.B|C|A +      (5) 
S.B.A|C|B      (6) 
 
By using POR transformation
77
 #1 to all cut-sequences, we obtain the following 
transformed equivalent results: 
 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
                                                     
77
 i.e., the first minimisation step which reduces a representation using two gates ‘POR’ and 
‘AND’ to a representation using one gate only ‘PAND’, i.e. A|B . B  A<B. 
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A<C . A|B +      (2) 
S.C|A|B +       (3) 
S . B<A . B|C +     (4) 
B<C . B|A +      (5) 
S . A<B . A|C     (6) 
 
Then we apply the law of absorption #15 to cut-sequences (2) and (5) to get the 
following results, where (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) are introduced by the transformation of (2) 
and (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) are introduced by the transformation of (5): 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<B<C +       (2.1) 
A<C<B  +      (2.2)  
A<C . A|B +      (2.3) 
S.C|A|B +       (3) 
S . B<A . B|C +     (4) 
B<A<C +       (5.1) 
B<C<A      (5.2) 
B<C . B|A      (5.3) 
S . A<B . A|C     (6) 
 
Next, we apply the completion law #8 on (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (5.1) for the 
purpose to reduce all these to simply A<C and we refer to it as (25), i.e., it originates from 
the previous cut-sequence #2, plus a branch from the cut-sequence #5. Similarly, we 
apply the same reduction completion law (RCL #8) on (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) and (2.1) to 
reduce them to B<C and we refer to it as (52) for the same reason as the previous one, i.e., 
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it originates from the previous cut-sequence #5, plus a branch from the cut-sequence #2. 
Therefore, by using the Boolean idempotent law (A + A  A) we have the following: 
 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<B<C +       (2.1) 
A<C<B  +      (2.2)  
A<C . A|B +      (2.3) 
B<A<C +       (5.1) 
S.C|A|B +       (3) 
S . B<A . B|C +     (4) 
B<A<C +       (5.1) 
B<C<A      (5.2) 
B<C . B|A      (5.3) 
A<B<C +       (2.1) 
S . A<B . A|C     (6) 
 
Then the application of RCL #8 gives: 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<C +       (25) 
S.C|A|B +       (3) 
S . B<A . B|C +     (4) 
B<C +       (52) 
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S . A<B . A|C     (6) 
By application of the absorption law #15 on both (4) and (6) we will get: 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<C +        (25) 
S.C|A|B +       (3) 
S . B<A . B|C +     (4.1) 
S . B<C<A +      (4.2) 
S . B<A<C +     (4.3) 
B<C +        (52) 
S . A<B . A|C +    (6.1) 
S . A<C<B +     (6.2) 
S . A<B<C     (6.3) 
 
We can also apply the 3-event absorption law (i.e., law #17) on cut-sequence (3), 
then the Boolean distributive law “A . (B + C)  A . B + A . C” on the obtained sub-
branches to get the following: 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<C +       (25) 
S . ( C<A<B +     (3.1) 
C<B<A +       (3.2) 
C<A . C|B +      (3.3) 
C<B .C|A +      (3.4) 
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C|A|B )       (3.5) 
S . B<A . B|C +     (4.1) 
S . B<C<A +      (4.2) 
S . B<A<C +     (4.3) 
B<C +       (52) 
S . A<B . A|C +    (6.1) 
S . A<C<B +     (6.2) 
S . A<B<C     (6.3) 
 
Next, we associate all of (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (6.1), 
(6.2) and (6.3) by using the Boolean distributive law “A . (B + C)  A . B + A . C”. 
Therefore, we have: 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<C +       (25) 
S . ( C<A<B +     (3.1) 
C<B<A +      (3.2) 
C<A . C|B +     (3.3) 
C<B .C|A +     (3.4) 
C|A|B +      (3.5) 
B<A . B|C +      (4.1) 
B<C<A +       (4.2) 
B<A<C +       (4.3) 
A<B . A|C +      (6.1) 
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A<C<B +       (6.2) 
A<B<C )      (6.3) 
B<C +       (52) 
 
We also obtain the following by applying the Boolean absorption law “ A + A.B 
 A” on (25) and (52): 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
S . A<C +       (25.1) 
A<C +       (25.2) 
S . ( C<A<B +     (3.1) 
C<B<A +      (3.2) 
C<A . C|B +     (3.3) 
C<B .C|A +     (3.4) 
C|A|B +      (3.5) 
B<A . B|C +      (4.1) 
B<C<A +       (4.2) 
B<A<C +       (4.3) 
A<B . A|C +      (6.1) 
A<C<B +       (6.2) 
A<B<C ) +     (6.3) 
S . B<C +       (52.1) 
B<C       (52.2) 
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(25.1) and (52.1) can be associated with (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (4.1), (4.2), 
(4.3), (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) by using the Boolean distributive law “A . (B + C)  A . B + 
A . C”, and hence: 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<C +       (25.2) 
B<C +       (52.2) 
S . ( 
A<C +        (25.1) 
B<C +        (52.1) 
C<A<B +       (3.1) 
C<B<A +      (3.2) 
C<A . C|B +     (3.3) 
C<B .C|A +     (3.4) 
C|A|B +      (3.5) 
B<A . B|C +      (4.1) 
B<C<A +       (4.2) 
B<A<C +       (4.3) 
A<B . A|C +      (6.1) 
A<C<B +       (6.2) 
A<B<C      (6.3) 
) 
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In the next step, we apply the Boolean Algebra Idempotence law of the logical 
disjunction on (3,2), (4.2), (4.3), (3,1), (6.2) and (6.3). This is to get them duplicated for 
the purpose of: 
a) Reducing (25.1), (52.1) (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (4.2), (6.2), (4.3) and 
(6.3) to C by using the 3-event RCL #9. 
b) Reducing (3,2), (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) to B<A by using the RCL #8. 
c) Reducing (3,1), (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) to A<B by using the RCL #8. 
 
The application of the disjunction Idempotence law gives the following: 
“SystemFailure” =  
C<A . C<B +      (1) 
A<C +       (25.2) 
B<C +       (52.2) 
S . ( 
A<C +        (25.1) 
B<C +        (52.1) 
C<A<B +       (3.1) 
C<B<A +      (3.2) 
C<A . C|B +     (3.3) 
C<B .C|A +     (3.4) 
C|A|B +      (3.5) 
B<C<A +       (4.2)  
C<B<A +      (3.2)  
B<A . B|C +      (4.1) 
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B<C<A +       (4.2) 
B<A<C +       (4.3) 
C<A<B +       (3.1)  
A<B . A|C +      (6.1) 
A<C<B +       (6.2) 
B<A<C +       (4.3)  
A<B<C +      (6.3)  
A<C<B +       (6.2)  
A<B<C      (6.3) 
) 
Then, by application of the reductions a), b) and c) mentioned earlier, we have: 
“SystemFailure” = C<A . C<B +  A<C + B<C + S . ( C + B<A + A<B ) 
Finally (and by application of RCL #1, i.e., A<B + B<A  A . B) we have the following: 
“SystemFailure” = C<A . C<B +  A<C + B<C + S . (C + A . B) 
These are the cut-sequences described by Figure 3—4 (c). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of a recent temporal qualitative analysis 
technique so-called Pandora. The technique not only extends standard fault trees with 
temporal information modelling capabilities, but also provides a set of temporal laws 
besides the Boolean logic laws. These are useful to preserve the significance of the 
temporal semantics all along the logical reduction of the fault trees, and as demonstrated 
through the case study example in section 3.3.  
We have highlighted three temporal gates introduced by Pandora: PAND, POR 
and SAND. The latter (which is conceived to model the simultaneity of events) has been 
removed and the original temporal laws were adapted correspondingly. The main reason 
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which has driven the alteration of the original temporal laws is our use of SMs (which 
describe the failure behaviour of systems) to generate the fault trees. The generated fault 
trees are, therefore, in all cases (whether static or dynamic) without any SAND gate.  
Representation of simultaneity (at the level of the SMs) is useful to be made if we 
assume common failure modes by which events may occur at the same time. Such an 
assumption was made in the second case study of this thesis (see chapter 6 about the 
brake-by-wire system) to model the dynamics of the vehicle (section 6.1).  
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4 Automatic Generation of Temporal Fault Trees from 
State Machine Models of Systems 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
State machines are an expressive, high-level form of modelling the behaviour of systems. 
They readily express the different effects of events on a system in different states, making 
them well-suited to modelling the effect of failure and fault events on a system. We 
observed in the literature chapter how the use of SMs is becoming prevalent and 
particularly important for modelling dynamic systems — like for example in (and among 
other modelling approaches) Altarica [(Rauzy, 2002), (Griffault A. , 2003) and (Bernard 
R. , 2009)], FSAP/NuSMV-SA [(Bozzano et al., 2003) and (Bozzano et al., 2006)], 
representation of SEFTs [(Kaiser et al., 2007) and (Grunske et al., 2005)], analysis of 
DFTs and SEFTs using Markov chains [(Dehlinger et al., 2008), (Dugan et al., 1992), 
(Dugan et al., 1997), (Dugan et al., 2000), (Kaiser et al., 2007) and (Vesely et al., 2002)] 
and, most recently, AADL [(Feiler et al., 2007), (Joshi et al., 2007), (Rugina A., 2007) 
and (Rugina et al., 2008)]. HiP-HOPS also defines an extension with state automata 
modelling capabilities as described in (Papadopoulos Y., 2000). 
We have discussed two different approaches to perform dependability analysis on 
dynamic systems. The first approach consists of converting the SMs to GSPNs as with 
AADL error models
78
 [(Rugina A. , 2007) and (Rugina et al., 2008)]. Yet this approach is 
less suitable for qualitative analysis
79
. An alternative approach involves conversion of 
state machines to combinatorial fault trees, like in (Joshi et al, 2007) with AADL and in 
(Rauzy, 2002) with Altarica. The problem highlighted with this type of conversion 
consists, in particular, of the loss of the temporal semantics expressed by state machines 
during their translation to combinatorial (i.e., static) fault trees — these have no concept 
of event order or sequence, and this can potentially cause serious errors.  
                                                     
78
 These are effectively SMs (showing transitions from normal to degraded and failed states) as 
observed in (Feiler et al., 2007). 
79
 I.e., establishment of direct relationships between causes and effects of failure, as in FMEA. 
Qualitative analysis is particularly important when probabilistic data are not available, e.g. at early 
stages of design. 
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In (Rauzy, 2002), this problem emerging from the conversion of SMs to 
combinatorial FTs was noted when a conjunction of two mutually exclusive paths 
through the SM for a k-out-of-n system both became results of the fault tree analysis. 
This was solved by incorporating NOT gates into the conversion to introduce a partial 
order, so that different paths through the SM could be distinguished by indicating that 
some events did not occur. However, although this will work in certain cases (e.g. to 
prevent the result (A AND B) OR (A AND C) OR (B AND C) when A and B are 
mutually exclusive), it still cannot distinguish SM paths that differ only in sequence. If, 
for example, the state machine defines that different sequences of faults, e.g. A before B 
and B before A, lead the system into two mutually exclusive failure states, the fault trees 
for these two states will show the combination of A and B as a common cause of both 
states. This result is logically and probabilistically incorrect, and will thus lead to 
incorrect conclusions regarding the dependability of the system.  
This approach of converting SMs to combinatorial fault trees for dependability 
analysis is being used in conjunction with influential modelling languages including 
AADL and Altarica. The former is gaining growing acceptance in the aerospace 
community and the latter was already used together with the conversion algorithm 
described in (Rauzy, 2002) in an industrial context. For example, this algoritnm (which 
compiles mode automata into combinatorial FTs) was used as part of the OCAS tool 
which has been developped by Dassault Aviation in a certification process of its Falcon 
7X flight controls. Thereafter, the Aralia tool — described in (Dutuit et al., 1997) — was 
used to handle the analysis of the generated FTs from Altarica models (both qualitatively 
and quantitatively). Besides, the Altarica’s modelling and analysis platform — a tool 
which uses computer-performed generation of fault trees — was qualified as a validation 
tool in several aerospace projects, including Airbus civil aircraft programs (Bernard R. , 
2009). 
The potential for erroneous results arising from application of this approach in a 
subset of SMs must therefore be addressed. To correct the conceptual flaw discussed 
above and allow true qualitative temporal safety analysis, in this chapter, we outline our 
technique to enable conversion of SMs to temporal FTs as opposed to static FTs, thereby 
preserving the significance of the sequencing of faults. The fault trees can then be 
analysed using Pandora (see chapter 3) to enable qualitative analysis of the generated 
TFTs. The approach is generally applicable to error models expressed as SMs, including 
the AADL error model. It can also in principle be combined with a compositional 
analysis technique like HiP-HOPS (Papadopoulos Y. , 2000), which would enable 
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automatic synthesis and analysis of temporal fault trees from complex models where the 
error behaviour of the system has been described by SMs.  
Our aim in this chapter is, precisely, to propose a new approach for safety 
analysis of dynamic systems with SM-based failure behavioural models. The core of our 
approach consists of the conversion of the SMs to dynamic analysis models (i.e., 
temporal FTs). These will be consequently analysed using a temporal qualitative analysis 
technique like Pandora. The significance of the temporal semantics expressed by SMs 
will be, therefore, preserved during the conversion to TFTs, and along the logical 
reduction of these TFTs by using the temporal laws of Pandora. 
We use the primary standby (PS) example system — described in chapter 1 — to 
demonstrate how the proposed method has helped us analyse the system, and therefore 
correct the analysis results produced using a conversion of the system’s SM to static 
models (like pure combinatorial FTs), which limits any consequent analysis to static 
techniques like FTA. The PS example system will also serve in the following chapter to 
be scaled up from a single to a triple redundancy. The example is, therefore, useful not 
only to show how we can reuse some of the failure behavioural models in the analysis of 
larger systems; but it will also serve, mainly and most importantly, to propose a 
compositional approach for our technique and to demonstrate how it can contribute to an 
improvement in the overall safety of increasingly complex modern safety-critical 
systems. 
Figure 4—1 captures in a single view the PS example system in (a), the SM 
which represents its failure behaviour in (b) and its corresponding FT in (c) — where A, 
B and S represent abbreviations of ‘A fails’, ‘B fails’ and ‘S fails’ respectively. Briefly, 
the system (as explained in chapter 1) operates either in primary mode (i.e., with 
component A) or standby mode (i.e., with component B). The sensor S serves to activate 
B upon detection of an output deviation (e.g. omission of output) from A.  
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Figure 4—1. (a) The PS example system. (b) SM failure behavioural model of the PS.  
(c) FT of the PS. 
 
‘I’ is the input to the system and ‘Out’ is an abstraction of the output, which we omit to 
consider in the analysis for the sake of clarity. The SM in (b) shows that an omission of 
input ‘O-I’ is a single point of failure of the system, failures of A and B together will lead 
the system to a total failure (irrespective of the order of the two failures); but about A and 
S, only a failure of S preceding that one of A is relevant to the system failure behaviour 
— if this happens in this order, then B cannot be activated upon failure of A; otherwise, 
the system can still continue operating in standby mode, i.e., A failing first will cause the 
SM to transit to the top state
80
 (B active and A failed, i.e. the system is only degraded), 
and thus a subsequent failure of S will have no impact on the system (i.e., no transition). 
This SM clearly shows how the order in which the same two events occur can affect the 
overall outcome — the system, as a result, will be either degraded or totally failed 
depending on which one has failed first. 
                                                     
80
 In this case, S has already detected that something went wrong with A and has, therefore, 
activated B before failing. 
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Different sequences of the same events causing different effects is not an 
uncommon pattern of events; many safety-critical systems feature the ability to continue 
operating with a subset of functionality, e.g. some aeroplanes can continue to fly even 
after an engine failure. In this case, one event may be a failure of the fire extinguishing 
system and the other one an engine fire. If the fire extinguishing system fails first, the fire 
cannot be extinguished and may spread, whereas if an engine fire occurs first, the fire can 
be extinguished and the aeroplane can continue to fly, albeit in a degraded state.  
By transforming a SM to FTs, each of the system failures (i.e., final states of the 
SM) would become the head (i.e., top event) of their own fault tree, with the root causes 
beneath. All paths through the SM to a given final state become a disjunction of possible 
causes of the corresponding top event, and each cause is represented as a conjunction of 
all failure events in that path which have caused the system to enter the final state. Each 
conjunction represents one cut set of the fault tree, and if it contains no redundancies, 
then it is a minimal cut set (MCS). By applying this to the SM of Figure 4—1 (b), we 
would obtain ‘System Failure’ as top event of the fault tree as follows and where ‘.’ and 
‘+’ represent the logical gates ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ respectively: 
System Failure = O-I.S + A.S + O-I.B + A.B + O-I + B.A + O-I.A 
The SM has seven different paths leading to a unique final state (System Failure), and 
hence the seven cut sets of the unique fault tree expression above. This fault tree 
expression can be logically reduced according to the absorption law X + X.Y = X, thus 
we would obtain: 
System Failure = A.S + A.B + O-I + B.A  
The idempotent law X + X = X would help us to further reduce the expression to become: 
System Failure = A.S + A.B + O-I.  
Hence the minimised fault tree of Figure 4—1 (c). 
Clearly, by transforming the SM of the PS to a combinatorial fault tree, we would 
obtain the conjunction of the failures of A and S as a cause of the total failure of the 
system. This, however, is not accurate and invalidates application of this approach to this 
and other cases where the temporal ordering of failures is significant — the results are not 
an accurate representation of the behaviour shown in the SM. Note that any consequent 
quantitative analysis would also be incorrect. Thus, this kind of transformation can 
potentially lead to serious errors in the analysis. Therefore, we need firstly to compile 
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SMs into FTs that have representation capabilities of concept of time or event 
sequencing, then secondly to be able to preserve the significance of the temporal 
semantics and event sequencing these new FTs contain along their logical reduction. 
 
4.2 Compilation of SMs into TFTs 
Our approach consists of the conversion of SMs (which are dynamic models) to temporal 
FTs (which are also dynamic) rather pure combinatorial FTs (which are static). We 
observed in the literature chapter different approaches which extend FTs with temporal 
capabilities for modelling sequence-dependent failures (a situation frequently exhibited 
by dynamic systems). Therefore, we start this section by presenting the reasons which 
have influenced our initial choice concerning the TFT approach targeted by the 
transformation from the SMs. 
 
4.2.1 The Pandora choice 
It is necessary but not sufficient to preserve the significance of the temporal semantics 
expressed by the SMs during their transformation to the corresponding FTs. The 
generated FTs (with temporal information if necessary) need to be logically analysed. If 
these are not already in their minimal form, then a logical reduction is needed. It also 
necessary to preserve the significance of the temporal semantics (transferred from the 
SMs to the generated FTs) during all the reduction process. 
The approaches to dynamic FTs observed in chapter 2 focus primarily on 
quantitative analysis, like SEFTs (Kaiser et al., 2007) and DFTs (Vesely et al., 2002) 
which are solved with Markov chains. The approach in (Merle, 2010), however, attempts 
to qualitatively analyse dynamic FTs by determining minimal canonical forms of the 
structure functions corresponding to the FTs. However, a minimal canonical form is not 
necessarily unique
81
 for a structure function of a dynamic FT and the complexity involved 
was beyond the scope of the work in (Merle, 2010). TFT minimisation itself is also 
beyond the scope of work of this doctoral thesis. 
                                                     
81
 There are typically as many minimal canonical forms of the structure function as there are 
minimization criteria. 
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Pandora (chapter 3) was designed mainly for temporal qualitative analysis. It not 
only extends FTs with its three temporal gates (PAND, POR and SAND), but also 
provides sets of temporal laws which complete the Boolean laws — like (among others) 
temporal commutative, associative and distributive laws, also completion, absorption and 
reductive laws . Briefly (and as seen in chapter 3), Pandora provides two different 
approaches to the reduction of its TFTs. One of these relies on temporal logic (i.e., logical 
reduction through redundancy, contradiction and completion); the other approach is a 
hierarchical reduction technique which uses dependency trees to model relationships of 
events. 
For the purpose of our study, we use a variation of Pandora where the SAND gate 
is omitted. We avoid non-determinism in the state machine by assuming a common 
failure mode by which two (or more) failures occur simultaneously. This assumption was 
also observed being used in other state-transition based modelling techniques like Markov 
chains in for instance (ARP4761, 1996), and where a simultaneous failure of two or more 
components was given one failure rate. Consequently, the temporal laws identified in 
chapter 3 to be used for the logical reduction of the generated FTs are variations (without 
SAND operators) of their corresponding Pandora laws. Temporal expressions are 
generally complex, particularly when compared with Boolean ones. Therefore, the 
temporal laws are very useful in order to reduce the complexity involved through 
minimisation of the generated temporal expressions. 
 
4.2.2 Representing SMs using Pandora logic 
A state machine will have as many fault trees as there are final states. Each final state 
represents a system failure (i.e., one fault tree top-event) and each transition between 
states represents an event in a fault tree. Every full path between the initial state and a 
given final state becomes a new branch of its corresponding FT — i.e., represented by the 
conjunction of the events that label that path. In the case where some system failures are 
sequence-dependent, then the corresponding FTs should be temporal. Thus, not all SMs 
require the use of temporal gates when transformed to fault trees. In many cases, standard 
Boolean logic is adequate to represent the behaviour and perform a correct analysis; for 
example a SM where two events e.g. A then B lead to a ‘Degraded’ state and two other 
different events e.g. C then D lead to a ‘Failed’ state as in Figure 4—2.  
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Figure 4—2. SM example of a static system. 
 
In this case, we are concerned with separate combinations of events, i.e., the two 
branches have no events in common and each event contributes only to a single end state 
(and ultimately, contributes to only one top event). Here, a change in the sequence of the 
events (e.g. D before C instead of C before D) will not lead to a different failure. In the 
case that D happens first, the system simply stays in the initial state and when C occurs it 
performs two instantaneous transitions to reach the final failed state; thus the failure 
behaviour is not sequence-dependent as in the case of the SM of the PS in Figure 4—1 
(b). Therefore, in this scenario, Boolean logic is sufficient to model the situation 
unambiguously (Degraded = A.B and Failed = C.D) and thus the simpler transformation 
of SMs into fault trees described in (Joshi et al., 2007) is sufficient to obtain an accurate 
analysis. 
Imposing temporal constraints during the conversion depends on whether or not 
the SM has at least one event appearing in more than one path. Typically, if there is at 
least one event that contributes to the occurrence of more than one system failure, then 
conversion to temporal fault trees may be needed. It may also be true even if there is an 
event that is a contributory factor to the occurrence of only one system failure, but as a 
result of more than one sequence of events. In such cases, an accurate analysis depends 
upon the correct preservation of the temporal semantics, as different sequences of those 
shared events – or other events relative to those shared events – may lead to different 
final states (and thus different system failures). The application of our approach allows 
complex dynamic analysis to be applied only when necessary, depending on whether each 
part of the system is static or dynamic. 
 
4.2.3 Pandora description of the PS state machine 
Figure 4—1 (b) presents a more detailed view of the failure behaviour of the PS example 
from Figure 4—1 (a). Note that two paths for a combination A and B have been shown 
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here for clarity, though as will be seen this does not affect the results. Likewise, the state 
machine shows that the final state "System Failure" is dependent on different sequences 
of events. For example, the sequence in which S failing before A can lead to system 
failure is shown, but the failure of S after A does not lead to system failure (as it has no 
effect). Other paths that are clearly redundant, such as failures of A then S then B, are 
omitted. 
This type of sequence-dependent failure behaviour is clearly visible from the 
state machine, but cannot easily be analysed in this form. We could convert it to a 
combinatorial fault tree, but as explained earlier, the temporal semantics would be lost. 
Instead, we must convert it into a Pandora temporal fault tree. The first step in the process 
is to identify shared events, i.e. events that are present in more than one path through the 
state machine. For example, the event "A fails" contributes to multiple paths through this 
SM: "A fails  B fails", "B fails  A fails" and "S fails  A fails". These sequences of 
events are all different causes of the same system failure, and since fault trees do not 
represent states explicitly, only events, it is necessary to use a temporal fault tree to 
represent this type of failure behaviour. 
To see how the sequence of events affects the conversion process, let us consider 
three paths, each sufficient on its own to cause the system failure:  
Path 1:   A fails  B fails  
Path 2:   B fails  A fails  
Path 3:   S fails  A fails  
The event ‘A fails’ (which we shall abbreviate to just ‘A’, and similarly ‘B’ = ‘B fails’, 
‘S’ = ‘S fails’, and ‘I’ = ‘O-I’) influences the state of the system in all three paths. 
However, which path is taken from the initial state depends on whether A, B, or S occurs 
first, assuming no omission of input occurs before. For example, in the case that A occurs 
first, we are already in path 1 and S does not influence the state of the system; only a 
subsequent failure of B (or O-I) leads to system failure. However, if S occurs first 
(leading us into path 3) then a subsequent failure of A is sufficient to cause system 
failure. 
The only way to accurately model this in a fault tree is to use temporal operators. 
In particular, we want to ensure that the relative ordering of each event that leaves the 
initial state (e.g. in this case, A, B, and S each leads to a different path depending on 
which occurs first) is explicitly represented. The main sequence operator in Pandora is the 
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PAND gate, and we can use this to unambiguously distinguish between a path in which A 
occurs first (i.e. path 1) and a path in which S occurs first (i.e. path 3): 
Path 1:   A < B  
Path 3   S < A  
However, the situation is more complex than it first appears, as we also want to express 
priority – the idea that one event must occur first – without also implying that another 
event must occur. For example, to distinguish between path 2 and path 3, we need to 
know whether S or B occurs first, but S and B are not shared between these paths – only 
A is. Thus to distinguish path 3 from path 2, we need to say that S occurred before B, but 
only if B occurs; B does not have to occur for path 3 to be completed leading to system 
failure. 
To do this, we can take advantage of Pandora's POR gate. The POR gate 
represents this concept of priority – that one event should take priority over others and 
must occur first, but without specifying that the other events must also occur. Thus we 
can represent the three paths as follows:  
Path 1:    (A < B) . (A | S)  
Path 2:    (B < A) . (B | S)  
Path 3:    (S < A) . (S | B)  
Thus path 1 specifies two constraints: firstly that both A and B must occur, with A 
occurring first, and secondly that if S also occurs at all, it must occur after A. The second 
constraint represents a situation where S has already served its purpose and activated the 
backup, in which case its subsequent failure has no effect. Thus, in path 1, both A and B 
must occur for the system to fail as a whole. The PAND gate alone would not work in this 
type of situation as it would mean that all three events must occur. Only the POR gate 
correctly represents the temporal semantics and allows us to preserve the sequences of 
events in the state machine. 
Using two operators like this enables us to accurately represent the temporal 
semantics of the SM, but it does lead to more complex expressions and thus a more 
complex translation process. By using Pandora's temporal laws, it is possible to simplify 
the generation of these expressions so that they require only one operator – the POR. The 
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law A<B <=> (A|B).B means that any expression containing a PAND can be converted to 
use a POR instead, e.g. for Path 1:  
 (A < B) . (A | S)  <=> (A | B) . B . (A | S) <=> 
 (A | B | S) . B <=> A | B | S . B 
A second law was also applied here: A|B . A|C <=> A|B|C. Note that A|B|C is not 
equivalent to A|(B|C); after the first event, the others can occur in any order, so A|B|C 
<=> A|C|B. Thus we can represent the three paths as follows:  
Path 1:   A | B | S . B  
Path 2:   B | A | S . A  
Path 3:   S | A | B . A  
This form allows us to see both the temporal constraints (represented by the PORs) and 
the purely combinatorial constraints (represented by ordinary conjunctions). 
 
4.2.4 Automatic generation of Pandora formulae 
Informally, normalised graphical notations, e.g. Figure 4—1 (b), describe SMs of 
systems, subsystems or components. States are represented by ellipses or circles and 
events are represented by arrows that join states. Each ellipse or circle contains a textual 
description of its corresponding state. Similarly, arrows are labelled with textual 
descriptions of the corresponding events. 
A state machine has a finite number of states. It may change state when an event 
occurs, but at each instant it is in only one state. Definition 1 formally describes a state 
machine.  
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For example, consider again Figure 4—1 (b). The SM that formally describes the PS is 
defined as follows:  
 S = {A active, B active A failed, A active B failed, A active S failed, System Failure}. 
 Σ = {A fails, B fails, S fails, O-I}. 
 δ is defined as shown in the SM figure. 
 s0 = A active. 
For the purpose of this study, we assume a state machine to be acyclic. A cyclic 
SM may imply that failures are repairable or repeatable, which is incompatible with the 
semantics of Pandora. There is, therefore, a finite set of possible paths in the state 
machine. If  is a path from u to u' (u, u') ∈S2, we write it as u u’. 
 
We write u u’ iff ∃∈P s.t. u u’. In such a case, state u' is said to be reachable from 
state u. However, if there exists a one-event path from u to u', then u' is said to be 
immediately reachable from u and we write it as u u’ (i.e., u u’ iff ∃e∈Σ s.t. u
 
 u’). 
We assume that from s0 we can reach any other state, i.e.,t≠s0∈S s0 t. Also, 
∈P ∃(u, u')∈S2 s.t. u u’ and Seq = ⟨u0, u1, . . . , un⟩ is the sequence of the states of 
the path , where n = length() is the number of events that label  and the sequence is 
ordered for backward traversal, i.e., u0=u' and un=u. 
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A state machine path can be traversed forwards or backwards. The Pandora 
formula which corresponds to a final state is generated by performing backward 
traversals of all paths starting from that final state to the initial state. Forward traversals 
are performed starting from every ‘join’ state (i.e., with an out-degree strictly greater than 
1) to, at worst, all reachable final states, or until the condition for imposing a temporal 
constraint is satisfied.  
 
The choice of an event in     uniquely determines the state that the event is 
incident to. As for   , an event incident to u needs to be distinguished from every 
possible identical event also incident to u, but from a different state. This is done by 
associating each event with the state from which it is incident, and hence the definition 3 
above. 
All final states are permanent states — there are no events that lead from a final 
state to any other state. 
 
There is a corresponding Pandora formula for each final state. Let 𝜙s s∈F be the formula 
for a final state s. 𝜙s is the disjunction over the paths  (from the initial state s0 to s) of the 
conjunction of events that label . Moreover, any one of the events e that label , which 
is incident from a state u with an out-degree of two or more (a state at which paths 
diverge), is the input event, which must occur first or alone, of a POR gate that associates 
it with the disjunction of other events e’ incident from u to the states u’ if, and only if, the 
subpath of  from u to s shares an event with the paths from u through u’ to any state. 
Algorithm 1 generates a set Φ of Pandora formulae: Φ = {𝜙s | s∈F} — one 
formula 𝜙s for each final state s. These expressions can then be analysed by Pandora. For 
each join state      during a path traversal (line 11 of the Algorithm), and for each event 
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e’≠    ∈ Σ    
 (line 14), a temporal constraint is imposed (line 21) if, and only if, the two 
subsets Ω (line 12) and Σ’ (initially as in line 15) of Σ share an event (Σ’ ⋂ Ω ≠ ∅). Ω 
represents the set of the events that label the subpath h of the current full path i s.t. 
   s (i.e., h is the part of i which has already been traversed) and Σ’, which is 
initialised as {e’} (e' as specified in lines 14 and 16), may possibly be further populated 
as shown in Algorithm 2 — PopulateAt(t = δ(   , e’)).  
 
126 
 
 
This additional population of Σ’ (performed by algorithm 2) can happen only if 
e’Ω (lines 15 and 17 of algorithm 1) and the state that e’ is incident to is not a final state 
(line 17) — i.e., t∈S = δ(   , e’) is such that     ≠ ∅ (to explore, perhaps exhaustively, 
paths that diverge from the join state     through the state t). In such a case, the paths from 
t are traversed forwards as long as Σ’ and Ω remain disjoint sets (line 5 and line 8 of 
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Algorithm 2). In other words, a temporal constraint needs to be imposed if, and only if, 
e’∈ Ω or ∃(y∈Σ, ’∈P, f∈S, v∈S in    ’, w∈S in    ’) s.t. t f, v
 
 w and y∈ Ω — 
i.e., either e’ must be one of the events that label h (the subpath of i s.t.    s) or h and 
’ must share an event. 
 
 
4.2.5 Conversion of the PS state machine 
In general, for every final state of the SM, the algorithm generates a fault tree (possibly a 
temporal one) with that final state as the top event. A backwards traversal is performed, 
starting with each final state and ending at the starting state, and thus every path between 
those states becomes a new branch in the fault tree. Initially, only AND gates are used, so 
that all events in each path are represented as a conjunction. Next, for each visited state 
that is common to more than one path (known as a ‘join’ state), the algorithm tries to 
detect whether a temporal operator is required to unambiguously distinguish one path 
from another. For example, the final state of the PS state machine is ‘System Failure’, and 
the join states encountered during backwards traversal are all those visited states with 
more than one output path for each – thus every state in our example SM is a join state 
except the final one. 
At this stage, the algorithm examines the events forming the branches so far and 
checks to see if any are shared. In the example SM, it would find that A is a shared event 
for join state ‘A active’. Thus to distinguish e.g. path 1 from path 3, the algorithm would 
determine that the order of A and S is important and would add a temporal constraint to 
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each branch (A|S for path 1, S|A for path 3). Similarly, since path 2 and path 3 both 
emerge from the same join state, it would examine the events that cause transitions away 
from the join state (i.e. B and S in this case) and add the appropriate constraints to 
distinguish them, i.e. ‘S|B’ for path 3 and ‘B|S’ for path 2. Since the temporal operators 
are only added later, SMs with no shared events, like the one in Figure 4—2, will have no 
temporal constraints and will consist only of logical conjunctions:  
Degraded =  B.A  
Failed =  D.C  
No further refinements are necessary in that case. But in a situation like the one in Figure 
4—3, A and B are shared events and the join state is the initial one. Therefore we have: 
Degraded =  B.A|B  =  A<B  
Failed =  A.B|A  =  B<A 
 
Figure 4—3. Example of a SM with shared events  
 
The result of the algorithm is a set of (possibly temporal) fault trees, one per final 
error state, each containing one branch for each path through the SM to the given final 
state. Each sequence or combination of events in the fault trees will be unambiguous, i.e. 
any shared events will be part of sequences to ensure that the same sequence cannot lead 
to the top event of more than one fault tree. 
Application of the conversion algorithm on the SM of the PS yields the following 
cut sequences (represented in traversed order), which provide an unambiguous 
description of the different event sequences that can cause the system to fail: 
1)  B . A | S | B        
2)  A . B | S | A       
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3)  A . S | A | B  
4)  I . A | I | S | B     
5)  I . B | I | S | A     
6)  I | S | A | B  
7)  I . S | I | A | B.  
These results show how the sequence of the sensor failure relative to the failure of A, the 
failure of both primary and standby, and the omission of input alone or relative to other 
failures are all important in causing system failures.  
 
4.2.6 Minimisation of the generated TFTs 
Although the seven results shown previously are sufficient to unambiguously describe the 
sequences of events that can lead to system failure, these are not minimal. Just as with the 
initial results of an ordinary fault tree analysis, the sequences can be reduced to a 
simplified form to give a clearer view of exactly which events are necessary, and in 
which order should they occur to cause system failure. 
We can apply the relevant temporal laws of the variation of Pandora (in which 
simultaneity is omitted) to perform this minimisation. In the version of Pandora which is 
adapted to state machines, the laws which include the SAND operator have been 
modified to remove it. In particular, the three main laws of Pandora, i.e., the Completion 
Laws (which relate temporal operators to Boolean ones) have their SAND terms are 
removed in this situation. The three modified Completion Laws are therefore: 
X . Y <=> X<Y + Y<X  (the Conjunctive Law) 
X + Y <=> X|Y + Y|X   (the Disjunctive Law)  
X <=> Y<X + X|Y    (the Reductive Law)  
These laws are particularly useful for minimising the results from the conversion 
algorithm. By applying the Reductive Law, we can both add extra terms to an expression 
and also reduce multiple cut sequences into one. In this case, cut sequences #4 to #7 can 
be reduced to just "I" on its own. The other three cut sequences, #1 - #3, can likewise be 
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reduced. Each can be simplified and expanded by the law X<Y . X|Z <=> X<Z<Y + 
X<Y|Z to obtain the following cut sequences:  
A<S<B  
A<B|S  
B<S<A  
B<A|S  
S<B<A  
S<A|B  
These in turn describe constituents of the 3-event Reductive Law, X<Y <=> X<Z<Y + 
Z<X<Y + X<Y|Z, and can be reduced to even simpler forms. For example, S<B<A + 
B<S<A + B<A|S reduces to just B<A, and similarly for S<A. Another law, X|Y <=> 
X<Y + X|Y, means we can obtain S<A<B from S<A|B and thus also reduce 
S<A|B + A<S<B + A<B|S to just A<B. One further minimisation is then possible here: 
we can apply the Conjunctive Law to A<B and B<A to obtain A.B. Thus the final 
minimal cut sequences are as follows: 
A.B  
S<A  
I 
These minimised cut sequences give an instant understanding of the failure behaviour of 
the system: it will fail if both A and B fail, if the sensor S fails before A, or if there is no 
input. By converting the SM to a temporal fault tree and minimising the expressions 
produced, we have obtained a concise set of results that provides an more accurate view 
of the system failure behaviour than the results of the standard FTA expressed by Figure 
4—1 (c). In this case, it is clear that preserving the order of A and S is vital in 
determining whether a system failure will be caused. 
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4.3 Complexity analysis of the conversion algorithm 
The conversion algorithm is biased towards increasingly dynamic systems. The best-case 
complexity of checking the necessity of a temporal order is O(n) and the worst case is 
O(n
2
), n being the number of paths from the initial state to the final states in the SM. The 
best case is a SM where for every divergent path; there exists a sharable event
82
 that is 
incident to the immediately reachable state from the join state at which the path diverges. 
In such a situation, the price to pay for each join state j is an O(m
2
) operation of temporal 
order enforcement, and where m is the out-degree of j. The worst case is a SM where for 
every divergent path, either there are no sharable events or there exists only one sharable 
event — immediately before the last reachable final state. A SM where there are no 
sharable events at all (e.g. SM of a static system) is also a worst-case scenario.  
To show the quadratic growth of the conversion algorithm with the number of 
full paths, we define a marking function that marks every state with the number of paths 
to the final states (these latter states are special cases which are marked with 1). Let M be 
that marking function s.t. M : S ℕ+. The number of paths from a state u to the 
final states is the sum, for all events incident from u to its successors (i.e., the 
immediately reachable states from u), of the number of paths from these successors to the 
final states (i.e., their corresponding markings), and hence:  
     
{
 
 
 
 
                                           
∑          
  Σ  
                
 
 
This algorithm will add the marking of each successor v as many times as there 
are events that are incident from u to v. Apart from the final states, every state u will be 
marked such that M(u) = |P
u
|, where P
u
 = {∈P | u f, f∈F} . For example, marking the 
states of the SM of the PS in Figure 4—1 (b) gives M(A active) = M(δ(A active, A fails)) 
+ M(δ(A active, O-I)) + M(δ(A active, B fails)) + M(δ(A active, S fails)), since we have: 
                                                     
82
 An event which causes the condition for imposing a temporal constraint to be satisfied. 
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M(δ(A active, A fails)) = M(B active A failed) = M(δ(B active A failed, O-I)) + M(δ(B 
active A failed, B fails)) = 2. 
M(δ(A active, O-I)) = M(System Failure) = 1. 
M(δ(A active, B fails)) = M(A active B failed) = M(δ(A active B failed, A fails)) + M(δ(A 
active B failed, O-I)) = 2. 
M(δ(A active, S fails)) = M(A active S failed) = M(δ(A active S failed, A fails)) + M(δ(A 
active S failed, O-I)) = 2. 
Therefore, the marking of the initial state M(A active) is totalling seven full paths in the 
SM. This marking conforms to the backward traversals that are performed from each of 
the final states (line 9 of Algorithm 1 in section 4.2.4). 
Let N be the total number of paths (from the initial state to the final states). 
During each backward traversal starting from a final state s, at every visited state u that is 
a join state (i.e., line 11 of Algorithm 1), at worst, all remaining paths to all possible final 
states will be exhaustively traversed forwards by Algorithm 2. This results in a total 
number M(u) of traversed paths. This number is preserved along the backward traversal at 
every state that is not a join state until another join state gets visited, ultimately the initial 
state s0 with M(s0) equals to N. This will be repeated Ns times for the final state s, where 
Ns is the total number of paths from s0 to s. Thus, for all final states we have a total 
number of traversed paths which is equal to N × ∑    ∈ , i.e., N
2
. Note that to determine 
each Ns s∈F, we can use another version M’ of the marking function M, which marks the 
initial state with 1. Thereafter, the number of paths reaching a state u is the sum, for all 
elements in   , of the number of paths that reach each predecessor u' (i.e., u’u), and 
hence: 
      
{
 
 
 
 
                                            
  ∑       
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4.4 Supplemental application of the conversion algorithm 
In this section, we present an additional contribution by showing that we can apply the 
conversion algorithm on Markov state diagrams for the purpose to automatically optimise 
these. Markov models are well-known with the state explosion problem and, therefore, a 
work which contributes to their optimisation by reducing their size while preserving the 
quantitative results can have a positive impact overall. 
To illuminate this point, let us assume a system with two components A and B 
with the failure rates A and B respectively. Figure 4—4 (a) represents the corresponding 
Markov model such that initially both components are working (which is described by the 
initial state “A B”). Thereafter, if B fails first there will be a transition to the state “A X” 
(i.e., A is working and B is failed) and then only a failure of A can cause a complete 
failure of the system. However, if A fails first then the system fails immediately. 
 
 
 
 
(a) before optimisation  (b) after optimisation 
 
Figure 4—4. A Markov model optimisation example 
 
For the sake of clarity, in the following we use the symbols A and B to designate 
the failure events which correspond to the failure rates A and B respectively. The 
application of the conversion algorithm on the state-transition diagram (a) gives: 
 
“Total failure” = A|B + A.B|A 
 
We can perform some Pandora minimisation on the failure expression generated by the 
algorithm as follows: 
“Total failure” = A|B + B<A (using the temporal law Y.X|Y  X<Y) 
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 = A<B + A.¬ B + B<A  (using the temporal law X|Y  X<Y + X.¬Y) 
 = A. B + A.¬ B (using the temporal law X.Y  X<Y + Y<X) 
 = A.( B + ¬B) (using the distributive law) 
 = A. 1 (tautology) 
Therefore, we can simply have: “Total failure” = A and the corresponding optimised 
Markov model is as represented by Figure 4—4 (b). 
Let us now compare the quantitative results provided by the Markov solutions 
corresponding to both models, i.e., (a) and (b). 
 
1) The left hand side model (a): 
 
  
 PAB(t) = – (A+ B) PAB(t)    where PAB is the probability for the state “AB”. 
 
  
 PAX(t) = B PAB(t) – A PAX(t)   where PAX is the probability for the state “AX”. 
 
  
 PF(t) = A PAB(t) + A PAX(t)   where PF is the probability for the final state. 
The solution of the differential equations is given by: 
PAB(t) =  –        
PAX(t) =  –   –   –       
Concerning PF(t) we have: 
 
  
 PF(t) = A PAB(t) + A PAX(t) = A  –       + A  –   – A  –       = A  –   
⇒ PF(t) = –  –   + Cste (the constant is 1 since PF(0) = 0 = Cste –       = Cste – 1) 
⇒ PF(t) = 1 –  –   
 
2) The right hand side model (b): 
 
  
 PAB(t) = –A PAB(t) 
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 PF(t) = A PAB(t) = A  –   
The solution of the differential equations is given by: 
PAB(t) =  –    
PF(t) = ∫  
    dt = –  –   + Cste (where Cste is a constant) 
Since at time t0 = 0 we have PAB(t0) = 1 and PF(t0) = 0 then Cste must be 1 
This means that PF(t) = 1 –  –   and this is exactly the same solution as for the previous 
model. 
A similar optimization example consists of the model represented by Figure 4—5 
(a). This can be the description of a system with three components A, B and C with 
failure rates A, B and C respectively. Like in the previous example, the sequence 
“ABC” in the model means a state where all components are working. A failed 
component is replaced by the symbol ‘X’ in that sequence — e.g., “AXC” means a state 
where all components are working except B is failed and the states “AXX1” and “AXX2” 
mean that both B and C are failed; B has failed before C for the former and after C for the 
latter. 
 
 
 
 
(a) before optimisation  (b) after optimisation 
 
Figure 4—5. A second Markov model optimisation example 
 
The application of the conversion algorithm on the state-transition diagram of 
Figure 4—5 (a) generates a failure expression which can be minimised (using the Pandora 
temporal laws) to simply the failure event with rate A (this is fully detailed in appendix 
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A — 5), and for which the corresponding Markov model is represented by Figure 4—
5(b). The Markov solutions give identical final state probabilities in both models (a) and 
(b).  
Similar redundancies can be removed from the Markov model of the generic 
primary-standby system (depicted in chapter 2 section 2.3.4), and which is represented in 
Figure 4—6 such that the failure states are all merged into one final state (i.e., the 
complete failure of the system). The meanings of the transition labels and the state names 
appearing in the figure are as follows: 
λA, λB and λS are failure rates for A, B and S resp. 
A B S (system functioning with A, none is failed) 
X B S (system functioning with B, only A is failed) 
A B X (system functioning with A, only S is failed) 
A X S (system functioning with A, only B is failed) 
X B X (system functioning with B, both A and S are failed) 
A X X (system functioning with A, both B and S are failed) 
This representation with one system failure state helps to show some redundant 
transitions which are similar to those appearing in the Markov model examples of 
figuresFigure 4—4 andFigure 4—5. For example in the top of the figure from the state 
“XBS”, either the two transitions labelled with S then B lead the system to a total 
failure, or simply only the transition with rate B can cause the same effect (from that 
state). Those together can be optimised to only one transition labelled with B. Similarly, 
we have two transitions labelled with S then A leading the system (from the state 
“AXS”, see bottom of Figure 4—6) to the “Total Failure” state, as well as only one 
transition with the rate A also leading the system to a complete failure (from the same 
state). Those two scenarios together can, thus, be optimised into a one-transition scenario 
(labelled with the rate A). 
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Figure 4—6. Markov model of the PS (all failure states merged into one state) 
 
Like the previous examples, we apply the conversion algorithm on the Markov 
model to generate the following TFTs, and where (for the sake of clarity) A, B and S 
replace the rates A, B and S respectively. 
“Total Failure” =  
B.S|B.A|S|B +   (1)  
A.B|A.S|B|A +   (2)  
A.S|A.B|S|A +   (3)  
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A|B.S|B|A +   (4)  
B|S.A|S|B +    (5)  
A|S.B|S|A    (6) 
The application of the POR transformation law (Y.X|Y  X<Y) gives: 
“Total Failure” =  
S<B . A<B . A<S +   (1)  
B<A . S<A . S<B +   (2)  
S<A . B<A . B<S +   (3) 
A|B . S<A . S|B +    (4)  
B|S . A<B . A|S +    (5)  
A|S . B<A . B|S    (6) 
Then, the application of the extension law (X<Y . Y<Z  X<Y . Y<Z . X<Z  
X<Y<Z) on (1), (2) and (3) gives: 
“Total Failure” =  
A<S<B +      (1)  
S<B<A +      (2)  
B<S<A +      (3) 
A|B . S<A . S|B +    (4)  
B|S . A<B . A|S +    (5)  
A|S . B<A . B|S    (6) 
Next, we apply the extension law (X<Y . Y|Z  X<Y . Y|Z . X|Z) on (4), (5) and 
(6); hence: 
“Total Failure” =  
A<S<B +      (1)  
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S<B<A +      (2)  
B<S<A +      (3) 
A|B . S<A +     (4)  
B|S . A<B +      (5)  
A|S . B<A      (6) 
By application of the absorption law (X<Y|Z  X<Y<Z + X<Y . Y|Z) on (4), (5) 
and (6), we get the following: 
“Total Failure” =  
A<S<B +      (1)  
S<B<A +      (2)  
B<S<A +      (3) 
S<A<B +      (4.1) 
S<A . A|B +      (4.2) 
A<B<S +      (5.1) 
A<B . B|S +      (5.2) 
B<A<S +      (6.1) 
B<A . A|S      (6.2) 
 
(1), (4.1), (5.1) and (5.2) reduce to A<B by using the completion law (X<Y  
Z<X<Y + X<Z<Y + X<Y<Z + X<Y . Y|Z); these show that the occurrence of S is 
irrelevant. Similarly, (2), (3), (6.1) and (6.2) reduce to B<A by using the same law. 
However, before reducing we need to preserve (2), (3) and (4.1) for a further reduction 
afterwards. This can be done by using the Boolean absorption law (X + X  X), and 
hence: 
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“Total Failure” =  
A<B +  
S<B<A +      (2)  
B<S<A +      (3) 
S<A<B +      (4.1) 
S<A . A|B +      (4.2) 
B<A 
Finally, by using the same previous completion law we can reduce (2), (3), (4.1) 
and (4.2) to S<A; these show that the occurrence of B is irrelevant. Therefore, we have: 
“Total Failure” =  
A<B +  
S<A +  
B<A 
These constitute the TFT description of the obtained Markov model of Figure 
4—7, and where the state 1 is a state of the PS in which the components A, B and S are 
all OK, and the states 2, 3 and 4 represent states of the system in which A has failed, S 
has failed or B has failed, respectively. 
 
Figure 4—7. The PS Markov model produced without redundancies 
In appendix A — 6, we show that the optimised Markov model of the PS preserves the 
same probabilistic result for the “Total Failure” state. 
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The use of the optimised Markov model is sufficient if the emphasis is mainly put 
on computing a probabilistic measure for the complete failure of the system. However, it 
is always possible to build the full Markov model from the optimised one if some 
probabilistic results
83
 related to partial loss of functionality are required. This can be 
performed by applying the algorithm below: 
Algorithm 3: construction of an elaborated Markov model 
Input: optimised Markov model or a reduced SM representation of the failure  
behaviour of a system. 
 
1. Initiate the construction of the full Model starting from a state where all the 
system components are operational.  
2. Generate a set of target states (with the associated transition rates) by 
considering the effect of failure of every component.  
3. Determine for every new state whether it is an operational or a failed state 
by checking it against the optimised Markov (or the reduced SM) model. 
4. Repeat the same (as steps 2 and 3) for every newly generated state, but only 
by considering the effects of the remaining failures (which have not already 
been treated in a same path from the initial state).  
5. Stop when no more failure scenarios remain — i.e., all paths have been 
exhaustively constructed.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
For the sake of clarity, to compute the probability of being in a state where, e.g., 
the PS system is in primary mode but both the backup component and the sensor are 
failed, we only highlight the two failure scenarios of interest rather than running 
completely the algorithm to build the full Markov model. We start from the initial state in 
which all components are functional. Next, if the sensor (resp. backup) fails first, then the 
generated state would match with state 3 (resp. state 4) of the optimised model in Figure 
                                                     
83
 Though irrelevant to a complete system failure since the corresponding states were removed 
during optimisation. 
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4—7, and which shows that the system is still operational. A subsequent failure of the 
backup (resp. the sensor) leads to the generation of a new state in the full model to build 
which best matches with the current, i.e. the same state in the optimised model — state 3 
(resp. state 4), since only a failure of the primary component causes a change of state in 
the optimised version. This means that the recently generated state of the full model is 
still an operational state. 
Algorithm 3 is not only useful
84
 considering an optimised Markov model as 
input. But, it is mainly important if the input is an abstract state-transition representation 
of the failure behaviour of a system. In some circumstances quantitative results may be 
required directly if it is possible, i.e., without passing through the qualitative analysis 
process. For example, we have presented in chapter 3 section 3.3 an abstract SM 
description of the failure behaviour of the vehicle management system VMS (Figure 3—
4). That SM is used as input to the algorithm which generates TFTs, and after a 
minimisation process we can obtain the minimal cut-sequences as demonstrated in that 
chapter. These obtained cut-sequences can then be quantitatively analysed, e.g., based on 
the work in (Merle, 2010) which accomodates any failure distribution of basic events. 
However, if the failure distribution of the basic events is particularly exponential and if a 
Markov solution is required directly from that reduced SM, we can then apply algorithm 
3 to generate the corresponding Markov model — every new state will be tagged 
operational or failed by checking against the reduced SM along the exceution of the 
algorithm and every transition label will be substituted with the corresponding failure 
rate.  
 
4.5 Quantitative analysis of TFTs 
The work in (Merle, 2010), i.e., quantitative analysis of dynamic fault trees (DFTs) based 
on the structure function presents a state-of-the-art method which enables performing 
probabilistic assessments on dynamic systems irrespective of the failure distribution of 
the basic failure events. The method uses algebraic expressions for the top-events of 
DFTs and the probabilistic models of the dynamic gates are given. To facilitate the 
quantitative analysis, these DFT expressions can be reduced to sum-of-product canonical 
                                                     
84
 To calculate probabilities related to non-complete failure states that have been removed during 
optimisation. 
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forms. Minimisation is complex, but this is not uncommon when it comes to qualitatively 
analyse dynamic or temporal fault trees and there can be many minimisation criteria.  
In (Merle, 2010), faults or failure events are considered non-repairable and can be 
treated as functions of time. For example, let a(t) be a function of time ‘t’ describing a 
fault ‘a’. the possible two values of a(t) are 0 for no fault and 1 for fault. Let d(a) be the 
date of occurrence of a fault, i.e., single change of the value of a(t) from 0 to 1 at d(a). 
Therefore, we have: 
     {
             
           
 
 
In the algebraic models of static gates, this allows functions of time to be manipulated as 
classical boolean values, though with the help of two identity elements — i.e., one for a 
fault which always occurs and another one for a fault which never occurs. 
To express sequences of events, temporal and dynamic gates were also 
introduced in Merle’s work. But here we focus mainly on the temporal operator ‘’ used 
in the algebraic framework (called non-inclusive BEFORE) and which has exactly the 
same semantics as the Priority-OR operator ‘|’ of Pandora — i.e., to be true, the second 
input event of the non-inclusive BEFORE has to occur strictly after the first input event 
or to not occur at all. Its probabilstic model is given by (assuming that the basic events 
are statistically independent, and this hypothesis is maintained for all this section): 
Pr[AB](t) = ∫      
 
 
              (1) 
Where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are two events and for an event ‘x’,       is the cumulative distribution 
function and       is the probability density function s.t.          
    . 
Similarly, the probabilistic model given for the Priority-AND is as follows: 
Pr[B.(AB)](t) = ∫      
 
 
           (2) 
Where B.(AB) is equivalent to A<B (i.e., A PAND B) in Pandora, the cumulative 
distribution and the probability density functions are as defined previously (i.e.,       and 
      for an event x, respectively). 
A central issue with these probabilistic models is that they accommodate any 
failure distribution and are, thus, more realistic since lots of components do not conform 
to the exponential failure distribution. However, the latter is the more common failure 
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distribution of basic events and to illustrate this aspect on this particular case, let us 
assume that A and B are the failure rates which are associated with the events A and B, 
respectively. Therefore, we have: 
          
–   
          
–   
Similarly, 
          
–   
          
–   
Therefore, for the particular case of exponential failure distribution for the basic 
events, we have: 
Pr[AB](t) = ∫      
 
 
             
 
= ∫    
–  
 
 
       –        
 
= ∫    
–  
 
 
  –      = ∫    
–      
 
 
   
At t = 0, Pr[AB](0) = 0. Thus we have: 
Pr[AB](t) =  
 
   
  –       + 
 
   
      (3) 
Concerning the PAND-equivalent expression in Merle’s probabilistic model, for the case 
of exponential distribution we have: 
 
Pr[B.(AB)](t) = ∫      
 
 
         
 
= ∫    
–  
 
 
    –      
At t = 0, Pr[B.(AB)](0) = 0. Therefore, we have: 
Pr[B.(AB)](t) = 
 
   
  –         –   + 
 
   
  (4) 
The application of the probabilistic model of the PAND given in (2) to the particular case 
of exponential distribution given in (4) shows the same result given in (Fussell et al., 
1976) for a PAND gate with two input events. 
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There have been considerable works in the literature around solving DFTs 
quantitatively [e.g., in (Amari et al., 2003) & (Fussell et al., 1976)]. However during the 
period of this thesis, the only
85
 novel and mathematically sound approach that includes 
POR-like
86
 gate (i.e., non-inclusive BEFORE) and accommodates any failure distribution 
for the basic events is in (Merle, 2010), it also deals with qualitative analysis.  
 
4.5.1 Some comparisons with combinatorial techniques 
As stated previously in this section, the following hold under the hypothesis of statistical 
independence, exponential failure distribution and non-simultaneity of occurrence of 
failure events. Let A and B be two failure events with rates A and B, respectively. 
Therefore, we have: 
P(A AND B) = P(A) × P(B) = (1 –  –  ) × (1 –  –  )  (5) 
=  –       –  –   –  –   + 1 
It was previously shown in chapter 2 section 2.3.4 that (5) gives the same result as the 
result given by the Markov model of Figure 2—20, which describes the conjunctive 
failure of two parallel components. Moreover, the Markov model which was optimised 
for the particular case where the failure rates are identical (i.e., A = B = ) also gives the 
same result as given by (5) — i.e., P(A AND B) =   –    -  2      + 1.  
Let us now compare it with the results given using the probabilistic model in (4) 
for the PAND gate. The first completion Pandora law given in chapter 3 shows that: A.B 
 A<B + B<A. Also, “A<B” and “B<A” are mutually exclusive. Therefore, we have: 
P(A AND B) = P(A PAND B) + P(B PAND A) 
= 
 
   
  –         –   + 
 
   
  for “A PAND B” given by (4)  
+ 
 
   
  –         –   + 
 
   
  for “B PAND A” given by (4) 
                                                     
85
 i.e., which is found published in the literature. 
86
 i.e., semantically like the Pandora POR gate. 
146 
 
=  –       –  –   –  –   + 1  
and this is the same result given in (5). 
Let us now compare it using NOT operator (‘¬’), i.e., we deduct from one the 
probabilities of either A or B occurring alone (not both) as well as the probability of 
neither A nor B occurs, and as follows: 
P(A failing AND B failing) = 1  P(A AND ¬B)  P(¬A AND B) – P(¬A AND ¬B) 
= 1  ( –     –      )  ( –     –      )  ( –   ×  –  ) 
= 1 –  –   –  –   +  –       
and this is the same result given in (5). 
 
4.5.2 Some comparisons with Markov solutions 
Let us assume two components whose failure events A and B are associated with their 
respective failure rates A and B. Figure 4—8 represents a Markov model for the two 
failure events occurring in sequence. If B fails first, then a transition to state numbered 2 
occurs. Otherwise (i.e., A fails first), a transition to state 3 occurs and will be followed by 
a transition to state 4 upon a subsequent failure of B. Thus, state numbered 4 is the state 
which we use to determine the Markov probabilistic model for A PAND B.  
 
Figure 4—8. Markov model of a PAND gate with two input events (state 4) 
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If we use this Markov model (which is a state-transition diagram) as input to the 
conversion algorithm presented in section 4.2.4, we also get A APAND B for state 4, as 
follows (for the sake of clarity we use A and B instead of A and B, respectively): 
Expression(state 2) = B|A 
Expression(state 4) = B . A|B  A<B   (POR transformation law #1, see chapter 3) 
The differential equations are as follows: 
 
  
 P1(t) = – (A+ B) P1(t) 
 
  
 P2(t) = B P1(t) 
 
  
 P3(t) = A P1(t) – B P3(t) 
 
  
 P4(t) = B P3(t) 
and the solution of the differential equations is given by: 
P1(t) =  –        
P2(t) =  
 
    
  –        + 
 
    
  
P3(t) =  –   –  –        
P4(t) =  
 
    
  –        –  –   + 
 
    
  
On the one hand, This Markov solution shows that P2(t) is the same result given 
in (3) after swapping A and B, i.e. it is the probability Pr[BA](t), or Pr[B|A](t) by using 
the vocabulary of Pandora. The corresponding algebraic expression generated by the 
conversion algorithm is Expression(state 2), which is equal to “B POR A” (i.e., B|A). On 
the other hand, it shows that P4(t) is the result of Pr[B.(AB)](t) given in (4) or 
Pr[A<B](t) by using the vocabulary of Pandora. The corresponding algebraic expression 
generated by the conversion algorithm is Expression(state 4), which equal to “A PAND 
B” (i.e., A<B). 
Since the probability of being in state 2 is the probability of “B|A”, then the 
probability of being in the lower path of the Markov model is the probability of “A|B”. 
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State 3 represents a situation where A occurred and B has not occurred (i.e., “A.¬B”). 
State 4 represents, as seen earlier, a situation where both A and B occurred, but in 
sequence (i.e., “A<B”). Since “A|B” means that either A occurs alone (B does not occur 
at all) or both A and B occur in sequence (A occurs before B occurs), then the probability 
of “A.¬B + A<B” should be equal to P3(t) + P4(t), and which should also be equal to 
Pr[AB](t) — i.e., the probabilistic model given in (3), and as demonstrated next. 
To calculate the probability of “A.¬B + A<B” (i.e., probability of “A|B”), we 
need to recognise whether the events are independent or mutually exclusive. Statistical 
independence of events is crucial in probability and statistics. Two events are statistically 
independent if the occurrence of either event has no effect on the occurrence of the other. 
However, “A.¬B” and “A<B” are mutually exclusive (i.e., we do not deduct the product 
of their probabilities from their sum), and hence:  
On the one hand, we have: 
Pr(A|B) = Pr(A.¬B) + Pr(A<B)  
= F(a).(1 – F(b)) + ∫      
 
 
          
And for the particular case of exponential distribution, we have: 
Pr(A|B) =     –   .   –    + ∫    
–  
 
 
    –       
=   
 
    
  –       + 
 
    
  and which is the same as given in (3) 
On the other hand, we have: 
P3(t) + P4(t) =   –   –  –        
+ 
 
    
  –        –  –   + 
 
    
  
=   
 
    
  –       + 
 
    
 = Pr[AB](t)   
and which is also the same as given in (3). 
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This means that we can optimise the Markov model of Figure 4—8 to adjust it for 
the purpose of quantifying a POR gate with two input events, and hence a more accurate 
model for such a POR gate is described by Figure 4—9. 
 
Figure 4—9. Markov model of a POR gate with two input events 
The differential equations are as follows: 
 
  
 P1(t) = – (A+ B) P1(t) 
 
  
 P2(t) = B P1(t) 
 
  
 P3(t) = A P1(t) 
and the solution of the differential equations is given by: 
P1(t) =  –        
P2(t) =  
 
    
  –        + 
 
    
  = Pr[B|A](t) = Pr[BA](t), as given in (3) 
by swapping A and B  
P3(t) =  
 
    
  –        + 
 
    
  = Pr[A|B](t) = Pr[AB](t), as in (3)  
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4.5.3 Probabilistic model of a POR gate with n input events 
The model described by Figure 4—9 is more accurate for representing a POR gate with 
two input events than the preceding model. Indeed, the model of Figure 4—8 was 
originally intended to describe a PAND gate with two input events, but as we have seen it 
can also be used to calculate the probabilistic expression of a POR as well. One reason to 
consider the model of Figure 4—9 as more accurate for this purpose is that it does not 
only serve to produce exactly the same probabilistic results for a POR as from the 
preceding model, but it also represents a better candidate model for a POR gate with two 
input events that we can extend easily to n input events (n N+ s.t. n2, see Figure 4—
10).  
 
Figure 4—10. Markov model of a POR gate with n input events 
In Figure 4—10, each i 1≤i≤n represents the failure rate associated with the 
failure input event Fi 1≤i≤n of the POR gate. Therefore, the probability of being in state 3 
represents the probability for the expression F1|F2|F3| … |Fn (where n2) which means that 
either F1 has occurred alone (none of the Fi 2≤i≤n has occurred) or F1 has occurred first, 
i.e., before any other Fi 2≤i≤n has occurred. 
The differential equations are as follows: 
 
  
 P1(t) = – (1+ 2+ … +n) P1(t) 
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 P2(t) = (2+3+ … +n) P1(t) 
 
  
 P3(t) = 1 P1(t) 
and the solution of the differential equations is given by: 
P1(t) =  – 
∑  
 
      
P3(t) = Pr[F1|F2|F3| … |Fn](t) =   
 
∑  
 
   
  – ∑  
 
      + 
 
∑  
 
   
 
P3(t) represents the probabilistic model of a POR gate with n input events (n2) 
for the particular case of exponential failure distribution for the basic events. It gives 
exactly the same result as given in (3) for the particular case where n=2 (i.e., a POR gate 
with two input events). We emphasise, once again, that the expression given in (3) is also 
a particular case for the application of the exponential failure distribution to the 
expression of Merle (2010) given in (1), and which accommodates any failure distribution 
for the basic events. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
To better model the dynamic failure behaviour, state machines are often used, but these 
typically require conversion to some other format (like fault trees or Petri nets) before 
they can be analysed. Existing SM-to-FT methods focus on converting them to standard 
combinatorial fault trees, but this can result in errors in situations where different 
sequences of the same events have different outcomes. 
In this chapter, we have presented a different approach which converts state 
machines into Pandora temporal fault trees. This has the benefit of better capturing the 
dynamic behaviour represented by the original state machines, thus allowing more 
detailed analysis of different sequences of events. Also, our approach helps to reduce the 
complexity of performing temporal FTA by generating temporal fault tree expressions 
only if necessary, resulting in a more manageable logical reduction of the fault trees 
overall. 
We demonstrated this technique on a simple generic redundant system and 
showed how the corresponding SM can be converted into temporal expressions and 
subsequently analysed to produce useful qualitative information about the dynamic 
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failure behaviour of the system. We also demonstrated the quadratic growth of the 
conversion algorithm with the number of full paths (from the initial state to the final 
states) in the SM. The algorithm has been implemented and we hope that this approach 
can be developed further and become automated as part of the HiP-HOPS safety analysis 
tool framework. We also aim to extend it further and potentially make it compatible with 
other SM-based modelling approaches, such as AADL. 
An additional application of the conversion algorithm for the purpose of 
optimising Markov models has been presented. These models are state-transition 
diagrams and are well-known with the state explosion problem. Therefore, a solution 
which enables the automatic reduction of the size of a Markov model (while preserving 
the quantitative results for the “completely failed” state) can help to facilitate the 
probabilistic assessments. Moreover, we have thoroughly investigated in this chapter 
different approaches for the quantitative analysis of TFTs and presented a probabilistic 
model for the quantification of a POR gate with n input events (n2).  The conversion 
algorithm relies mainly on the POR operator to differentiate sequences of events.  
In summary, performing meaningful qualitative safety analysis on dynamic 
systems means using both dynamic modelling and dynamic analysis approaches; by 
converting SMs to temporal FTs, it becomes possible to do both and thus can analyse 
more accurately systems which exhibit dynamic behaviour. 
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5 Compositional synthesis of Temporal Fault Trees from 
State Machines 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Despite the greater expressiveness and higher-level formalism of SMs (and their 
extensions like statecharts and mode automata), some open research issues still remain. A 
central issue is representing large-scale dynamic systems in a way which can serve as a 
solid basis for a subsequent accurate and dynamic analysis. Indeed, it is difficult to 
represent in a single coherent and complete picture how a large system which is 
embedded with several complex interrelated components behaves (with its constituent 
parts) in conditions of failure. Also, the analysis can be unmanageable due to a 
considerable number of failure events which increases with the number of components 
involved.  
To remedy this problem, we propose a solution which extends the analysis 
approach presented in chapter 4 — i.e., conversion of SMs to TFTs. The fault trees are 
generated from the SMs of the individual components of a system. These ‘sub-models’ 
(i.e., the SMs) are relatively small and thus easier to understand, thereby making their 
corresponding TFTs tractable. For example, Figure 5—1 (b) shows the SM of one of the 
components (the sensor) of the PS system.  
The sensor ‘S’ is initially monitoring the primary component ‘A’. A premature87 
failure of ‘S’ causes the redundant component (‘B’) to be irrevocably disabled; as a 
consequence, the composed system (the PS) relies exclusively on a single component (the 
primary ‘A’). In such a situation, the failure state of ‘S’ may only deteriorate to a severe 
level should an omission of output from ‘A’ (‘O-A’) occur88. This wouldn’t happen if the 
failure of ‘S’ was not premature, as B can take over A’s job (which is still a safe level). 
Therefore, the effect omission of alert signal (‘O-S’) from the sensor is restricted to a 
severe failure of ‘S’. ‘O-S’ is a non-atomic89 event which impacts another component of 
                                                     
87
 During time at which the monitored component is active — i.e., if A fails, S will not be 
operational to wake B up. 
88
 Typically due to an internal failure of ‘A’ (omission of input ‘O-I’ is a single point of failure). 
89
 i.e., a fault which is caused by failures in some other components (i.e., it can be expanded into a 
combination or a sequence of events). It represents one or a group of final state in a component’s 
SM. 
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the PS — i.e., similar faults typically cause another component’s SM (or the composed 
system) to change its state.  
 
 
(a). The PS system. 
 
 
(b). SM of the sensor S. 
Figure 5—1. SM of the sensor of the PS example system. 
For example, if the SM of ‘S’ enters the state “Severely Failed” and thus causing 
the effect ‘O-S’, this will impact the SM of ‘B’ (Figure 5—2) by a transition from “OFF” 
to “Permanently OFF” (unlike ‘A’90, the initial state of ‘B’ is “OFF”). Otherwise (i.e., if 
‘O-A’ happens first), then ‘S’ wakes ‘B’ up instead (i.e., this alters the state of ‘B’ to 
“ON”), and in which case nothing more but an internal failure of ‘B’ leads the SM to a 
severe level of failure (the same if ‘B’ fails dormant then ‘O-A’ occurs). Omission of 
input ‘O-I’ is a single point of failure for the system. It is, therefore, represented at system 
level — i.e., in the SM of the PS (see Figure 5—3).  
                                                     
90
 Initially, the PS system is functioning in primary mode. 
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Figure 5—2. SM of the backup B of the PS system. 
 
Unlike the detailed SM of the PS presented in the previous chapters, it is here a 
highly abstract description of the monolithic behaviour of the system. The system fails as 
a whole (see Figure 5—3) if there is an omission of input (‘O-I’) or if the backup is 
unable to take over a failed primary component (and thus omission of output ‘O-B’ from 
‘B’) — assuming that the ‘Out’ component of Figure 5—1 (a) does not fail on its own (it 
only abstracts the output of the system). 
 
 
Figure 5—3. Highly abstract SM depicting the monolithic behaviour of the PS. 
 
In this way, the SM of the systems is an abstraction of a hierarchy of the SMs of its 
components. An event causing a transition in a SM is possibly due to another SM 
entering one of possible final states (e.g., if the event is not an internal failure). For 
instance, if the SM of ‘B’ enters either “Permanently OFF” or “Severely Failed”, this will 
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cause ‘O-B’ to occur in the SM of the PS. Similarly, if the SM of ‘S’ enters its “Severely 
Failed” final state, this will cause ‘O-S’ to occur in the SM of ‘B’. 
Modelling the behavioural aspects of the components in this way forms the basis 
of our compositional approach. The TFTs will be generated from the individual 
component SMs, and no longer from a single full-scale SM of the system as in the 
previous chapter. The relatively small component TFTs will be thereafter synthesised by 
merging then into bigger ones (ultimately extensive system TFTs). For example, Figure 
5—4 shows the fault tree with top-event ‘O-S’ (generated from the SM of ‘S’) merged 
into the fault tree with top-event ‘O-B’ (generated from the SM of ‘B’). These are 
synthesised to form one expansive cut-sequence of the system fault tree with top-event 
‘PS Failed’ (the left branch of Figure 5—4).  
 
 
Figure 5—4. Synthesised fault trees. 
 
Using a simple system like the presented PS, we have shown an example for the 
synthesis of the system TFT (which corresponds to the system failure ‘PS Failed’) from 
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the fault trees which are generated from the SMs of the components. In this chapter, we 
develop this technique to enable such compositional synthesis of TFTs on a large-scale.  
Work on TFT minimisation itself is out of the scope of the thesis; nevertheless, 
minimising the resulted fault trees does not necessarily take place only after the synthesis 
completes (i.e., once the system TFTs become extensively developed). Indeed, the local 
TFTs (which are generated from the components’ SMs) can be logically reduced 
wherever possible to remove any new redundancies or contradictions before synthesising 
them.  
 
5.2 The TFT synthesis approach 
Our synthesis technique relies, mainly, on an accurate compositional description of the 
failure information which complements the architecture of the system to analyse — a 
state automata model in the form of compositional SMs. The second pillar of the 
proposed approach is a variation of the conversion algorithm presented in4. We use the 
algorithm to generate the necessary failure expressions from the individual SMs (we 
concentrate on the expressions of the final states
91
 that represent output deviations). The 
third pillar is the synthesis algorithm by which the fault trees of these expressions will be 
merged into (ultimately) comprehensive system fault trees.  
The synthesis works backwards by starting with the TFTs of the system failures 
(i.e., total failures as top events). For instance, in the context of the PS system studied 
earlier (Figure 5—1.a), we start to generate the first level of the system fault tree of the 
top event ‘PS Failed’ from the highly abstract SM of the PS (see Figure 5—3). Thus, the 
generated preliminary fault tree for the example system is ‘PS Failed’ = ‘O-B’ OR ‘O-I’. 
Thereafter, for each event that is derived from the component failures, the synthesis 
method expands the preliminary system TFTs with the fault trees of the components. 
Such non-atomic events are typically represented each by the top event of a component’s 
fault tree. For example, ‘O-B’ (which is an output deviation of the component B) is the 
top event of the fault tree ‘O-S’ OR (‘O-A’ AND ‘B fails’). Therefore, expanding ‘PS 
Failed’ gives ‘O-S’ OR (‘O-A’ AND ‘B fails’) OR ‘O-I’. This will be repeated at each 
level of every system TFT until no more non-atomic events remain — i.e., the expression 
of each system failure cannot be expanded any further as all possible substitutions have 
                                                     
91
 We turn our attention to the final states that impact other components or the super-component, 
i.e., entering such a final state causes a transition in another SM in the hierarchy.  
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taken place, and the complete fault tree has been synthesised for that particular system 
failure. For the PS, by substituting ‘O-S’ with ‘S fails’ PAND ‘O-A’ (TFT of component 
S) then ‘O-A’ with ‘A fails’ (FT of component A), the extensive system-wide TFT of ‘PS 
Failed’ becomes (‘S fails’ PAND ‘A fails’) OR (‘A fails’ AND ‘B fails’) OR ‘O-I’.  
At the end of the synthesis, for every fully developed system (temporal) FT, a 
final analysis takes place to obtain more reduced cut sequences wherever possible (or 
minimal cut sets, if the fault tree contains no temporal logic), by using a temporal 
qualitative analysis approach like Pandora
92
. From this point onwards we will refer to the 
proposed technique, i.e., the transformation from State Automata to synthesised Fault-
trees extended (if necessary) with PandORA temporal information as SAF-ORA
93
. 
 
5.2.1 Compositional modelling of the analysis-related information 
The first central issue mentioned earlier and on which Safora relies is the compositional 
modelling of the system behaviour. This consists of a highly abstract SM which describes 
the monolithic failure behaviour of the system at the top-level of the hierarchy and the 
components (and sub-components) SMs at the lower levels (see Figure 5—5). Typically, 
each event of the abstract SM of the system is the effect of one (or more) final state(s) 
being reached in a (or some) component SM(s). If it is the effect of more than one 
component SM each reaching a final state, then the order in which the final states were 
entered may affect the overall outcome (and in which case the conversion algorithm will 
enforce a temporal order as seen in chapter 4).  
For example, if two of the SMs of the sub-components level (those which are 
downstream in the event-causal chain, see Figure 5—5 bottom) each enters a final state, 
then the remaining SM of the same level (which is upstream) enters its final state too. 
Thereafter, the conversion algorithm (when applied to the latter SM) will determine if the 
temporal order in which the first two final states were reached is relevant (and thus needs 
to be preserved). Moreover, several final states in a SM can each (when entered) cause a 
                                                     
92
 The version which is adapted to SMs, i.e., without simultaneity of events. 
93
 Although half of Safora (SAF) is an acronym — State Automata to Fault-trees, the other half 
(ORA) is not, but preserves the meaning of hour or “time” from its Greek origin (ώρα in Greek). 
The reason is that Safora is conceived for the premier purpose to produce synthesised temporal 
FTs from state automata. Nevertheless, Safora has the dual benefit to produce both types of FTs 
(i.e., static and dynamic) — e.g., if the temporal flavour is not deemed necessary for a fault tree, 
then it will be static.  
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same event to occur in any SM upstream in the event-causal chain. In Figure 5—2 for 
instance, reaching either final state “Permanently OFF” or “Severely Failed” in the SM of 
the standby component B will cause the event ‘O-B’ (omission of output from B) to occur 
in the SM of the PS system — i.e., a disjunction of final states being reached.  
 
 
Figure 5—5. Compositional modelling of the system failure behaviour. 
 
Figure 5—5 (top) also shows a situation where a disjunctive combination of entered final 
states can cause a safety issue upstream (i.e., a system failure in the case of Figure 5—5). 
In other words, the final state of the abstract SM (top of Figure 5—5) is reached through 
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different paths; each path has an event which is the effect of reaching a final state in a SM 
downstream (middle of Figure 5—5). 
In this section, we have shown and discussed a way to describe how a system and 
its constituent parts behave in conditions of failure. The use of compositional SMs for this 
purpose forms the basis of Safora. In that sense, the generated (temporal) FTs, their 
synthesis and the produced analysis results all depend on the precision of the state 
automata representation of the failure behaviour. 
 
5.2.2 The Safora automatic generation and synthesis of TFTs 
Assuming a system which is embedded with several complex interrelated 
components, each modelled by its own SM; the idea of Safora makes it possible to 
construct the system TFTs for a final analysis in a compositional manner. The first step 
consists of transforming the hierarchy top level SM — i.e., a highly abstract description 
of the monolithic behaviour of the system — to produce a set of preliminary TFTs (see 
Figure 5—6). 
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Figure 5—6. Overview of the Safora method. 
 
Algorithm 1 takes the top level SM as parameter. Then, for each final state (line 3), it 
generates the corresponding failure expression (line 4) of a preliminary system TFT (the 
definitions used are the same definitions
94
 of chapter 4, section 4.2.4). Ultimately, the 
algorithm produces a set of system failure expressions (line 7); each corresponds to the 
first level of a system TFT.  
                                                     
94
 Briefly, a SM is a quadruple which consists of: S (a finite set of states), Σ (a finite set of events), 
δ (a function: S × Σ → S s.t. for (u, u’)∈S2 and e∈Σ, u’ = δ(u, e) iff e is incident from u to u’, i.e., 
u
 
 u’) and  s0 (the initial state). F is a subset of S containing the final states of the SM. 
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The ‘GenrateFailureExpression’ method in line 4 of the algorithm takes the 
system abstract SM as first parameter and a final state for which it generates a failure 
expression as second parameter. Then, Algorithm 2 generates that failure expression; it is 
a variation of the two algorithms of chapter 4 section 4.2.4) merged together. It is distinct 
in the sense that it produces only the failure expression of the designated final state (the 
second parameter), rather than a set of expressions i.e. one per final state like in chapter 4. 
At this stage, since these failure expressions are generated from a highly abstract 
SM, each typically contains mainly non-atomic (i.e., expandable) events. For example, 
Figure 5—6 shows the first level of the system fault tree composed of two non-atomic 
events, each is a fault tree top-event which corresponds to a SM final state of a lower 
level component — entering one of these final states causes a transition to the final state 
in the SM upstream, i.e. a complete failure which corresponds to the top-event of the 
preliminary system FT. Algorithm 3 is developed to synthesise the lower levels of such 
FTs by expanding
95
 every non-atomic event (lines 2 and 3). We would like to emphasise, 
though, that a non-atomic event is handled indistinguishably in the Safora approach. In 
that sense, such event can be the effect of a source component SM as well as a sub-
component SM being in a final state — both cases are commonly referred to as 
downstream SMs in the state automata hierarchy of Figure 5—6.  
                                                     
95
 A non-atomic event which represents a failure of a component without a corresponding SM 
remains undeveloped. 
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In the case of a source connected component SM that is in an affecting
96
 final state; this 
typically represents an output deviation from the source component which corresponds to 
a matching input deviation into the impacted component — e.g., the final state ‘Severely 
Failed’ of the sensor SM (see Figure 5—1.b) which affects the SM of the backup 
component B of the PS (see Figure 5—2). In the second case (i.e., a sub-component’s SM 
being in an affecting final state), this typically represents an output deviation from the 
sub-component which causes the composed component’s SM to change its state — e.g. 
                                                     
96
 i.e., it impacts a component upstream. 
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the final states of the SM of backup B (see Figure 5—2) each causes the change of state 
to ‘Failed’ in the top-level SM of the PS (see Figure 5—3). 
 
 
 
The synthesis is done by working backwards, starting with the expressions of the system 
failures. The input of algorithm 3 is the set of expressions which are generated from a 
highly abstract system SM (like the top-level SM of Figure 5—6). The outcome consists 
of synthesised system fault trees, reached by recursively merging the component fault tree 
expression which corresponds to a non-atomic event into the higher level expression (line 
3) — the ‘SynthesiseFaultTree’ method is first invoked to expand the non-atomic events 
of the preliminary failure expressions (like the events which are immediately below the 
top event of Figure 5—6), then it recursively synthesises them into, ultimately, full-scale 
system-wide TFTs (algorithm 4). 
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If distinct final states of a component’s SM represent the same failure — i.e., an identical 
output deviation (e.g. omission of output) from that particular component — then the 
TFTs which correspond to these final states need to be merged, such that each TFT 
becomes a new branch of a common bigger tree in a disjunctive form; this is because 
either branch can lead to that same failure.  
Therefore, given a failure expression  and a non-atomic event  of , if the 
‘SynthesiseFaultTree’ method finds the state machine which produces the output failure  
(line 1 of algorithm 4), then it generates a disjunction of local TFT expressions — one 
expression for each final state that represents  (lines 3 through 5). The newly generated 
TFTs for each component can then be minimised if appropriate to obtain a simplified 
intermediate form; this helps to remove any redundancies or complexities as early in the 
process as possible. Next, these TFTs (combined in a disjunctive form) will be merged 
into  by substituting  (line 6). The newly merged disjunctive tree can contain both 
symbols which represent basic events (e.g. internal failures of the component from which 
it was generated) as well as non-atomic events. In the case of newly introduced non-
atomic events , the algorithm (lines 7 through 9) recursively synthesises each 
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corresponding TFT into the fault tree represented by  (assuming the state automata 
contains the SM which produces ).  
When no more non-atomic events remain in the expression, the system fault tree 
has been thoroughly synthesised for that particular system failure as all possible 
substitutions have taken place. At this point, a final analysis takes place to further reduce 
the cut sequences (or the cut sets, if it contains no temporal logic) and thus determines the 
minimal sequences or combinations of events that lead to that system failure. 
 
5.3 Case study 
 
5.3.1 A generic triple-module redundant system 
To better illustrate how our proposed compositional approach works, we use a Generic 
Triple-module Redundant (GTR) system, as depicted by Figure 5—7 (originally used in 
Walker & Papadopoulos, 2006). Components A, B and C are abstract representations of 
any kind of input, control or actuating device. These are arranged in a redundant series 
such that A is the primary component which is backed up, in order, by components B and 
C. S1 and S2 are monitoring sensors designed to detect omission of output from A and B 
respectively and to activate, in response, the next backup
97
 in the series. D is simply an 
abstraction of the output of the GTR and ‘I’ represents the input to the system. 
 
 
Figure 5—7. GTR system 
                                                     
97
 If S1 detects omission of output from A it should activate B, and if S2 detects omission of 
output from B it should activate C. 
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The results of standard FTA performed on the system can be expressed as the 
following list of MCSs (Walker M. , 2009): 
1.  Omission of input at I. 
2.  All of A, B, and C fail. 
3.  Both A and S1 fail (B will not be activated). 
4.  All of A, B, and S2 fail (C is not activated). 
5.  Failure of D. 
At first glance, all appear to be correct. If there is no input to the system, then it cannot 
operate; similarly, if the output component of the system fails, then the system cannot 
function. If all three main components (A, B, and C) fail, then the system will likewise 
fail as well. However, MCS #3 and MCS #4 are more complex. These detail situations 
where the monitoring sensors themselves fail, and are thus unable to detect a failure of 
the monitored component. In consequence, the next backup cannot be activated and 
thereby leading to premature system failure. 
However, like the system of Figure 5—1.a, the GTR system exhibits dynamic 
behaviour: its true failure behaviour depends on the chronology of events. The system can 
function in any of three modes – with A active, B active, or C active – and the transition 
between those modes is triggered by omission failures detected by the monitors S1 and 
S2. Different sequences of failure events can lead to the system failing in different ways, 
and not all of them are correctly represented by the results. 
For example, assume that B fails first, and then A fails second; in this case, 
sensor S1 will not be able to activate B when it detects omission of output from A, and 
sensor S2 will not activate C because B was never activated — it can only detect an 
omission of output once its monitored component is activated. Thus the sequence "B fails 
before A fails" will cause the system to fail regardless of the status of C and S2. This 
means that MCSs #2 and #4 are unduly optimistic — in certain cases, the system will fail 
without all of the events in those MCSs having to occur. 
Similarly, S1 failing before A means that component B will not be activated upon 
omission of output from A, since the monitor is not operational and thus unable to detect 
the omission. Again, this means that the system can fail irrespective of the state of S2 and 
C. However, if S1 fails after A, then it has no effect on the system: it has already served 
its purpose and activated B, so unless there are further failures elsewhere, the system will 
168 
 
continue to operate. Thus MCS #3 can be unnecessarily pessimistic in this case. The same 
is also true of the relationship between B and S2 — if S2 fails after it has detected 
omission of B, then it has no effect on the system. 
Clearly, standard combinatorial fault trees do not always produce accurate results 
for even simple dynamic systems like this one. In this example, we have seen that 
although FTA suggests a failure of all of A, B, and C is necessary to cause system failure, 
a failure of B before A is sufficient, giving a false sense of security; this information, had 
it been known, may have resulted in a different system design, e.g. a triple voter or some 
other different redundancy architecture. 
To remedy this problem, we show how we can generate the TFTs from the SMs 
of the individual components. Thereafter, we demonstrate the Safora approach by 
building the system TFT (in this case there is only one — i.e., total failure of the GTR 
system as top event) and then performing the post-synthesis temporal qualitative analysis 
on it — some temporal logical reductions may be possible to perform during the synthesis 
of the component TFTs. 
 
5.3.2 State automata of the GTR 
The highly abstract description of the monolithic failure behaviour of the GTR system is 
depicted by Figure 5—8. It corresponds to the top-level SM of the state automata 
hierarchy (see system level of Figure 5—5. Compositional modelling of the system failure 
behaviour.) — the remaining SMs in this section correspond to the components level of 
Figure 5—5 (each one of these represents the failure behaviour of a component). The 
system is initially active (state ‘ON’); but it totally fails if there is omission of output 
from component D (i.e., ‘O-D’) or omission of input to the system (i.e., ‘O-I’).  
 
Figure 5—8. Abstract SM of the GTR 
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Despite the fact that ‘I’ is input to all three components A, B and C (see Figure 
5—7 of the GTR), ‘O-I’ is represented at the system level rather than repeated in each 
component, as can be seen in Figure 5—8. This is because ‘O-I’ affects the whole GTR 
(it is a single point of failure for the system). Thus, the SM of component A (Figure 5—9) 
has simply one path from ‘ON’ to ‘Failed’, with the effect of omission of output from A 
(‘O-A’). The state transition of A is assumed to be triggered only by a basic event of the 
component (e.g. an internal failure ‘A fails’), since a lack of input is represented by O-I at 
the system level. 
 
 
Figure 5—9. SM of A 
 
Sensors S1 and S2 have similar jobs (which is to activate the next backup if 
omission of output is detected from the monitored component). There is, therefore, 
potential for reuse of the sensor SM from Figure 5—1 (b), with ‘O-A’ replaced by an 
input failure from A or B and ‘S fails’ becoming ‘S1 fails’ or ‘S2 fails’ as appropriate. 
The state machine for S1 is shown in Figure 5—10; it is identical to Figure 5—1 (b) 
except that ‘S1 fails’ and ‘O-S1’ replace ‘S fails’ and ‘O-S’, respectively. 
 
Figure 5—10. SM of S1 
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However, for the SM of S2 (shown in Figure 5—11), we need to distinguish 
between two types of omission of output from B. ‘O-B Not Severe’ is a detectable 
omission of output from B and occurs when B has been activated by S1 upon failure of A 
and then subsequently fails; it is the effect of entering state ‘Safely Failed’ in the SM of B 
(see Figure 5—12) and allows S2 to activate C, assuming S2 itself has not yet failed. The 
other kind of omission is ‘O-B Severe’, an undetectable omission of B caused either by B 
failing dormant or S1 failing prematurely; either case means that S1 is unable to activate 
B upon failure of A. This omission is the effect of B entering the ‘Permanently OFF’ or 
‘Severely Failed’ states, as seen in Figure 5—12. 
 
 
Figure 5—11. SM of S2 
 
 
Figure 5—12. SM of B 
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As can be seen from Figure 5—14, ‘O-B Severe’ will lead the system to a total 
failure by causing an omission of output from D (‘O-D’). This in turn alters the state of 
the GTR system to ‘Failed’ (i.e., complete failure of the system) as shown in Figure 5—8. 
The SM of D also shows an additional cause for O-D: the basic event ‘D fails’. This is the 
only other single point of failure for the system. 
For component C (SM of Figure 5—13), there are two final states, both with 
omission of output from C (O-C) as common effect. The state ‘Permanently OFF’ means 
that C will never be activated and is caused by O-S2 (i.e. S2 has prematurely failed and 
both A and B have failed in sequence). The other final state is a state where A and B have 
failed in sequence and where C has also failed (caused by the event ‘C fails’). Omission 
from C is the third cause of failure for output component D, leading to O-D, and thereby 
causing a total failure of the system. 
 
 
Figure 5—13. SM of C 
 
Note that A and D are each initially in state ‘ON’ — i.e. the GTR system is 
initially working with its primary component, and the output is being delivered by the 
system. Backup components have their initial states set to ‘OFF’ and sensors are initially 
set to ‘Monitoring’. 
172 
 
 
Figure 5—14. SM of D 
 
5.3.3 Synthesis and analysis of TFTs 
At this stage, we are ready to start with the highly abstract SM of the GTR, to generate a 
set of preliminary system fault trees — one TFT per final state in general (there is only 
one final state in the SM of the GTR in particular). The first level of the GTR system fault 
tree is represented as follows (by application of algorithms 1 then 2 of section 5.2.2 “The 
Safora automatic generation and synthesis of TFTs”):  
Failed (of the GTR system) = O-I + O-D 
No logical reduction is possible here at this stage. Thereafter, the application of algorithm 
3 (in the same section as above) on the system failure expression will call the method 
‘SynthesiseFaultTree’ to expand the non-atomic event ‘O-D’. This is done by searching 
in the state automata model for the state machine that produces ‘O-D’ as effect of 
entering, at least, one of its final states. 
Thereafter, by application of the algorithm of the method ‘SynthesiseFaultTree’ 
(i.e., algorithm 4) on the SM of component D
98
, we generate a disjunction of failure 
expressions; each corresponds to a final state that represents ‘O-D’ (lines 3 to 5).  
 
                                                     
98
 We assume that all necessary state machines exist in the Safora model (i.e., we have a complete 
state automata). If, for example, the SM of D is not part of the model, then ‘O-D’ will be treated 
like an atomic event (i.e., it remains as it is and no further work needs to be done, see algorithm 4 
line 1) — this is the case of ‘O-I’ as it represents an input deviation which cannot be expanded any 
further. 
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Therefore, we have:  
From SM of D: 
For the sake of clarity, ‘D’ is an abbreviation of ‘D fails’ in the expression. 
 Failed(of component D) = D 
 OFF = O-C + O-B Severe 
Similarly, later on in this section we use the same notation for all the internal failures of 
the components — i.e., ‘A’ is an abbreviation of ‘A fails’, ‘B’ is an abbreviation of ‘B 
fails’…etc. The failure expression leading to ‘O-D’ is the disjunction of the  above 
expressions leading to the final states “Failed” and “OFF”. Therefore, we have: 
O-D = D + O-C + O-B Severe 
Again no logical reduction of the expression is possible at this stage. So, we proceed with 
merging (line 6) the fault tree with top event ‘O-D’ into the first level of the system fault 
tree to obtain the following result in the next level: 
Failed = O-I + D + O-C + O-B Severe 
The inserted fault tree expression leading to the top event ‘O-D’ has introduced new non-
atomic events into the expanded system expression. These events also represent each a 
top event of a component’s (temporal) fault tree. Therefore, their corresponding 
expressions need to be merged into the system expression. Algorithm 4 iterates over these 
non-atomic events (lines 7 through 9), recursively calls the ‘SynthesiseFaultTree’ method 
for each one of these (line 8) in order to determine the corresponding local failure 
expression (lines 3 through 5), and then synthesise each generated expression into the 
system failure expression (line 6). Thus, the system fault tree becomes gradually more 
expanded since, at each iteration, a failure expression local to a component is generated 
from the component’s SM and then synthesised into the system expression. 
For example, the newly introduced expandable events into the system failure 
expression of the second level are ‘O-B Severe’ and ‘O-C’, each is represented by two 
final states of the SM producing it — the states “Permanently OFF” and “Severely 
Failed” of the SM of B each represents ‘O-B Severe’ (see Figure 5—12), and similarly 
the states “Permanently OFF” and “Failed” of the SM of C each represents ‘O-C’ (see 
Figure 5—13). Thus, each top event will be replaced with the disjunction of the failure 
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expressions of the final states representing it. Lines 3 through 5 of algorithm 4 generate 
the below failure expressions through the method ‘GenerateFailureExpression’ 
(described in algorithm 2) to construct the fault trees leading to the output deviations ‘O-
B Severe’ and ‘O-C’. 
From SM of B: 
 Permanently OFF = O-S1 
 Severely Failed = O-A.(B|O-A)  
(equivalent to B<O-A) 
 
Therefore, the TFT which leads to ‘O-B Severe’ is represented by the below disjunction 
of failure expressions: 
O-B Severe = O-S1 + O-A.B|O-A 
Some initial minimisation of this failure expression can take place using the temporal law 
(A|B).B  A<B.  
Thus, we have now: 
O-B Severe = O-S1 + B<O-A 
As a result, the following is a more expanded system failure expression, and which 
corresponds to a temporal fault tree (the use of a temporal gate is necessary): 
Failed = O-I + D + O-C + O-S1 + B<O-A 
‘O-A’ and ‘O-S1’ are now the most recently introduced non-atomic events and the 
synthesis algorithm is a depth first traversal and expansion of the fault tree. 
Therefore, we have: 
From SM of A: 
O-A = Failed(of component A) = A 
Therefore, the system failure expression becomes as follows: 
Failed = O-I + D + O-C + O-S1 + B<A 
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From SM of S1: 
O-S1 = Severely Failed(of the sensor S1) = O-A.S1|O-A 
Again, we can use the law (A|B).B  A<B to apply an initial minimisation on the failure 
expression of the sensor. Thus, we now have: 
O-S1 = S1<O-A 
Therefore, we have: 
Failed = O-I + D + O-C + S1<O-A + B<A 
Since the substitution of ‘O-S1’ with its corresponding expression has introduced ‘O-A’ 
again, the algorithm synthesises once more the expression leading to ‘O-A’ into the 
system expression. Thus, we have now: 
Failed = O-I + D + O-C + S1<A + B<A 
At this stage, the remaining non-atomic event is O-C — it was introduced after 
synthesising the fault tree of component D into the system-wide fault tree (through the 
synthesis of the corresponding expressions).  
Therefore, 
From SM of C: 
 Permanently OFF = O-S2 
 Failed = C.(O-B Not Severe) 
The fault tree which leads to O-C is thus the below disjunction of the two expressions: 
O-C = O-S2 + C.(O-B Not Severe) 
A more expanded system failure expression is, thus, as follows: 
Failed = O-I + D + O-S2 + C.(O-B Not Severe) + S1<A + B<A 
Obviously, at this level of the system TFT synthesis, new non-atomic events were also 
introduced through the local failure expression of component C which leads to ‘O-C’, 
namely ‘O-S2’ and ‘O-B Not Severe’. Omission from sensor S2 (‘O-S2’) is caused by a 
severe failure of the sensor which has a TFT expression similar to that one of sensor S1, 
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but according to the output omission from its monitored component (see section 5.3.2 
about the sensor S2). 
 
Therefore, 
 
From SM of S2: 
O-S2 = Severely Failed(of the sensor S2) = (O-B Not Severe).S2|(O-B Not Severe) 
Similarly, the expression can be minimised to become as follows: 
O-S2 = S2<(O-B Not Severe) 
The synthesis of the failure expression of ‘O-S2’ into the system failure expression gives: 
Failed = O-I + D + S2<(O-B Not Severe) + C.(O-B Not Severe) + S1<A + 
B<A 
However, the local failure expression of the sensor has also introduced the non-atomic 
event ‘O-B Not Severe’.  
Therefore:  
From SM of B: 
O-B Not Severe = Safely Failed = B.O-A|B  
The expression can also be logically reduced to become as follows (using the same 
temporal law as in the previous reduction (A|B).B  A<B): 
O-B Not Severe = O-A<B 
This gives a more expanded system failure expression by substituting the first occurrence 
of ‘O-B Not Severe’ with its minimised failure expression, such as: 
Failed = O-I + D + S2<(O-B Not Severe) + C.( O-A<B) + S1<A + B<A 
Thereafter, the newly introduced ‘O-A’ will be substituted with ‘A fails’ (abbreviated A), 
and hence: 
Failed = O-I + D + S2<(O-B Not Severe) + C.(A<B) + S1<A + B<A 
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Similarly, substituting the second occurrence of ‘O-B Not Severe’ gives: 
Failed = O-I + D + S2<(O-A<B) + C.(A<B) + S1<A + B<A 
Then we synthesise the expression of the last occurrence of ‘O-A’ into the system 
expression, and hence: 
Failed = O-I + D + S2<(A<B) + C.(A<B) + S1<A + B<A 
Despite the substitution of all non-atomic events, the system failure expression can be 
expanded further. The cut-sequence ‘S2<(A<B)’ shows that there is no order between 
‘S2’ and ‘A’. Indeed, ‘S2<(A<B)’ is true if ‘S2’ occurs before the PAND gate with the 
two inputs ‘A’ before ‘B’ evaluates to true. Therefore, we can expand it into a disjunctive 
form of other cut-sequences, each with a possible order in which the events can occur 
while preserving the same overall outcome, and hence: 
S2<(A<B) = S2<A<B + A<S2<B 
In the two possibilities of events order (i.e., ‘S2<A<B’ and ‘A<S2<B’), ‘S2’ occurs 
before ‘B’ and then also before ‘A<B’ evaluates to true. Therefore, the final expansion of 
the system failure expression gives: 
Failed = O-I + D + S2<A<B + A<S2<B + C.(A<B) + S1<A + B<A 
Figure 5—15 summarises the synthesis process of the system TFT through a depth first 
expansion of the non-atomic events. The figure (which is a graphical representation of the 
system failure expression) clearly shows the below results contrasted against the results 
obtained from FTA (see Table 5—1). 
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Figure 5—15. Synthesized TFT of the GTR (depth first expansion of non-atomic events) 
 
Table 5—1. Comparison with FTA results 
FTA minimal cut sets 
(Walker M. , 2009) 
Safora generated cut-sequences 
(minimised using Pandora) 
Omission of input at I Idem 
Failure of D Idem 
All of A, B, and C fail 
B<A 
C.A<B 
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Both A and S1 fail S1<A 
All of A, B, and S2 fail 
S2<A<B 
A<S2<B 
 
While one of the FTA results suggests all three components A, B and C need to 
fail for a total failure, the expressions which are generated by the Safora technique (and 
minimised using Pandora) show it as a dangerously optimistic assumption. Indeed, the 
system can fail for less than that — i.e., a total failure does not require C to fail if B fails 
before A; C is required to fail otherwise. Another FTA result, which suggests both A and 
S1 need to fail for a complete failure of the system, seems to be overly pessimistic. Our 
method shows that the combination of failures of S1 and A is order sensitive — i.e., while 
S1 failing before A is relevant to the system failure behaviour, the opposite is still a safe 
situation. Finally, the Safora technique also shows that the combination of failures of A, 
B and S2 is order sensitive. The combination is relevant to the system failure behaviour 
irrespective of the order in which A and S2 fail, but each needs to fail before B.  
 
5.3.4 Comparative evaluation  
This part is aimed at evaluating the Safora technique by comparing it against the 
approach where the system is directly modelled with TFTs for a subsequent Pandora 
qualitative analysis. If the system was originally and entirely modelled as a TFT instead 
of using component SMs, we may have arrived at a fault tree expression such as the 
following (Mahmud et al., 2012): 
Failed =  D +               (A) 
O-I +              (B) 
S1<(A+O-I) +            (C) 
(B + O-I)<(A+O-I) +          (D) 
S2<((A + O-I)<B + (A + O-I)<O-I ) +    (E) 
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C . ((A + O-I)<B + (A + O-I)<O-I )    (F) 
 
In this approach, minimisation of the system failure expression is considerably 
more complex. (A) and (B) are each a single point of failure, the remaining expressions 
can be analysed as follows: 
(C) S1<(A+O-I): 
1.  S1<(A+O-I) 
2.  (S1|A).(S1|O-I).(A+O-I) 
3.  (S1|A).(S1|O-I).A + (S1|A).(S1|O-I).O-I 
4.  (S1<A).(S1|O-I) + (S1|A).(S1<O-I) 
5.  S1<A|O-I + S1<O-I<A + S1<O-I|A + S1<A<O-I 
6.  S1<A|O-I + S1<O-I|A + S1<A<O-I 
7.  S1<A|O-I + S1<O-I|A 
 
(D) (B + O-I)<(A+O-I): 
Using the temporal law (X + Y)<Z  X<Z + Y<Z, The cut-sequence (D) can be 
expressed as a disjunctive form B<(A + O-I) + O-I<(A + O-I), where B<(A + O-I) is 
similar to (C) and thus can be substituted in the same way with B<A|O-I + B<O-I|A, 
while O-I<(A + O-I) contains a contradiction and will be, therefore, eliminated:  
1.  O-I<(A+O-I) 
2.  (O-I|A).(O-I|O-I).(A+O-I) 
3.  (O-I|A).0.(A+O-I) 
4.  0 
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(E) S2<((A + O-I)<B + (A + O-I)<O-I ): 
(E) is more complex, and hence more difficult to reduce: 
1.  S2<((A + O-I)<B + (A + O-I)<O-I) 
2.  S2<(A<B + O-I<B + A<O-I + O-I<O-I) 
3.  S2<(A<B + O-I<B + A<O-I + 0) 
4.  S2<(A<B + O-I<B + A<O-I) 
5.  S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B + A<O-I) . (A<B + O-I<B + A<O-I) 
6.  S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B + A<O-I) . A<B + S2|(A<B). S2|(O-I<B + A<O-I) . 
(O-I<B + A<O-I) 
7.  S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B + A<O-I) . A<B + S2|(A<B). S2|(O-I<B) . S2|(A<O-
I) . (O-I<B + A<O-I) 
8.  S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B + A<O-I) . A<B + S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B) . S2|(A<O-
I) . O-I<B + S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B) . S2|(A<O-I) . A<O-I 
9.  S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B) . S2|(A<O-I) . A<B + S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B) . 
S2|(A<O-I) . O-I<B + S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B) . S2|(A<O-I) . A<O-I 
10.  S2<(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B) . S2|(A<O-I) + S2|(A<B) . S2<(O-I<B) . S2|(A<O-I) 
+ S2|(A<B) . S2|(O-I<B). S2<(A<O-I) 
11.  O-I<S2<A<B + S2<O-I<A<B + S2<A<O-I<B + S2<A<B|O-I + O-
I<A<S2<B + A<S2<O-I<B + A<S2<B|O-I + A<S2<O-I<B + S2<A<O-I<B 
+ S2<O-I<A<B + S2<O-I<B|A + O-I<A<S2<B + O-I<S2<A<B + O-
I<S2<B|A + B<S2<A<O-I + S2<B<A<O-I + S2<A<B<O-I + S2<A<O-I|B + 
B<A<S2<O-I + A<S2<B<O-I + A<S2<O-I|B 
 
(F) C . ((A + O-I)<B + (A + O-I)<O-I ): 
This cut-sequence is relatively easier to reduce and as follows: 
1.  C.((A + O-I)<B + (A + O-I)<O-I) 
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2.  C.(A<B + O-I<B + A<O-I + O-I<O-I) 
3.  C.(A<B + O-I<B + A<O-I + 0) 
4.  C.(A<B + O-I<B + A<O-I) 
5.  C.A<B + C.O-I<B + C.A<O-I 
Therefore, the system failure expression is the disjunction of the following cut-sequences: 
1.  D 
2.  O-I 
3.  S1<A|O-I 
4.  S1<O-I|A 
5.  B<A|O-I 
6.  B<O-I|A 
7.  O-I<S2<A<B 
8.  S2<O-I<A<B 
9.  S2<A<O-I<B 
10.  S2<A<B|O-I 
11.  O-I<A<S2<B 
12.  A<S2<O-I<B 
13.  A<S2<B|O-I 
14.  A<S2<O-I<B 
15.  S2<A<O-I<B 
16.  S2<O-I<A<B 
17.  S2<O-I<B|A 
18.  O-I<A<S2<B 
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19.  O-I<S2<A<B 
20.  O-I<S2<B|A 
21.  B<S2<A<O-I 
22.  S2<B<A<O-I 
23.  S2<A<B<O-I 
24.  S2<A<O-I|B 
25.  B<A<S2<O-I 
26.  A<S2<B<O-I 
27.  A<S2<O-I|B 
28.  C.A<B 
29.  C.O-I<B 
30.  C.A<O-I 
 
At this stage of the minimisation, the individual cut-sequences have been each 
logically reduced independently. We can also minimise the cut-sequences against each 
other. For example, we can apply the rule A|B+B  A+B to several cut-sequences (e.g. 
cut-sequences 2, 3 and 5) and the Boolean absorption laws A<B + A  A and A<B + B 
 B to many others (such as 4 and 6). This gives the following final list of seven 
minimal cut-sequences: 
1.  D 
2.  O-I 
3.  S1< A 
4.  B< A 
5.  S2<A<B 
6.  A<S2<B 
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7.  C.A<B 
 
These results are the same as those obtained using the Safora method, but they are much 
more complex and they required more steps and thus more time and effort to achieve 
them. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
We have presented a method for the compositional synthesis of TFTs from SMs — each 
SM describes the failure behaviour of a component, except one which is a highly abstract 
description of the monolithic failure behaviour of the system. As for the analysis, it can 
be performed at the component level wherever possible — i.e., logical reduction of the 
local TFT which is generated from a component’s SM before its synthesis into the system 
TFT. This makes the entire process (i.e., failure modelling, analysis and synthesis) 
substantially compositional and potentially more scalable; as large-scale system TFTs are 
synthesised from smaller component TFTs. 
The technique works backwards, starting with the first level of each system TFT 
(i.e., total failures as top events) generated from the abstract system SM, and then 
recursively generates the TFTs from the SMs of the components which cause the top 
events. Next, these local TFTs are analysed as much as possible then merged into their 
corresponding system-wide TFTs. A final analysis takes place once we obtain a fully 
expanded system TFT (or set of TFTs) in order to determine the root causes of the 
failures. The TFTs are generated, synthesised and analysed without sacrificing any 
information about the dynamic behaviour of the system. 
A central issue of the approach is the compositional modelling of the failure 
behaviour. Firstly, this helps to better manage the complexity involved in the 
transformations from SMs to TFTs — the worst case complexity of the conversion 
algorithm is O(n
2
), n being the number of paths from the initial state to the final states in 
the SM (see chapter 4, section 4.3). Secondly, the hierarchical modelling of the failure 
behaviour also simplifies the task of the system designers, allowing them to focus on 
modelling local failures in each component. Thirdly, the generated TFTs are 
correspondingly much smaller and then simpler to analyse and to synthesise into system 
TFTs.  
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Concerning the analysis outcome, the accuracy of the results relies strongly on 
the preciseness of the failure behavioural models (i.e., the state automata); though, this 
not uncommon in dependability modelling and analysis — e.g., the Markov differential 
solutions depend chiefly on the Markov state diagrams or on whichever dependability 
models that the Markov chains are checked against (e.g. DFTs).  
The technique we have proposed is simpler to understand from both a modelling 
and analysis perspective and is considerably more scalable than using TFTs directly. We 
have used a dual-purpose case study based on a generic triple redundant system. First, we 
have shown how the approach enables a more accurate and full analysis of an 
increasingly complex dynamic system. Second, we have evaluated the scaling benefits 
(like clarity and ease of analysis) of using compositional SMs for the initial dynamic 
modelling by contrast with a direct modelling of the system with a full-scale TFT. 
Another important issue of the proposed method is the ability to combine it with a 
compositional analysis technique like HiP-HOPS, which would enable automatic 
synthesis and analysis of TFTs from complex models of systems in which the error 
behaviour is described with state automata. 
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6 Brake-By-Wire case study 
This brake-by-wire (BBW) example system is a supplemental case study based mainly on 
the research prototype used in (Walker, Papadopoulos et al., 2009). The aim is to apply 
the Safora method in a similar manner as for the GTR example system in order to re-
confirm the benefits of the approach. For this purpose, it is sufficient to consider the 
BBW components which are relevant to the study — i.e., principally the vehicle 
dynamics, actuators, sensors and the communication bus (see Figure 6—1). The more 
realistic BBW system is very complex and since the purpose of the study is not to 
manipulate a huge number of components with their corresponding fault trees; we need 
therefore to abstract the system to the level shown in Figure 6—1. 
The BBW of the figure operates using one actuator and one rotation sensor at 
each wheel of the vehicle. The actuators are controlled by two electronic control units 
(ECUs) through a dual communication bus. The latter carries signals from the sensors 
towards the ECUs and braking commands back from the ECUs through the comparator to 
the actuators — the comparator forwards the braking commands only in case of identical 
output from both ECUs. The remaining component is the ‘Vehicle Dynamics’ which 
abstracts the output of the system. In that sense, this component describes the different 
braking effects which are relevant to the BBW system failure behaviour — we put 
emphasis on braking failures with catastrophic and critical effects as shown in Figure 6—
2, and which describes the monolithic failure behaviour of the system.  
 
6.1 Compositional modelling of the BBW failure data 
Initially, the BBW system is operating normally — i.e., the corresponding SM is in the 
“Regular” initial state (see Figure 6—2). Thereafter, we consider only the input 
deviations that lead the system to either a catastrophic or a critical situation — i.e., the 
deviations ‘Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock’ and ‘Dev-CriticalWheelLock’ respectively. 
Any input deviation that causes a moderate or a marginal system failure will not be 
considered at the top level, and thus such a deviation is not part of the highly abstract 
description of the system monolithic failure behaviour, as represented by Figure 6—2.  
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‘Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock’ is the effect of entering the states (of the ‘Vehicle 
Dynamics’ SM, see Figure 6—3) and where: a) both front brakes99 fail irrespective of the 
order or at the same time, b) one front and one rear brake both on the same side (either 
the driver or the passenger side) fail simultaneously, c) the two front brakes and the rear 
one behind the driver fail at the same time, d) the two rear brakes and the front brake on 
the driver’s side fail simultaneously and finally e) all four brakes of the vehicle  
 
                                                     
99
 In Figure 6—3, commission failures of the actuators label the SM transitions — an actuator 
commission directly causes a failure of the corresponding brake. 
188 
 
 
Figure 6—1. Architecture of the brake-by-wire system100
                                                     
100
 Compiled from Maenad (http://www.maenad.eu, 2012 — Torchiaro et al., 2011), Atesst2 
(http://www.atesst.org, 2010), (Walker, Papadopoulos et al., 2009) and (Papadopoulos Y. , 2000). 
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fail at the same time. The other relevant output deviation of the ‘Vehicle Dynamics’ SM 
is the ‘Dev-CriticalWheelLock’ which is the effect of entering the states where: a) anyone 
of the front brakes fails followed by a failure of the rear brake of the same side — i.e., 
either both on the left or on the right side of the vehicle, b) both rear brakes fail 
irrespective of the order, but not at the same time — which has a moderate effect rather 
than critical, finally c)  a simultaneous failure of the front brake on the driver’s side with 
the rear brake on the passenger’s side (i.e., opposite to the front one). 
 
 
Figure 6—2. A highly abstract BBW SM 
 
The events and state names of Figure 6—3 have suffixes like ‘FD’, ‘FP’, ‘RD’, 
‘RP’ which respectively mean “Front on the Driver’s side”, “Front on the Passenger’s 
side”, “Rear on the Driver’s side (i.e., behind the driver)” and finally “Rear on the 
Passenger’s side (i.e., behind the front passenger)”. The reason of this specification 
(rather than using ‘Right’ and ‘Left’) is to make the case study valid for vehicles 
manufactured to be used in countries like the UK (where vehicles drive on the right) or 
for vehicles manufactured to be used in countries like France or the US.  
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Table 6—1 (which forms the foundation of the ‘Vehicle Dynamics’ SM) shows 
the different sequences of braking failures (actuator commissions) with their 
corresponding effects on the vehicle. We assume, though, that simultaneous failures are 
due to common failure modes, and which cause separate
101
 transitions in the 
corresponding SM. Therefore, when it comes to simultaneous failures we express these 
by preceding the suffixes with ‘Diag’ (two failures at the same time of diagonally 
opposed actuators) or ‘Trig’ (three failures at the same time of actuators forming a 
triangle). For example, the actuator commission failure ‘C-ActuatorDiagD’ represents a 
common cause failure by which ‘C-ActuatorFD’ and ‘C-ActuatorRP’ occur 
simultaneously — the prefix ‘C-’ is to express a commission output deviation and this 
applies to all the BBW components’ SMs. The letter ‘D’ which follows ‘Diag’ means that 
the diagonal line first extremity is the front actuator on the Driver’s side, the other 
extremity being necessarily (since the line is diagonal) the rear actuator on the 
passenger’s side — the other diagonally opposed actuators are at the front on the 
Passenger’s side and at the rear behind the driver, thus ‘C-ActuatorDiagP’102 would 
represent a common cause failure by which ‘C-ActuatorFP’ and ‘C-ActuatorRD’ occur 
simultaneously. 
                                                     
101
 A similar approach can be found in Markov state diagrams where transitions due to common 
failure modes are often labelled with separate failure rates like in (ARP4761, 1996). 
102
 This failure (i.e., ‘C-ActuatorDiagP’) is omitted in the study since it causes less critical effects 
(an acceptable equilibrium of the vehicle can be regained by the locking of the opposite wheel) 
and does not impact the sequencing of the other failures. However, ‘C-ActuatorDiagD’ is 
considered in the study due to the critical effects it may cause since the vehicle veers plausibly 
from the side into oncoming traffic before equilibrium can be regained by the locking of the 
opposite wheel. 
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Table 6—1 also shows commission failures represented like: 
‘C-ActuatorD’: causes a simultaneous failure of the front brake on the Driver’s 
side and the rear brake behind it on the same side.  
‘C-ActuatorP’: causes a simultaneous failure of the front brake on the 
Passenger’s side and the rear brake behind it on the same side.  
‘C-ActuatorF’: causes a simultaneous failure of the two Front brakes.  
‘C-ActuatorR’: causes a simultaneous failure of the two Rear brakes.  
The dynamics of the BBW system are highly complex in the automotive industry. 
We have, therefore, simplified the models and particularly the failure behavioural 
description of the “Vehicle Dynamics” component to the level presented in Figure 6—3. 
Complexity analysis of the conversion algorithm is provided in chapter 4 (section 4.3). 
Thus, it is not intended in this case study to demonstrate the conversions of large scale 
SMs and to produce huge amounts of complex TFTs. The main purpose is, by contrast, to 
emphasise and to analyse some relevant sequencing of faults.  
In order to limit the complexity of the study, we only focus on sequences of no 
more than two (strictly ordered) actuator commissions — i.e., sequences of up to two 
braking failures — and as seen in Figure 6—3. We assume that sequences of three 
braking failures or more (the four brakes fail in order) are due to common failure modes 
by which the corresponding wheels actually lock at the same time. Moreover, in the 
reality it is very rare to observe more than two wheels locking in sequence; but like in 
Figure 6—3, we treat such situations (even though rare) as simultaneous locking of 
wheels by representing these as separate events in the vehicle dynamics’ SM — i.e., same 
time commissions of the corresponding actuators.  
Indeed, we turn our attention to the more critical effects of common failure 
modes (by which some wheels may lock simultaneously). In this context, ‘C-
ActuatorTrigFD’ represents a simultaneous failure of the three actuators ‘C-ActuatorFD’, 
‘C-ActuatorFP’ and ’C-ActuatorRD’ — which form a triangle (abbrev. Trig) with the 
Front actuator on the Driver’s side as the summit (suffix FD). Similarly, ‘C-
ActuatorTrigRD’ represents a simultaneous failure of the three actuators ‘C-ActuatorRD’, 
‘C-ActuatorRP’ and ‘C-ActuatorFD’. Each of those triangles of commissions of actuators 
includes those which occur on the driver’s side due to their higher criticality — i.e., ‘C-
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ActuatorTrigFP’103 and ‘C-ActuatorTrigRP’104 are omitted from this study, since each one 
of these includes the failures of the actuators which occur on the Passenger’s side and are 
thus less critical. Finally, ‘C-ActuatorAll’ represents a simultaneous failure of all 
actuators which means that the four brakes fail at the same time, and thus locking all 
wheels at once. 
Figure 6—4 represents the failure behaviour of an actuator. This one executes the 
ECU command by applying braking pressure on the corresponding wheel (there is one 
actuator for each wheel see Figure 6—1). Each actuator is initially in a ‘Regular’ state 
which means that it is functioning properly. The actuator’s SM enters the ‘Inaccurate’ 
state due to a commission failure represented by the event ‘ActCommission’105 (i.e., the 
actuator applies a braking pressure without being commanded to do so) or due to a false 
braking signal (e.g., an incorrect command to brake) received from the bus, and which is 
represented by the event ‘C-BusCommand’.  
                                                     
103
 A common failure mode by which ‘C-ActuatorFP’, ‘C-ActuatorFD’ and ‘C-ActuatorRP’ fail 
simultaneously. 
104
 Same as the previous but for the simultaneous failure of ‘C-ActuatorRP’, ‘C-ActuatorRD’ and 
‘C-ActuatorFP’. 
105
 An internal failure like in the case where a jam occurs while the actuator is applying a braking 
pressure, and which therefore persists when the braking is required to stop. 
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Table 6—1. Effect classification of the vehicle wheel locking —  
information gathered from (Walker, 2009) and (Walker et al., 2009). 
Failure Effect Severity 
either C-ActuatorFD or C-ActuatorFP 
Average loss of stability and control with 
manageable consequences. 
Moderate 
C-ActuatorRD (resp. C-ActuatorRP) 
Low loss of stability which can be regained by 
managing braking through C-ActuatorFP (resp. C-
ActuatorFD). 
Marginal 
C-ActuatorFD < C-ActuatorRD 
High loss of stability and control with possible 
severe consequences — narrow margin to 
manoeuvre. 
Critical 
C-ActuatorFP < C-ActuatorRP 
High loss of stability and control — the vehicle 
veers plausibly towards the driver’s side (i.e., 
possible severe consequences). 
Critical 
C-ActuatorRD < C-ActuatorFD 
Average loss of stability with better possibility of 
manoeuvring. 
Moderate 
C-ActuatorRP < C-ActuatorFP 
Average loss of stability with better possibility of 
manoeuvring. 
Moderate 
C-ActuatorD  
(i.e., C-ActuatorFD & C-ActuatorRD)  
High loss of stability and control with limited 
possibilities of manoeuvring — the vehicle veers 
plausibly towards the driver’s side. 
Catastrophic 
C-ActuatorP  
(i.e., C-ActuatorFP & C-ActuatorRP) 
High loss of stability and control with very limited 
possibility of manoeuvring (whether automatically 
or manually). 
Catastrophic 
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C-ActuatorFD < C-ActuatorRP 
Average loss of control and the vehicle can regain 
stability through the locking of opposite wheels — 
better possibilities of manoeuvring. 
Moderate 
C-ActuatorRP < C-ActuatorFD 
Low loss of stability which can be regained 
through the locking of opposite wheels — good 
possibilities of manoeuvring. 
Marginal 
C-ActuatorDiagD  
(i.e., C-ActuatorFD & C-ActuatorRP)  
High loss of stability and control — locking of 
opposite wheels offers, however, some margin to 
manoeuvre. 
Critical 
C-ActuatorFD < C-ActuatorFP 
(resp. C-ActuatorFP < C-ActuatorFD) 
Locking of the two front wheels causes severe 
braking and loss of control — the vehicle veers 
plausibly to the driver’s side (resp. passenger’s 
side). 
Catastrophic 
C-ActuatorF  
(i.e., C-ActuatorFD & C-ActuatorFP) 
Locking of the two front wheels causes severe 
braking and loss of control — the vehicle veers 
less severely due to simultaneous brake locking. 
Catastrophic 
C-ActuatorRD < C-ActuatorRP 
(resp. C-ActuatorRP < C-ActuatorRD) 
Better margin to manoeuvre with locked rear 
wheels than front — the vehicle veers plausibly to 
the driver’s side (resp. passenger’s side). 
Critical 
C-ActuatorR  
(i.e., C-ActuatorRD & C-ActuatorRP)  
Simultaneous locking of rear wheels is more 
manageable than front — better potential to regain 
stability. 
Moderate 
C-ActuatorTrigFD  
(i.e., C-ActuatorFD & C-ActuatorFP 
&C-ActuatorRD)  
Severe loss of stability — very difficult to 
manoeuvre. 
Catastrophic 
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C-ActuatorTrigRD  
(i.e., C-ActuatorRD & C-ActuatorRP 
&C-ActuatorFD)  
Severe loss of stability — very difficult to 
manoeuvre. 
Catastrophic 
C-ActuatorAll  
(i.e., C-ActuatorFD & C-ActuatorFP 
& C-ActuatorRD & C-ActuatorRP)  
Severe loss of stability — very difficult to 
manoeuvre. 
Catastrophic 
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Figure 6—3. Vehicle Dynamics SM 
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Figure 6—4. Actuator SM 
 
Similarly, the SM of the bus (see Figure 6—5) is initially in the ‘Regular’ state 
and can transit to either the “Command Incorrect” or the “Data Incorrect” state. The 
former transition is due to an incorrect command to brake (i.e., ‘C-BrakeCommand’) 
which is propagated from the ECUs through the bus to the actuators. The latter is due to 
an internal failure of the bus (i.e., ‘BusCommission’) — e.g., electromagnetic interference 
or memory bits that are stuck in the bus. Corrupted data is plausibly also due to incorrect 
sensor data (i.e., ‘C-SensorData’) since the bus is a dual communication means — i.e., 
communicating data from the sensors to the ECUs and then brake commands from the 
ECUs to the actuators.  
 
 
Figure 6—5. Bus SM 
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The comparator whose failure behaviour is described in Figure 6—6 forwards the 
brake commands from the two ECUs to the actuators only if the commands are identical. 
This is to prevent accidental braking signals generated from one ECU to cause undesired 
wheel locking. Therefore, an incorrect braking command must be duplicated for its 
propagation to the actuators (as seen in Figure 6—6 where both twin C-ECUs are 
required to enter the state ‘Propagating’). 
 
 
Figure 6—6. Comparator SM 
 
Concerning the ECU, the corresponding SM transits from the state ‘Sound’ to the 
state ‘Unsound’ only due to corrupted data received through the communication bus (i.e., 
‘C-BusData’). We assume that both ECUs do not fail internally since these often recover 
quickly from their own hardware or software malfunctions. 
 
 
Figure 6—7. ECU SM 
 
Figure 6—8 describes the SM of a sensor. Each sensor measures the rotation 
speed of the corresponding wheel, it then supplies the ECUs with the related data based 
on which braking commands may be produced. The ECUs command to brake if the 
sensor data indicates that the corresponding wheel is turning too fast or may jeopardise 
the control of the vehicle. The sensors may fail completely; but this is a situation which 
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can be detected by the ECUs since these would not receive any sensor data after a pre-
determined period of time. For the purpose of this case study, however, we only consider 
sensor high-bias internal failures (i.e., ‘SenCommission’) that cause high value errors. 
These sensor errors lead to an interpretation that the rotation speed of the corresponding 
wheel is too high, and hence causing braking commands to be made by the ECUs.   
 
 
Figure 6—8. Sensor SM 
 
The failure behaviour of each sensor (resp. actuator) needs to be described only once 
since the sensors (resp. the actuators) are all identical. Similarly, representing the SM of 
one ECU is sufficient since both ECUs are the same. 
 
6.2 Compositional synthesis of the BBW system fault trees 
The application of the Safora method (see chapter 5 section 5.2.2) to the BBW 
compositional SMs starts with the conversion of the abstract system’s SM to generate a 
set of preliminary system FTs like: 
 
“Catastrophically Failed” = Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock 
“Critically Failed” = Dev- CriticalWheelLock 
The relevant system failure states of the study, i.e., “Catastrophically Failed” and 
“Critically Failed” are respectively reached through the input deviations ‘Dev-
CatastrophicWheelLock’ and ‘Dev- CriticalWheelLock’. The corresponding matching 
output deviations can be expanded by applying the conversion algorithm on the ‘Vehicle 
Dynamics’ SM (see Figure 6—3).  
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The failure expression of the first output deviation (i.e., ‘Dev-
CatastrophicWheelLock’) is thus as follows:  
Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorFP.C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRP + 
C-ActuatorFD.C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorFD + 
C-ActuatorF + 
C-ActuatorTrigFD + 
C-ActuatorTrigRD + 
C-ActuatorAll + 
C-ActuatorD + 
C-ActuatorP 
Some minimisation is possible at this first level using the law of POR transformation like: 
B . A|B  A<B 
Therefore, the system failure expression of ‘Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock’ becomes as 
follows: 
Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorRP) + (1) 
C-ActuatorFP <C-ActuatorFD.(C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorRP|) + (2) 
C-ActuatorF + 
C-ActuatorTrigFD + 
C-ActuatorTrigRD + 
C-ActuatorAll + 
C-ActuatorD + 
C-ActuatorP 
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The failure expression of the second output deviation (i.e., ‘Dev- CriticalWheelLock’) is 
as follows: 
Dev-CriticalWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorRD.C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRP + 
C-ActuatorRP.C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorFD + 
C-ActuatorRD.C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorFD + 
C-ActuatorRP.C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorFD + 
C-ActuatorDiagD 
 
Like the first minimisation which has been performed on the ‘Dev-
CatastrophicWheelLock’ branch, we can also reduce ‘Dev-CriticalWheelLock’ at this 
level using the POR transformation mentioned earlier. This gives: 
Dev-CriticalWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorRD.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRP) + (3) 
C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP.(C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFD) + (4) 
C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorRD.(C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorFD) + (5) 
C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorRP.(C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorFD) + (6) 
C-ActuatorDiagD 
The two expressions of ‘Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock’ and ‘Dev-CriticalWheelLock’ can 
be further reduced using some information produced by the conversion of the SM 
representing the “Vehicle Dynamics” to TFTs. The conversion also produces sequences 
of failures which have moderate or marginal effects; we can merge these results like in: 
 
Dev-Moderate-OR-MarginalWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorRP.C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRP + 
C-ActuatorFD.C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorFD + 
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C-ActuatorFP.C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorFD + 
C-ActuatorFD.C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorFD + 
C-ActuatorR 
This branch, even though irrelevant as suggested in the study, can complete the picture to 
make a global view of the effects of the sequencing of the actuator commissions or, as 
consequences, unwanted locking of wheels. It can be minimised using the POR 
transformation as well like in the following: 
Dev-Moderate-OR-MarginalWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorRP.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP) + (7) 
C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorFD.(C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP) + (8) 
C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorFP.(C-ActuatorRP|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFD) + (9) 
C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorFD.(C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorFP|C-ActuatorRP) + (10) 
C-ActuatorR 
By applying a temporal extension law to (1), we have the different order possibilities for 
the occurrence of the events ‘C-ActuatorRD’ and ‘C-ActuatorRP’ as follows: 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorFP +  (1.1) 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorFP +  (1.2) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorRP +  (1.3) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorRD +  (1.4) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP +  (1.5) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRD +  (1.6) 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorFP.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRP) +  (1.7) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRD.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRP) +  (1.8) 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorFP.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD) +  (1.9) 
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C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD) + (1.10) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorRP) (1.11) 
 
However, by conformance to the hypothesis made earlier, i.e., sequences of up to two 
failures — or simultaneous failures otherwise; the extension of (1) can be expressed as 
follows: 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRD +  (1.1) 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRP +  (1.2) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP +  (1.3) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP.(C-ActuatorFD|C-ActuatorRD|C-ActuatorRP)  (1.4)  
 
‘C-ActuatorRD’, as one of the POR optional input events, should not occur before ‘C-
ActuatorFD’; otherwise the effect would be moderate and not catastrophic (see Figure 
6—3 and branch 10 of ‘Dev-Moderate-OR-MarginalWheelLock’). Similarly, ‘C-
ActuatorRP’ (as another POR optional input event) should not occur before ‘C-
ActuatorFD’; otherwise the effect would be marginal (see Figure 6—3 and branch 8). 
Therefore, we can express all the failure sequence possibilities (with respect to the 
hypothesis) as follows: 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRD +  (1.1) 
C-ActuatorFD< C-ActuatorRP +  (1.2) 
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP  (1.3) 
At this stage of the minimisation of (1), the branch (1.1) produces a critical effect 
and not catastrophic. It would, thus, be absorbed through the expansion of branch (3) of 
‘Dev-CriticalWheelLock’. Moreover, (1.2) produces a moderate and not a catastrophic 
effect (see Figure 6—3). It would, thus, be absorbed through the expansion of (7) of 
‘Dev-Moderate-OR-MarginalWheelLock’. This means that (1) can be reduced to simply 
(1.3), i.e., C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorFP. In a similar way, we can reduce (2) to C-
ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorFD and thus, together with (1.3), would minimise to C-
ActuatorFD . C-ActuatorFP (their simultaneous occurrence is treated as a separate event, 
i.e., ‘C-ActuatorF’). Therefore, the order in which the front brakes fail is not relevant to 
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the catastrophic effect. It is, however, relevant in the case where we like to speculate 
about the veer side of the vehicle, but such thing is more conceptual and then requires us 
to preserve the corresponding states separate (as in Figure 6—3) rather than unifying their 
effects under the ‘Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock’ output deviation. 
By proceeding in a similar manner, we can minimise the expressions of ‘Dev-
CriticalWheelLock’ to get the following results: 
Dev-CriticalWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorRD + (3) 
C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP + (4) 
C-ActuatorRP<C-ActuatorRD + (5) 
C-ActuatorRD<C-ActuatorRP + (6) 
C-ActuatorDiagD 
Thereafter, we can merge (5) and (6) using the logical AND gate — this should not be 
interpreted as the common failure mode by which the rear brakes fail simultaneously, and 
which has a moderate effect instead. This gives therefore: 
Dev-CriticalWheelLock =  
C-ActuatorFD<C-ActuatorRD + (3) 
C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP + (4) 
C-ActuatorRD . C-ActuatorRP + (5’) 
C-ActuatorDiagD 
After minimising as much as possible, both expressions of ‘Dev-CatastrophicWheelLock’ 
and ‘Dev-CriticalWheelLock’ will be synthesised respectively into the “Catastrophically 
Failed” and “Critically Failed” system fault trees at the next level. At this stage of the 
synthesis, we have already seen how the Safora method preserves the significance of the 
temporal order of events through its conversion approach of the SMs to TFTs, and also 
along the logical reduction of the produced results by using the Pandora temporal laws. 
Though as stated earlier, we do not intend to produce vast amount of complex TFTs to 
minimise and synthesise, so we rather select one branch like (4) to compare our results 
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with those in (Walker M. et al., 2009). At the level of the branch (4), we need to expand 
the ‘C-ActuatorFP’ and ‘C-ActuatorRP’ actuator commission input deviations, where 
each needs to be substituted with the failure expression of the matching output deviation 
from the corresponding actuator. Since the actuators are all identical and with the same 
failure behaviour (described in Figure 6—4), we need to apply the conversion algorithm 
only once to the actuator’s SM and then, at a later stage, we designate to which wheel the 
expression is by using the suffix representations mentioned earlier (idem concerning the 
sensors). Therefore, we get from the SM of one actuator the following expression:  
C-Actuator = ActCommission + C-BusCommand 
Thereafter, we get from the SM of the bus the failure expression of the matching output 
deviation of ‘C-BusCommand’, and hence: 
C-BusCommand = C-BrakeCommand 
Its synthesis into the ‘C-Actuator’ failure expression gives: 
C-Actuator = ActCommission + C-BrakeCommand 
Similarly the ‘C-BrakeCommand’ input deviation can be expanded with its corresponding 
failure expression (of the matching output deviation) by converting the SM of the 
comparator as follows: 
C-BrakeCommand = C-ECU1 . C-ECU2(“the twin”) 
However, in order to propagate ‘C-BrakeCommand’ the comparator ensures that ‘C-
ECU1’ and ‘C-ECU2’ are identical. Therefore, some minimisation is possible at this level 
of the synthesis such that: 
C-BrakeCommand = C-ECU1 . C-ECU2 
 = C-ECU . C-ECU (where ‘C-ECU’ = ‘C-ECU1’ = ‘C-ECU2’) 
 = C-ECU (using the Boolean Idempotent law, i.e., A .A  A) 
Thus, the synthesis of the failure expression of ‘C-BrakeCommand’ into the ‘C-Actuator’ 
failure expression gives: 
C-Actuator = ActCommission + C-ECU 
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To extend ‘C-Actuator’ with the failure expression of ‘C-ECU’, we need to apply the 
conversion algorithm on the SM of the ECU. Therefore, we have: 
C-ECU = C-BusData  
After synthesis into the C-Actuator failure expression we have: 
C-Actuator = ActCommission + C-BusData 
At this level, there is a newly introduced input deviation (i.e., ‘C-BusData’) 
which is derived from failures and/or errors propagated through the bus. The expansion of 
‘C-BusData’ by applying the conversion algorithm on the SM of the bus gives: 
C-BusData = C-SensorData + BusCommission 
After the substitution of ‘C-BusData’ with “C-SensorData + BusCommission” into the 
failure expression of ‘C-Actuator’ we get: 
C-Actuator = ActCommission + (C-SensorData + BusCommission)  
The full synthesis of the ‘C-Actuator’ failure expression requires its extension 
with the failure expression of the ‘sub’-fault-tree whose top-event is ‘C-SensorData’. The 
conversion of the SM of the sensor gives: 
C-SensorData = SenCommission 
The last step of the synthesis of the ‘C-Actuator’ failure expression, therefore, gives: 
C-Actuator = ActCommission + (SenCommission + BusCommission)  
Then, by the Boolean associative law we have: 
C-Actuator = ActCommission + SenCommission + BusCommission 
These were common Safora steps of SM conversions, minimisation wherever possible 
and synthesis of produced results. Therefore, we have the following for both actuator 
commissions of (4): 
C-ActuatorFP = ActCommissionFP + SenCommissionFP + BusCommission 
And 
C-ActuatorRP = ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + BusCommission 
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 The failure of the dual communication bus ‘BusCommission’ is a common cause failure 
for all actuators leading to the locking of all wheels.  
The cut-sequence (4) — i.e., C-ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP — leading to a critical 
output deviation can , therefore, have its events substituted as follows: 
(ActCommissionFP + SenCommissionFP + BusCommission) < (ActCommissionRP + 
SenCommissionRP + BusCommission) 
By using the distributive temporal law, the cut-sequence becomes: 
ActCommissionFP < (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + BusCommission) + 
(4.1) 
SenCommissionFP < (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + BusCommission) + 
(4.2) 
BusCommission < (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + BusCommission) 
 (4.3) 
(4.3) can be substituted with the following by using the temporal law A<(B+C)  A|B . 
A|C . (B+C), and hence: 
(4.3)  (BusCommission|ActCommissionRP) . (BusCommission|SenCommissionRP) . 
(BusCommission|BusCommission) . (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP 
+ BusCommission) 
Therefore, (4.3) can be completely eliminated using first the simultaneity law, i.e. A|A  
0 and thus the conjunct (BusCommission|BusCommission)  0, then second the Boolean 
law A.0  0, and hence: 
(4.3)   (BusCommission|ActCommissionRP) . (BusCommission|SenCommissionRP) . 
0 . (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + BusCommission)  
  0 
Thereafter, using the Boolean law A+0  0, (4) becomes only as follows: 
ActCommissionFP < (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + BusCommission) + 
(4.1) 
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SenCommissionFP < (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + BusCommission) + 
(4.2) 
At this stage, we can also expand both (4.1) and (4.2) using the same temporal law as 
before, i.e. A<(B+C)  A|B . A|C . (B+C). therefore, (4) is equivalent to: 
(ActCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(ActCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(ActCommissionFP|BusCommission). (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + 
BusCommission) +  (4.1) 
(SenCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(SenCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(SenCommissionFP|BusCommission). (ActCommissionRP + SenCommissionRP + 
BusCommission) (4.2) 
With the Boolean distributive law, i.e. A.(B+C)  A.B + A.C, each one of (4.1) and 
(4.2) can be expanded to three disjunctions totalling six for both as follows: 
(ActCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(ActCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(ActCommissionFP|BusCommission) . ActCommissionRP +  (4.1.1) 
(ActCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(ActCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(ActCommissionFP|BusCommission) . SenCommissionRP +  (4.1.2) 
(ActCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(ActCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(ActCommissionFP|BusCommission) . BusCommission + (4.1.3) 
(SenCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(SenCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(SenCommissionFP|BusCommission) . ActCommissionRP + (4.2.1) 
(SenCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(SenCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(SenCommissionFP|BusCommission) . SenCommissionRP + (4.2.2) 
(SenCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(SenCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(SenCommissionFP|BusCommission) . BusCommission (4.2.3) 
Now we can use the temporal law B.A|B  A<B to minimise as follows: 
(ActCommissionFP<ActCommissionRP).(ActCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(ActCommissionFP|BusCommission) +  (4.1.1) 
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(ActCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(ActCommissionFP<SenCommissionRP). 
(ActCommissionFP|BusCommission) +  (4.1.2) 
(ActCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(ActCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(ActCommissionFP<BusCommission) + (4.1.3) 
(SenCommissionFP<ActCommissionRP).(SenCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(SenCommissionFP|BusCommission) + (4.2.1) 
(SenCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(SenCommissionFP<SenCommissionRP). 
(SenCommissionFP|BusCommission) + (4.2.2) 
(SenCommissionFP|ActCommissionRP).(SenCommissionFP|SenCommissionRP). 
(SenCommissionFP<BusCommission) (4.2.3) 
 
Those results clearly show that for the sequence where the brake at the front on 
the passenger’s side (FP) fail before the brake at the rear same side (RP) — i.e., the 
output deviations from their corresponding actuators occur in the same order C-
ActuatorFP<C-ActuatorRP — one of the following is sufficient to happen (see Figure 
6—9): 
(a) Internal failures of the corresponding actuators occur in the same order. 
(b) Internal failures of the corresponding sensors occur in the same order. 
(c) An internal failure of the actuator FP occurs before an internal failure of the 
sensor RP. 
(d) An internal failure of the sensor FP occurs before an internal failure of the 
actuator RP. 
(e) An internal failure of the actuator FP occurs before the bus fails. 
(f) An internal failure of the sensor FP occurs before the bus fails.  
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Figure 6—9. [C-ActuatorFP < C-ActuatorRP] cut-sequence (4) of the “Critically Failed” 
hazard 
 
6.3 Discussion 
A simplified version of a BBW system has been used for this study. A compositional 
modelling of the analysis related information has been provided, and as required by the 
Safora method in order to generate and synthesise the system TFTs from those which are 
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local to the components. Once a hierarchical description has been provided, the method 
started with the conversion of the highly abstract SM (which describes the monolithic 
failure behaviour of the BBW system) to the first system FTs — though, emphasis at this 
level was put on the input deviations which lead the system to catastrophic or critical 
situations. Marginal and moderate situations were considered at the level of a downstream 
SM (which describes the vehicle dynamics) — the related states can influence the fault 
sequences and, therefore, impose a temporal order on faults leading to the more severe 
states. For example, if a commission failure occurs from the actuator FP before a 
commission occurs from the actuator RP (which was thoroughly studied in section 6.2) 
this will lead to a critical situation. However, a reverse order in which those commission 
failures occur will lead to a less critical situation (i.e., moderate see Figure 6—3). 
More emphasis was put on one cut-sequence causing a critical effect — it was 
not intended in the case study to go through all the generated cut-sequences (with 
catastrophic and critical effects together), as this would have produced vast amounts of 
complex results which exceed the space allowed for the thesis. However, we have 
demonstrated the benefits of Safora since the method (given a hierarchical description of 
complex failure behaviour of a dynamic system) automatically detects when to impose 
temporal constraints to distinguish the severe sequences of faults from those which are 
less severe. The process is repeated for all the components until the system (temporal) 
fault trees become fully synthesised. Minimisation was performed wherever possible 
during the synthesis, but this one often needs to be completed afterwards to logically 
reduce the produced large-scale TFTs. 
The ability to reduce the complexity of the produced results was another 
highlighted benefit of Safora. This was particularly demonstrated in the GTR case study 
of chapter 5 due to the nature of the example system — i.e., several system constituents 
exhibit dynamic behaviour with more complex component interdependencies. This has 
helped us to show how we can minimise, wherever possible, the TFTs which are local to 
the system components before synthesising them into larger TFTs, and thus significantly 
reduce the complexity which is inherent in analysing TFTs. In this regard, a full 
comparison with a direct TFT modelling of the system has been provided (see section 
5.3.4). The BBW example system, however, exhibits the dynamic behaviour at the level 
of one of its components (i.e., the “Vehicle Dynamics” see Figure 6—3). This has also 
provided a good case to demonstrate the benefits of our approach concerning the 
generation of both static and dynamic fault trees, the necessity of the temporal order of 
failure events being automatically detected during the conversion of the component SMs 
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— e.g., the SM of Figure 6—3 (which is highly dynamic and thus produces mainly TFTs) 
vs. the remaining component SMs (which produce static fault trees).  
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7 Conclusions 
In this thesis we set out to study the existing safety analysis techniques which are 
performed on systems exhibiting dynamic behaviour. We started to explore the modelling 
approaches that are used to describe how such systems can fail.  In the literature survey, 
we observed the widespread use of state transition models for this purpose (whether 
higher level descriptions e.g. SMs or lower level formalisms like Petri nets and Markov 
models). We pointed out SMs as a prevalent and expressive paradigm being used in 
several approaches, e.g., the state extension of HiP-HOPS in (Papadopoulos, 2000) and 
also with some influential modelling languages which are highly accepted in the 
aerospace community, like Altarica in (Rauzy, 2002) and AADL in (Joshi et al., 2007).  
This dissertation has presented our approach to the analysis of dynamic systems 
whose behavioural aspects are represented using SMs. The contributions of this thesis can 
be summarised as follows: 
 We have outlined an important problem in the existing approaches to the SM-
based analysis of dynamic systems. Briefly, one approach is based on the 
conversion of SMs to static fault trees [like in (Rauzy, 2002) and (Joshi, 
Vestal, & Binns, 2007)]. In this approach, the significance of the SM temporal 
semantics is lost during the conversion.  The other identified approach consists 
of the conversion of SMs to GSPNs and Markov models. This is applied to 
AADL descriptions like in (Rugina A. , 2007); however, this approach is less 
suitable for qualitative analysis. 
 A novel algorithm which generates (temporal) fault trees from SMs has been 
presented. One of the advantages of the algorithm is that the temporal 
constraints are imposed only when necessary during the conversion. This will 
positively impact the efforts needed for the minimisation of the generated fault 
trees — minimisation of TFTs is known for being a complex process. 
 Minimisation is done using the Pandora sets of temporal laws; these include 
the SAND operator (for simultaneity). Therefore, we have identified then 
adapted a selection of temporal laws to the TFTs which we generate from the 
SMs — the generated TFTs are without SAND gates.   
 We have suggested a novel, compositional (and hence potentially more 
scalable) method which is based on our approach to generate TFTs from SMs. 
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The method relies on a hierarchical description of the failure information 
(which is based on the failure behavioural descriptions local to the components 
of the system), then synthesises large system TFTs from smaller component 
TFTs (generated from the individual component SMs). 
 We have presented a contribution regarding the optimisation of Markov 
models. These are state-transition based models and known with the state 
explosion problem. We have demonstrated how we can apply the conversion 
algorithm on these models, and hence we generate TFTs which we minimise 
using Pandora. This allows an automatic optimisation by identifying the 
redundancies to remove from the Markov models. 
 The algorithm which converts SMs to TFTs mainly uses POR gates to impose 
temporal constraints during the conversion. Therefore and from a quantitative 
perspective, the probabilistic models given in (Merle, 2010), and which 
accommodate any failure distribution for the basic events, were thoroughly 
investigated. Some detailed comparisons with combinatorial techniques as well 
as with Markov solutions were made and a probabilistic model for a POR gate 
with n input events (n N+ s.t. n2) was proposed in this thesis.    
Considerable work remains to be done such as:  
 Further development of this analysis approach to make it automated as part of 
the HiP-HOPS safety analysis tool framework. 
 Potentially make the approach compatible with other SM-based modelling 
approaches, like interfacing with OSATE
106
 (an Open Source AADL Tool 
Environment). This would allow Pandora TFTs to be generated from AADL 
state machines. 
 The algorithm worst-case complexity of checking the necessity of a temporal 
order during the conversion is O(n
2
), n being the number of paths from the 
initial state to the final states in the SM. An improvement can be done, e.g., to 
ensure that paths diverging at join states are not traversed more than once each.  
                                                     
106
 http://www.aadl.info/aadl/currentsite/tool/osate.html 
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 We assumed that events are non-repairable which is compatible with the 
semantics of Pandora. This also conforms to (Vesely et al., 1981) and, in 
consequence, we have also made the assumption that the SMs are acyclic. 
However, repairable events would be worth being considererd as many users 
aim at modeling repairable systems. This would imply the existence of cyclic 
behaviours and hence revision of the algorithm of this dissertation. The current 
implementation version simply breaks the cycles found during path traversals 
and acknowledge users where these have been detected in the SM.  
 The TFTs which are generated by the algorithm of this thesis are logically 
reduced using the sets of Pandora temporal laws. Work on minimisation such 
as ensuring that the reduced cut-sequences are minimal and related automation 
issues is not part of this thesis, but can be found in (Walker M., 2009). 
However, we would like also to study further the work presented in (Merle, 
2010) concerning the determination of the structure function of dynamic fault 
trees. Also, we want to investigate the complexity involved in the 
simplification of a structure function to a minimal canonical form and the 
calculation of this canonical form. 
Closing this thesis, we wish to say that our approach to dynamic safety analysis 
contributes to solving some of the problems encountered in the application of similar 
techniques. This potentially could have a positive impact whether in the industry, where 
the generation of fault trees from SMs has been applied to Altarica models (in some 
Airbus projects for instance), or in the research domain like with AADL models. 
Moreover, the SM conversion algorithm that we developed, in theory, could enable its 
application in large and complex systems. In this context, we have presented in chapter 5 
a method for the compositional synthesis of TFTs from SMs, which could improve the 
scalability of the application of this algorithm; also we have carried out two case 
studies
107
 of significant complexity and demonstrated in principle both the feasibility and 
value of the approach. However, a conclusive evaluation of the scalability of our 
approach could only be achieved in a much wider and more realistic context of 
application. 
                                                     
107
 See chapter 5 (section 5.3) and chapter 6. 
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Appendices 
 
A — 1. HiP-HOPS Fault trees displayed using Isograph FaultTree+ 
Figure A — 1 represents the fault trees synthesised by HiP-HOPS (as those of 
Figure 2—12), but displayed using the editor of the tool Isograph FaultTree+. 
 
 
Figure A — 1. HiP-HOPS synthesised fault tree displayed using FaultTree+ 
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A — 2. Outcome of HiP-HOPS Cut-set calculator 
Figure A — 2 describes three cut-sets of order one and one cut-set of order two 
— i.e., a result of the HiP-HOPS analysis of the failure annotations of the model 
described in Figure 2—11. 
 
Figure A — 2. Cut-sets determined by HiP-HOPS for the omission on output y 
of Subsystem2 
A — 3. A HiP-HOPS FMEA table showing the further effects of the 
failure modes 
Figure A — 3 shows the further effect of a failure of, e.g., component F of 
Subsystem2 — i.e., an omission on the output of Subsystem2, but with a contributing 
failure of component P (i.e., FailedP).  
 
 
Figure A — 3. Fragment of an FMEA table synthesised by HiP-HOPS (a further 
effects view) 
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A — 4. AADL error model with input / output propagation  
 
Figure A — 4. AADL SM for a component with an input-output deviation 
 
 
Table A — 1. AADL textual description of a component SM propagating an input / 
output deviation 
Declaration Implementation 
error model Example2 
features 
ON: initial error state; 
OFF: error state; 
Fail, Repair: error event; 
Deviation: in out error propagation 
 {Occurrence => fixed 0.8}; 
end Example2; 
 
error model implementation Example2.basic 
transitions 
ON- [Fail] ->OFF; 
OFF- [out Deviation] ->OFF; 
OFF- [Repair] ->ON; 
ON- [in Deviation] ->OFF; 
Properties 
Occurrence => poisson 1.0e-3 applies to Fail; 
Occurrence => poisson 1.0e-4 applies to Repair; 
end Example2.basic; 
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A — 5. Optimisation example of a Markov model 
 
 
Figure A — 5. A reducible Markov model 
 
A, B and C are the three components of the system with the failure rates A, B 
and C respectively (see Figure A — 5). The application of the conversion algorithm (see 
chapter 4) on the Markov model of the figure gives the following failure expression: 
“Total Failure” = A|C|B +  (1) 
 A.B|A.C|A|B +  (2) 
 A|B.C|A|B +   (3) 
 A.C|A.B|C|A +    (4) 
 A|C.B|C|A   (5) 
where (for the sake of clarity) A, B and C represent the failure events assigned with the 
rates A, B and C respectively.  
Now, by using the temporal law Y.X|Y  X<Y then by redundancy elimination we have: 
Cut-sequence (2)  B<A.C<A.C<B  C<B<A 
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Cut-sequence (3)  A|B.C<A.C|B  A|B.C<A 
Cut-sequence (4)  C<A.B<C.B<A  B<C<A 
Cut-sequence (5)  A|C.B<A.B|C  A|C.B<A 
Then, by expansion we have: 
Cut-sequence (1)  A<B<C + A<C<B + A<B.A|C + A<C.A|B + A|C|B 
Cut-sequence (3)  C<A<B + A|B.C<A 
Thus, we have: 
“Total Failure” = A<B<C +  (1.1)  
 A<C<B +   (1.2) 
 A<B.A|C +   (1.3) 
 A<C.A|B +   (1.4) 
 A|C|B +   (1.5) 
 C<B<A +   (2) 
 C<A<B +   (3.1) 
 A|B.C<A +  (3.2) 
 B<C<A +   (4) 
 A|C.B<A  (5) 
 
Similarly, we can apply the expansion law to (5) s.t.: 
(5)  B<A<C + A|C.B<A 
Thus, we now have: 
“Total Failure” = A<B<C +  (1.1)  
 A<C<B +   (1.2) 
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 A<B.A|C +   (1.3) 
 A<C.A|B +   (1.4) 
 A|C|B +   (1.5) 
 C<B<A +   (2) 
 C<A<B +   (3.1) 
 A|B.C<A +  (3.2) 
 B<C<A +   (4) 
 B<A<C +  (5.1) 
 A|C.B<A  (5.2) 
The expanded cut-sequences show that the occurrences of B and C, both after A or before 
A and in any order between them, or either B or C occurs before A and the other one after 
A, or either B or C occurs alone and irrespective of its order with A, or simply the two 
(i.e., B and C) do not occur; all these compose the “Total Failure” expression. Therefore, 
the occurrences of B and C are completely irrelevant and the “Total Failure” expression 
can simply be minimised to A such that: 
“Total Failure” = A. 
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A — 6. Markov solutions for the PS (before and after optimisation) 
We present in this appendix the two Markov models for the PS (before and after 
optimisation) and show that the reduced Model preserves the quantitative result which 
corresponds to the “Total Failure” state. For the sake of clarity, the states of the Markov 
model of the PS (presented in chapter 4 section 4.4) are numbered in Figure A — 6. This 
also helps to better link the states to their corresponding probabilities. The meanings of 
the transition labels and the state numbers appearing in the figure are as follows: 
λA, λB and λS are failure rates for A, B and S resp. 
State 1 corresponds to the state A B S (system functioning with A, none is failed) 
State 2 corresponds to the state X B S (system functioning with B, only A is failed) 
State 3 corresponds to the state A B X (system functioning with A, only S is failed) 
State 4 corresponds to the state A X S (system functioning with A, only B is failed) 
State 5 corresponds to the state X B X (system functioning with B, both A and S are 
failed) 
State 6 corresponds to the state A X X (system functioning with A, both B and S are 
failed) 
State 7 corresponds to the total failure state. 
 
Figure A — 6. Markov model of the PS (before optimisation) 
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The quantitative results provided by the Markov solution of the model before 
optimisation are given by solving the following differential equations: 
 
  
 P1(t) = – (A+B+S) P1(t) 
 
  
 P2(t) = A P1(t) – (S+B) P2(t) 
 
  
 P3(t) = S P1(t) – (A+B) P3(t) 
 
  
 P4(t) = B P1(t) – (A+S) P4(t) 
 
  
 P5(t) = S P2(t) – B P5(t) 
 
  
 P6(t) = B P3(t) + S P4(t) – A P6(t) 
 
  
 P7(t) = B (P5(t) + P2(t)) + A (P3(t) + P4(t) + P6(t)) 
The solution of the differential equations is given by: 
P1(t) =  –          
P2(t) =  –       –  –           
P3(t) =  –       –  –           
P4(t) =  –       –  –           
P5(t) = 
 
    
 –   + 
 
    
 –         –  –         
P6(t) = –         –  –       –  –       +  –     
P7(t) = 
 
    
 –         – 
 
    
 –   –  –   + 1  (total failure probability) 
Figure A — 7 represents an optimised Markov model for the PS. State 1 is a state 
in which the components A, B and S are all OK, and the states 2, 3 and 4 represent states 
of the system in which A has failed, S has failed or B has failed, respectively. State 5 is 
the total failure state of the system. 
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Figure A — 7. Markov model of the PS (after optimisation) 
The quantitative results provided by the corresponding Markov solution are given by 
solving the differential equations shown next. 
 
  
 P1(t) = – (A+B+S) P1(t) 
 
  
 P2(t) = A P1(t) – B P2(t) 
 
  
 P3(t) = S P1(t) – A P3(t) 
 
  
 P4(t) = B P1(t) – A P4(t) 
 
  
 P5(t) = B P2(t) + A P3(t) + A P4(t) 
The solution of the differential equations is given by: 
P1(t) =  –          
P2(t) = 
 
    
 –   – 
 
    
 –           
P3(t) = 
 
    
 –   – 
 
    
 –           
P4(t) = 
 
    
 –   – 
 
    
 –           
P5(t) = 
 
    
 –         – 
 
    
 –   –  –   + 1  (total failure probability) 
P5(t) is the same as the probabilistic result P7(t) of the total failure (state 7) in the model 
before optimisation. 
